Tuesday, January 29, 2013

No agreement today



“The optimist proclaims that we live in the best of all possible worlds; and the pessimist fears this is true.” J. B. Cabell

The title above is part of a chorus of song by the late legend, Fela. The full chorus was “no agreement today, no agreement tomorrow”. It was his peculiar take on dissent against a repressive military regime. It seems a fitting title for the noisy debates about the state of the nation and its future, which was aptly captured by the 10th Daily Trust Dialogue held last week. The organizers could not have chosen a better set of speakers to give vent to the discordance which characterizes discussions about the nation, particularly in view of the impending centenary of the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates back in 1914. The Dialogue lived up to its billing as a forum which throws up the bowels of the nation, and reminds Nigerians that they have a lot more questions than answers. This year’s Dialogue raised voices to such a pitch that you would have been forgiven if you thought it was a quarrel.

Should Nigerians worry that 100 years after European colonial interests threw together a motley of over two hundred ethnic groups and two of the world’s largest religions into a country, there are still questions over whether we can rightly claim to be a nation? Should we celebrate that historic decision with pomp and aplomb, or should we wail in regret over it? Ms Ann Kie Briggs, who enjoys the image of champion of the people of the Niger Delta, said far from celebrating, we should bow our heads in shame for failing to utilize the potential to build a nation that is founded on justice. Justice, however, will be evident only when oil and gas resources from the land in oil producing states, and the waters of the federal government of Nigeria are distributed in such a manner that the region lives in relative opulence. That justice is being denied her people because, President Jonathan has disappointed Nigerians with the levels of incompetence and corruption as well as a political sharing formula that is not built on current economic assets alone. Her prognosis for the survival of Nigeria was less than cheery, because the nation insists on “leadership based on numbers”, and leaders pay lip service to unity.

The lady run into Dr Sule Bello, a Bala Usman throwback who lampooned international imperialism for the state of the Nigerian nation. His rejection of the implication in Ms. Briggs’ presentation that the rest of Nigeria, particularly northerners, are responsible for the underdevelopment and degradation of the Niger Delta received a thunderous applause, although it may have received a different response if he had said this in Yenagoa or Port Harcourt.

Femi Falana raised his personal bar a bit. There will be a revolution, he insisted, agreeing with President Jonathan for a change, but only because corruption and impunity have eaten so deeply into the nation’s fabric that it could very well be the only option left for Nigerians. Hardworking and decent Nigerians are fighting for crumbs from oil wealth, when no one can say with any authority how much of the resource is produced and stolen.

When Bishop Mathew Hassan Kukah spoke last, the audience thought he would place some soothing balm on raw nerves that had been exposed by earlier speakers. He did not. His position was to step outside the fray, and attempt to arrest the panic which was set by Ms Briggs’ demand for more from those who have less; by Dr Bello’s unanswered lament over the damage of bad leaders and the specter of a western conspiracy hounding our lives; and by Mr Falana’s move-or-be-moved challenge to the leadership.

No, there will be no revolution, he said, and this nation is sitting on strong foundations to which every leader has contributed. We are too hard on ourselves and on our nation, and those who expect a perfect nation have not read history. There is a problem, however. We have been led by people who came to power by accident or force. Our leaders were never groomed, prepared and ready to lead our nation with vision and competence. This must change. Nations led by unprepared or accidental leaders lead our country as if it is an accident waiting to happen. So we question and doubt everything; and this includes those things we did well, or will do better in future.

But it wasn’t all doom and gloom. The Speaker of the House of Representatives said nation building is a difficult and often messy process, and the existence of conflicts in not in itself a bad thing. Conflicts serve as catalysts to improve the democratic process, if handled properly. The problem, however, is that Nigerian leaders very often behave as if the people owed them, rather than the other way round.

It is in the nature of Dialogues of this nature that the millions of Nigerians who gave their lives and limbs so that the nation can survive would not have had a say. The millions of little building blocks in the lives of citizens who are entirely inter-dependant as they pursue the tedium of normal existence from Katsina to Asaba, Baga to Osogbo did not have a say. Millions of young Nigerians who have little time for history, and who just want education, skills and jobs and security did not have a say. These are the building blocks of the nation, and those who think they can be ignored are mistaken. But they can be damaged and destroyed by irresponsible and incompetent leaders. At least the Dialogue last week agreed that good lenders can transform the Nigerian state, and move it beyond debates about basics such as whether it should continue to exist at all.

