Usurping the political space

“It is not the liberties we have but the liberties we take that cause all the trouble.” Anon

As he is wont to do, Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi triggered another quarrel when he called for the banning of ethnic and religious organizations on the grounds that they inhibit the growth of an all-inclusive political process, threaten national unity and heighten the state of insecurity in the nation. He said organizations such as the Jamaatu Nasril Islam (JNI), and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) which claim to represent Nigerian Muslims and Christians, as well as others such as the Aferifere, Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Ohaneze Ndi’Igbo are patently political, contrary to their claims. He said their existence offends the constitution which demands that government must promote associations that cut across ethno-religious divisions. Leaders who exploit ethno-religious differences fuel insecurity, such as the insurgency ravaging the north, he insists.

Even as he spoke, Sanusi must have known that government has neither the legal right nor the political will to move against these groups. They do not offend the constitution, and they are central building blocks of much of the powers of the ruling elite. They are creations of a political process which has fed on poison that has stunted its growth. It cannot wean itself of the addiction, and it cannot destroy it. It could turn it into a non-poisonous and nourishing asset, but leaders who rode to power on its back do not have the will or the capacity to do so.

Sanusi got what he apparently wanted, which was to trigger a national discourse on these monstrosities which have taken center stage in our political system. Virtually all of them repudiated his claims that they do more harm than good. They insist that they are informed by the need to protect special interests, they are protected by constitutional guarantees for freedom of association, and many say they are victims of violence and insecurity, and not its causes or champions.

No one would have expected anything less from all these organizations. But then no one would be impressed by their professions of innocence either. The recent image of President Jonathan kneeling before Pastor Adeboye of the RCCG, a repeat of an earlier pilgrimage he made in the build-up to the 2011 elections is still fresh in memory. The President himself said prayers gave him victory, and his penchant for making major policy statements from pulpits have radically improved the standing of the church in the political terrain. The Sultan’s recent salvo against politicians who are either unwilling or unable to act on advise on the insurgency ravaging the north is still vibrating. This is the symbolic head of Nigerian Muslims speaking, the head criticised by many Muslims as being too friendly to a government hostile or indifferent to Muslim interests on the one hand, and repudiated by the JASLIWAJ (a.k.a Boko Haram). He heads the JNI which insists that it is the vanguard of Nigerian muslims. He sits with the President of CAN and with other clerics and traditional rulers in the government-funded Nigeria Inter-Religions Council (NIREC) to put out joint statements, which are promptly negated by members when they leave the comfortable surroundings of meeting chambers.

The JNI and CAN are actually harmless creatures. The real action lies with individual what clerics, which they cannot control. Pastor Oritsejafor alone brings the roof down when he thunders in defence of President Jonathan; or when he threatens revenge and retribution when churches are attacked. Bishop Kukah’s homily at late Governor Yakowa funeral stands out as evidence that every inch of our political system is nurtured by religious sentiments. The reaction of Shiekh Ahmad Gummi and other Muslims to that homily merely confirms the central position of faith-based politics in the land.

This, perhaps, is where the real value of Sanusi’s provocation lies. It does no good condemning him or defending organizations which respond to massive stimulus, or create their own, owing to weaknesses in the political system. The most fundamental of those weaknesses is the failure to acknowledge that the Nigerian nation is made of citizens who are Muslims or Christians, and a few who think being either is a problem. Faith is a very important issue in the lives of the vast majority of Nigerians, yet our constitution merely acknowledges that we are a multi-religious and multi-ethnic state which must operate by involving all faiths and ethnic groups in its institutions and operation. Tensions exist between religious values such as personal integrity, honesty, justice, service, humility and sacrifice which are found in all the major religions, and nebulous provisions in the constitution which ape them.

A political system which demands expenditure of hundreds of millions of Naira and massive use of violence to secure an elective office, and encourages virtual looting of the public treasury in the end will stand condemned by all the basic values of Islam and Christianity. Impunity exist because there is neither the fear of man-made laws, nor those of God and the hereafter. The disconnect between core religious values and the political system is complete: you cannot win an election, or run a successful business in Nigeria if you insist on remaining strictly within the bounds of your faith.

So leaders who have risen to power on the back of un-belief turn around and create their own belief systems. They invest heavily in faith-based activities; they patronize clerics who in turn create political followership for them. They create falsehoods that the fortunes of Christians or Muslims will be better or worse depending on the faith of the leader. If this does not happen instantly, it is because the “other” side is frustrating the leader’s divine calling to deliver.

