SHUTTING DOWN MAIDUGURI

On Thursday, 7^th of July 2011, the Borno State Government announced that it has outlawed the use of commercial or private motorcycles in Maiduguri and the neighbouring Jere Local Government Area. The decision to ban the use of motorcycles is part of the efforts the government and security agencies to curtail the rising wave of violence in the State, which in the last few weeks had reached unprecedented levels. The new Governor of Borno State, Alhaji Kassim Shettima acknowledged that the decision will cause serious problems for the people of Maiduguri and its environs, and appealed to the people to bear with the government which is planning to release 7, 000 tricycles, known as keke NAPEP into the streets for use by the public. He said the State Government already has 1, 680 of the tricycles to release immediately, and will source for the balance very soon. In addition, the State Government would buy 100 new buses for intra-city transportation next week.

          The immediate result of the announced ban on motorcycles which took effect mid afternoon on Thursday was that major streets in Maiduguri became virtually empty. This was of course, the most predictable outcome, since motorcycles are the most popular mode of transportation, and even private owners would be afraid to use it in view of the tense security situation and the blanket ban. Citizens had to trek for various distances as motorcycles were taken off the roads, in a city which had already placed a 6pm to 6am ban on motorcycles. Maiduguri town had been under a virtual self-imposed curfew in the last few months, as citizens stayed indoors in the evenings and nights, so as to be safe from attacks by members of the Yusufiyya Movement. Securitymen under the Joint Task Force had been attacked many times, and they have in turn intensified their crackdown, principally by leaning hard on the local population in their search for their elusive attackers. The public has been caught in the middle of a vicious campaign, with people who live in, and use the community as shield to launch attacks on security personnel and selected civilian targets, public places and places of worship on the one hand, and security personnel who are more and more desperate to contain them. The Yusufiyya Movement or Boko Haram, is putting the public under tremendous pressure and stress, including vulnerability to attacks when innocent people happen to be passing by, or in the wrong place at the wrong time.  The Joint Task Force is also leaning very hard on a community it apparently believes knows more of the identity, movement, plans and attacks of the enemy that it reveals. The more intense the conflict becomes, the more the public will be squeezed between the Yusufiyya Movement and the Joint Task Force. The ban on the use of motorcycles in Maiduguri is just one instance in which the people of Maiduguri and environs will suffer more and more as fight intensifies.

          The strategy being adopted by the Government of Borno State and the Joint Task Force will be limited in terms of its impact, unless it is supported by good intelligence and an intensification of initiatives to identify and engage the leadership of the Movement. Heavy-handed responses which involve some physical discomfort and searches in homes of citizens may yield some suspects and clues, but they also generate serious hostility from the public. On the other hand, it will be unreasonable and unrealistic not to expect the security agencies to pursue suspects, to mount roadblocks, or to insist on some other measures which will inconvenience the public. But a prolonged siege which exposes the public to all manner of hardship, and which produces little evidence that it is winning the battle will make the security agents to lose the battle of the hearts and minds of the community. The environment will be even more hostile for the security personnel, and it will be that much more difficult to acquire the type of solid and valuable security and political intelligence needed to deal with this very serious problem.

          There is evidence that many of the people who represented targets for members of the Yusufiyya Movement recognise the fact that rendering apologies to them will reduce the hostility of the group. The former Governors of Borno and Gombe States and the Governor of Bauchi State have publicly apologised to the group, as it demanded, among other conditions for peace. The security agencies also appear to recognise the fact that force alone will not defeat the movement, and last week the State Security Service said that suspect members of the Movement under arrest and interrogation will not be prosecuted, in pursuit of President Jonathan’s stick and carrot approach. Yet the attacks by the movement are increasing daily in and around Maiduguri. Other citizens in Abuja, and in Niger and Kaduna States are undergoing harrowing experiences in the name of security precautions. The movement has not shown any willingness to stop its attacks, or engage the government in a dialogue or negotiation. On the contrary, there appears to be more than one group under the movement, and the sphere of conflict appears to be widening.

          The people of Maiduguri and its neighbours have paid a huge price for the activities of the Yusufiyya Movement. Between the unceasing attacks of members of this movement and security personnel who use every means to limit the damage of the attacks and expose the members, innocent citizens have suffered. Now the total ban on the use of motorcycles in Maiduguri will compound the problem, and it is doubtful if relief will come as early as the government is promising. Unless there is a radical improvement in intelligence gathering and in efforts to find political solutions to the problem of the Yusufiyya Movement, life in Maiduguri and its neighbouring areas will be intolerable. This may be what the Movement actually wants, and more and more Nigerians will live a garrisoned existence far beyond the neighbourhood of Maiduguri. Government needs to examine its strategy to deal with this problem before it creates wider areas of conflict as a result of the application of naked force as a containment measure.