The problem is that the people are no fools. They remain resolutely Muslim or Christian, and most can see the caricature which is made of their faith by leaders. Many ask for forgiveness as they chase crumbs. Others take up arms, denouncing the entire edifice. Majority leave matters to God, in whose name their resources are plundered, and they watch as leaders are blessed and anointed by clerics who fly their own planes.

Faith-based organizations will continue to wax stronger because they exploit a major vacuum in our political system. In a multi-religious society where political leaders exploit faith and run a winner-takes-all system, religion provides the fuel which takes leaders to power; and alienates many citizens who feel that their faith is a liability in the estimation of leaders. Religious leaders have huge powers and little responsibility. Those are the powers Sanusi wants to see taken away from then. It won’t happen. Even if you can ban them, faith will continue to play a major role in Nigerian politics.

The limitations of the political system which allows ethno-religious bodies to play important roles are to be found in the failure of a leadership to emerge which will lead with vision, justice and competence, whether the leader is Muslim or Christian, Gbagi or Urhobo. The political system needs to expand and subordinate these particularistic tendencies, and gradually establish a threshold where citizenry is distinctly a value equally shared, even though faith and ethnicity differ. It is important that leaders recognize that Islam and Christianity are offended by corruption and impunity, and if they can be fair and just to all citizens irrespective of faith or tongue, the damaging tendency to think we have to have one of our own in office will be curtailed. Corruption is at the heart of why fringe groups are taking central positions in our politics. Religious leaders and ethnic champions corrupt the political process by giving it false legitimacy; and are in turn corrupted by a political system which makes them its vehicles. What the nation needs are more intimate linkages between our religious and cultural values which define leadership and responsibility, and the operations of our governance structures and institutions.

The frontline gets wider

“The man who burns down his grains store must know where ash is expensive” Hausa Proverb

On the day the Senate gave approval for Nigerian soldiers and airmen to join others from France, a few West African countries and Malian troops to fight a rebellion in Mali, the crisis in that country escalated. French planes strafed rebel positions. Europeans kidnapped by allies of the Malian rebels were killed along with their kidnappers in an attack by Algerian troops. President Jonathan flew out to attend a Summit on the crisis, and the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Azubuike Ihejirika revealed that some of the insurgents in Nigeria under the generic cover of the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (a.k.a. Boko Haram) have received training in Mali. The death of European civilian hostages in the process of being rescued by Algerian troops will raise public awareness in Europe over a new frontline which is likely to suck in not just France, but Europe in possibly a long-drawn conflict with massive potentials for collateral damage.

Mali will be an active theater of war in the next few weeks, months, or years. The rebels may be routed by the superior weaponry and intelligence of the African International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in a matter of weeks, or the forces of Africa and Europe could be tied down in a prolonged conflict with an enemy that has roots and support in many neighbouring countries. If the intelligence suggests that the military defeat of a group of two to three thousand men under arms will be the end of this problem, it had better be very good intelligence indeed. If it suggests the possibility of the defeat and dispersal of an armed group, a radical improvement in the capacity of the Malian army in the north, a sustained and ultimately successful campaign of AL-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), and a marked improvement in the capacities of the basic institutions of the Malian state to prevent collapse, it should also foresee a prolonged engagement by all the parties currently in Mali.

It is important that this strategic intervention is informed by quality intelligence and strong strong political will to succeed, for a number of reasons. First, Mali represents the visible evidence of a problem which had built up over the last few years, feeding partly on local and age-long grievances, and partly on the massive restiveness among the Muslim population in Asia Middle East and Africa that had much to do with the US, NATO countries and Israel. It is vital that the linkages between pockets of activities in muslim activities are understood, because they represent a challenge to any strategy which seeks piecemeal solutions. Second, the terrain and the context of this engagement will be decisive in the manner it plays out. France may believe that it has mastered the Sahara owing to long-term preparations and commitments, but it is very doubtful if it can sustain a prolonged war against natives who are likely to fight as guerillas once the opening skirmishes are over. African troops fighting in a desert environment may be able to achieve short-term objectives, but political will of leaders and availability resourses may be difficult to sustain in a war that goes beyond a few months.

Thirdly, every one of Mali’s six neighbours is vulnerable to collateral damage. A quick and decisive military victory may give the impression of a solution, but in Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Libya and one or two other African countries, it will take more than the defeat of the Malian rebels to obliterate the incipient or active resistance, or the intricate linkages which bind much of the activities of insurgencies or rebellions, or their roots. A good appreciation of what makes the Sahel region and northern reaches of West Africa fertile breeding grounds for instability and organized violence needs to be built. The Sahara is an intimidating asset and liability even to the communities which have lived for centuries in it, but it cannot, on that account alone, explain why it is currently the focus of such intense activities that threaten the sovereignty or even survival of many countries in or around it, and by its own estimation, the strategic interests of the US and its European allies. A defense strategy that limits the vulnerability of nations and interest to the unique challenges of the vast Sahara must evolve out of this adventure, or if will merely fuel more instability.

There is yet another potential danger which needs to be addressed by this initiative. Containing rebel activities in Mali could trigger more hostile activities against governments and western interests in the region. The fragility of states such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad and even the Nigerian state (which is being severely challenged by a home-grown insurgency) will be a major factor in evolving a broad strategy. The worst outcome of a containment strategy which merely limits itself to rolling back the rebels in Mali will be the intensification of violence in countries and areas where it has already taken root. Nigeria, Algeria and Libya are particularly vulnerable, and all countries bordering them or which provide routes or shelters will remain targets of insurgencies and rebellions. Mali itself is particularly vulnerable, and the relatively-easy collapse of the democratically-elected government, as well as the present role of the military need to be addressed.

There will be legitimate expectations that the combined forces of Europe and West Africa will defeat the northern rebel army in Mail. It will also be reasonable to expect that some far-reaching steps will be taken to address Tuareg grievances and integrate than into the political process in Mail in the longer term. By the same token, it should be expected that AQIM and its related interests will fight back. If the assertions that Ansar Al-Din and some elements of AQIM are already active in Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Niger, Algeria and Libya are valid, there will have to be initiatives by all these countries to deal with their threats as they manifest locally. While they will need to collaborate to improve defense of borders and movements of small arms and sophisticated weapons in the vast Sahara, strong political will has to be deployed behind finding the roots of threats, and solutions to them.

For Nigeria, the irony would not have been lost that it is sending over 1000 troops to Mali at a time when its own forces are being pinned down in streets and highways by an illusive insurgency. Nigeria is offering the lives and limbs of its soldiers to be part of a grand strategy to bring peace and stability to Mali, at a time when a large chunk of its own territory has become an active frontline. The military admitted that soldiers on their way to Kaduna to join others flying to Mali were attacked in Kogi State, with fatalities. The revered Emir of Kano was attacked in broad daylight, again with fatalities. These events may or may not have any links with Nigeria’s role in Mali, but it will be important not to assume that there are no connections.

Nigeria’s contribution to rolling back a rebellion in Mali will be explained in terms of its strategic national interests. This will make sense in the light of information that many members of the insurgency have received training in Mali. These trained people will in turn attack the Nigerian state and population. A relatively symbolic contribution to a West African and European initiative to limit the incursion of militant Islam in the Sahel and Maghreb may escalate the Nigerian problem. This is all the more reason why the Jonathan administration should be more active in the search for options in the manner it relates to this insurgency. Just about everyone who has looked at this problem critically says that it has deep roots in bad governance, poverty and unresolved grievances. The modus operandi of the security agencies is also creating far more enemies than friends.

France and a few European countries, with US intelligence, have committed themselves to a campaign to roll back a rebellion, which may achieve short-term goals, but is uncertain in terms of the possibility of finding long-term solutions. Virtually all the West African nations contributing troops are doing so out of the obligation to put out a fire in a fellow ECOWAS member’s country, but they are acutely aware that it could flare up in their own backyard. If the campaign is short, sharp and effective, they would congratulate themselves. If, however, it is prolonged by the nature of the enemy, or the appearance that Europe and the US want to occupy Mali for an extended period and possibly tap into its fabled wealth in mineral resources, then political support will be difficult to sustain behind this campaign. Nigeria needs to assess its role in this campaign very carefully, and take steps to limit its damage at home. We do not want to be on the losing side in Mali, and fail to win the battle in Nigeria.

Speaking in tongues

“A friend is one who has the same enemies you have.” Abraham Lincoln

At the special interdemonical church service held to mark this year’s Armed Forces Remembrance Day in Abuja, President Jonathan appealed to ‘saboteurs’ in his administration to stop leaking security secrets to the Boko Haram sect. He was reported to have said, “the saboteurs in government condoning terrorism by Boko Haram, you do not love this nation. My question to our Armed Forces and other security outfits is what, what are you building? Will what you are building build or destroy the nation? You are supposed to build the nation wherever you go.” The president also mentioned a few of the usual sentiments associated with the occasion, such as the indivisibility of Nigeria and the increasing tendency for politicians to use the threats of secession as a political tool.

Even making allowances for the fact President Jonathan does make statements which require many more statements to clarify or limit damage, the allusion to saboteurs in the fight against the insurgency must raise more than eyebrows. The President had said last year that he had Boko Haram moles in his administration, a statement that shocked a nation in the grip of a raging war with a militant insurgency. It must also have made many people around the president squirm at the thought that they shared a breakfast with a mole, or that they could be the suspected moles. This does not do much good to morale or team spirit.

It may be something in spiritual environments that encourages statements which confound the nation by highly-placed persons, because the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Saad Abubakar chose a meeting involving traditional rulers and senior clerics in Kaduna two days ago to say that they have advised President Jonathan and northern governors on how the violence in the North can be contained, but their advise has been ignored. He also blamed politicians for both facilitating the growth of the insurgency, and being masterminds of the violence initially blamed on the Boko Haram sect. “So many times” the Sultan said, “politicians are arrested as masterminds of killings which have been earlier on attributed to Boko Haram. What is Boko Haram. I want to ask, who are members of the Boko Haram?” In spite of the stinging indictment of the presidency and northern governors by the Sultan, the chairman of the Northern Governors’ Forum Committee on Reconciliation, Healing and Security, Ambassador Zakari Ibrahim says the committee has been assured by the governors that they will implement its recommendations, which will be fair and just.

There is more. The Northern Elders Forum under the chairmanship of Danmasanin Kano, Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule met last week, seven months after submitting a detailed document complete with suggestions on dealing with the problems of insecurity and poverty in the North to President Jonathan. They told an assemblage of northern political groups and the media that they have heard nothing from the president since that widely-covered and historic visit. The northern governors have not met with them either, but they have set up their own committee, the same committee the Sultan informed politicians and leaders are not doing enough to bring a solution to the problem. There are a few more evidences of worrying disarray in the manner this problem is being managed or reported. You hear today about arrests of kingpins, and then a few more assassinations and firefights on a daily basis. Is the threat abetting, or changing its form?

Citizens looking for clues that the war against the raging violence in the North is being won or lost will find the signals being sent out by people who should make a difference either way most discouraging. If there are, as the President says, moles in the security services who provide information and intelligence to the insurgents, the president chose the wrong avenue and the wrong mode of dealing with them. The existence of moles is a very serious threat, and in most instances it is handled in a very decisive and professional manner. This does not include announcing their presence from a pulpit on an occasion designed to celebrate the patriotism and commitment of the Armed Forces. If the Sultan and leading clerics and traditional rulers have given actionable clues and recommendations to the president and governors which have been ignored, this will fuel the speculation that government is not interested in bringing this extremely damaging insurgency to an end. If the recommendations of members of the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) were not practical or valuable, government should say so. The members of the Council themselves should own up to some play to galleries: they say one thing as members of NIREC, and often quite the opposite when they speak to people of their own faith. Could this explain why the president and governors do not take them seriously?

The Sultan’s lament that politicians are responsible for starting this fire, and that “whatever is happening in the North is our own doing because we did not play or do what we are supposed to do” is one that needs very careful consideration. Apart from being an indictment of leaders, it suggests the possibility that the solution to this problem can only be found if Northern leaders generate sufficient political will and create a platform with sufficient clout and credibility to deal with it. This is the option that should be explored by the many groups, committees and initiatives to address the problem by Northerners. The Northern Elders Forum, Governors, Groups and leading clerics can, together, make a real difference in the security, economy and poverty of the North. But they have to act now, because with 2015 approaching, every problem which weakens the north will be made worse.

Obasanjo here, Obasanjo there

“A rattlesnake that doesn’t bite teaches you nothing.” J. West

At the zenith of his power, President Obasanjo was credited with the quip that you should check your watch every time President Ibrahim Babangida said good morning to you. True or not, the point was to emphasize how wily or deceptive Babangida had become. Chances are that Babangida would have heard of the popularized caution, and it is quite possible that he took it in his stride. After all, the leaders who hold out all their cards for all and sundry to see are soon run out of the game. These days, a new caution is in the making. It may come out in any form, but it will basically suggest that the best political strategies are cleared only when you know where President Obasanjo’s camp is. If you do not build him into your calculations, you could suffer a damaging ambush. If you underrate his strength, your assault or defence could be shredded to smitherings. If you overate his power, you could end up misallocating resources and designing the wrong strategy for the right battles.

The politician in President Obasanjo must be relishing all this attention. And why not? Life has been kind to Obasanjo. He was part of a military that shot itself into power in 1975. When another set of coup plotters shot dead his boss, Murtala Mohammed, he was the principal beneficiary, becoming the Head of State. He resisted the pressure to submit to ethnic pressure by handing over the President Shagari in 1979, becoming a pariah among Yoruba, and a hero in the North.

When he fell foul of a more intolerant Sani Abacha, he was promptly slapped with a treason trial and sentenced to death. His international connections saved his neck from the noose, and God intervened and took away Abacha. The military released Obasanjo, dusted him up and presented him as its candidate for the Presidency in 1999. A North which had been placed on the defensive over the aborted 1992 elections saw in an Obasanjo presidency, a win-win situation. Yoruba people sulked and turned their backs to him. The nation moved on, under the leadership of a man with a personality that could barely be accommodated by a fragile democratic system. With every one of his eight years as President Obasanjo grew in confidence that the President should run the government and the party exactly in his own image. Huge powers and massive resources give the Nigerian President awesome opportunities to create wealthy people, wreck political careers, make bold policies even against resistance by the legislature, and abandon them at will. Obasanjo learnt quickly that a President needed to have the legislature in his pocket; the party at his beck and call, and a war chest to fight elections and the opposition.

But eight years is all the constitution allows the President, no matter how powerful. In those eight years, with such awesome powers, he must have stepped on many toes; initiated many policies; kick-started many political careers and built up many rich and powerful people, all of whom could suffer massive setbacks when he is no more in power. Above all, he would have become hooked on the power to influence events, and the prospect of irrelevance in the face of legions of enemies who would want to rub his face in it would spur on even people with weaker personalities than Obasanjo’s.

And so a larger-than-life personality is unleashed on the political terrain who haunts it at every turn. Years out of power, Obasanjo’s uncanny capacity to re-invent himself is being played out even as we speak. One day after encomiums were poured on him in far away USA during the inauguration of the new Africa Institute at Valparaiso University, Indiana, the former vice-presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Pastor Tunde Bakare told his congregation that President Obasanjo is responsible for just about everything bad in Nigeria today. He said Obasanjo imposed a weak and sickly Yar’Adua, squandered the nation’s resources, promoted corruption and turned Nigeria into a makeshift nation without vision or goal.

Pastor Bakare’s swipe from the opposition merely repeats everything that has been said about Obasanjo, and it is unlikely to even generate an acknowledgement or a response from a man neck-deep in other battles in his own party. The falling out with President Jonathan is now out in the open, in spite of spirited efforts to paper them over. The manouvers to determine who has the final say over 2015 are very visible. The messy fights over the Adamawa State Executive of the PDP; the fight over the chairmanship of the Board of Trustees of the PDP and the visible efforts to build an anti-Jonathan northern front in the PDP by Obasanjo are only some of the more obvious signs that Obasanjo is determined to remain firmly at the heart of Nigerian politics.

This determination will not go unchallenged. President Jonathan’s political future hangs on it. Governors will lose or gain power depending on who ultimately loses out. These two will split the right party down the middle, before either huge resources, political clout and incumbency win, or it loses to opportunism and the capacity to exploit weaknesses of President Jonathan’s administration and ineffective control over the PDP. Northern governors in particular will be key in deciding the outcome of this epic battle, and both Presidents are likely to sap their energies and exploit their weaknesses as well.

The Obasanjo phenomenon is a complex one. In a nation which desperately needs to build and strengthen its institutions and democratic values, the dominance of powerful individuals like Obasanjo is a major liability. President Jonathan needs to stamp his authority on his administration and the party, yet much of the space is taken up by relics from a past he himself had benefitted from. A relatively young President is surrounded by geriatrics who have made a life career of politics, all of whom will do much more damage to him in opposition, than benefit him if they are part of his team.  He is being torn by the need to focus on governance threatened by insecurity, violent crimes and corruption on the one hand, and the temptations to play the 2015 game. His opposition, both within the party and outside it, will exploit his weaknesses in both areas. His own party, the PDP will be the battlefield, and the opening skirmishes being witnessed are vital to his position both in governance and in the political field.

The continuing influence of President Obasanjo may be testimony to the resilience of a personal character, but it reflects very poorly on the PDP. Its two most outstanding features are that it has been in power at the center and much of the states since 1999; and its character has been essentially defined by one man: Obasanjo. It has never outgrown its basic problems, and it does not appear on the threshold of a revolution that will transform it from a party of a powerful man or handful of men, to a party which retains power because it is genuinely elected by millions of loyal party men and women. If, in addition to exposing the weaknesses of the Jonathan administration, the opposition takes it upon itself to lampoon Obasanjo as well, its poor record of denting the PDP’s stranglehold on the nation will be that much more challenged. President Obasanjo is likely to be a constant factor in Nigerian politics in the near future. Whether that turns out to be for better or worse depends largely on whether those who wield power today, and those who want to replace them, intend to change the way the game has been played, or submit to the old way of doing things.