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Governors



“The right to be heard does not include the right to be taken seriously” Hubert Humphrey

Do State governor deserve the approbium directed at them from all informed sections of the polity? What does it feel like to be a governor and exercise the type of powers that make you at once a major source of power and patronage, and an albatross around the neck of our democracy? How did we end up creating such monstrosities, and what can the nation do about these 36 Nigerians who Chief E.K. Clark said recently represent a virtual opposition to the president, the PDP and the Nigerian people? Are the awesome powers of governors constitutional accidents, or products of a democratic process that does everything else except promote democratic values and practices?

There is a real danger that our governors could develop thicker skins from unceasing criticisms, and become even less responsive to criticisms. Their perceptions of being surrounded by opponents, enemies, a media that takes and fails to sing praises, and outright blackmailers will be compounded by the near-universal concensus that they represent everything negative about our democratic process. They are fighting a President who would love to whittle down their powers; party members who resent their frightening choke on party matters; federal legislators who come to power through their largess and patronage and then get so intoxicated by the rarified air of Abuja that they wear the toga of opposition and public opinion which portrays them as little more than guzzlers of public assets.

People who are hounded by hostile perceptions and bombarded with every criticism are the wrong people to trust with this much power. They could, as many do, retreat with all the powers they have, and run states virtually as personal estates. Shielded from prosecution by immunity clauses, with state legislators secure in their pockets, local governments as extensions of their assets, media that can be ignored, voters and a public that are relevant only around elections, with vast resources to buy clergy, community and opinion leaders and even political opposition, governors have all the potential to develop into frightful monsters. Very few of them are not at that stage already. In power they are untouchable out of they defy the laws of the land with stupendous riches.

It is important to seek an understanding over whether the situation regarding the central position of our governors is inevitable, avoidable, or necessary. Those who will make the case that it is inevitable that governors will have so much power will point to the flaw in our political system which places so much premium on public offices as sources of accumulation of personal wealth and dispensing of patronage. They will point to the weaknesses in our constitution which hands over the third tier of government, lock, stock and barrel to the second tier, the states. They will point to an untidy allocation of responsibilities and resources between federating units that gives too much underserved responsibility and resources to the center, and too much power to states without providing for effective institutional mechanisms to check them. They will point to the pervasive dominance of the PDP since 1999, and its tendency to acquire power at all cost, and run administrations which are successively worse than those that preceded them. They will point to the pivotal role of state governments in funding all parties, employing the same predatory tactics. Finally, they will point to the virtual control of governors over the amendment processes, including possible amendments that will reduce impunity and corruption.

Those who will see the status quo as avoidable will point at the military mindset which informed the constitutional provisions for an extremely powerful president and governors at state levels. They will make reference to the emergence of President Obasanjo as an extra-ordinarily powerful figure, and his influence on the manner state governors read their roles. They will draw attention to the missed opportunities during considerations for constitutional amendments to free local government councils and state assemblies and judiciary from the control of state governors, and improve the electoral process, particularly intra-party democracy.

Those who will argue that the awesome powers of governors are necessary will draw attention to the unfair allocation of powers and resources in the federal system which gives the federal government much more than it deserves or needs, and will then justify the existence of power in the office of state governors to make the best use of the resources the state has. They will argue that governors need powers which will otherwise be wasted or abused by a state legislature and local governments, so that important decisions and control of institutions responsible for policy formulation and implementation are not subverted. They will say it is easier to hold one office accountable; it is safer to trust resources in governors than to have chairmen of local councils controlling billions; and that you need power to handle security, provide rallying points for plural communities, and engineer social cohesion.

There could be, altogether, a different argument that can be made. Some people will say there is very little wrong with our constitution. What is wrong is the quality of people who operate it. They will have a lot of sympathy. The instances where state governors operate with scant respect for popular opinion or the laws of the land are many. Three or four governors have been away for months from their states, and have not taken the constitutional steps to regularize their absence. There is a state where the governor’s policy on all issues is labeled with his name; and all development projects and schools must have his name painted on rooftops. Another is being accused of spending three billion at the wedding of his daughters. Another is accused of importing a snake as a pet at the cost of millions. One has plunged his party into a serious crisis over the control of state party executives. Another is embroiled in a quarrel with a powerful Minister over President Jonathan’s record. Another is being accused of foisting a state religion. Northern governors are being collectively blasted by Nuhu Ribadu for frittering N8.3 trillion allocated to the region since 1999. Governors in the south-south are being accused of even worse abuse of the peoples’ resources. Four or five northern governors will now abandon state affairs (but not the money) effectively to pursue presidential ambitions. People in the north hold their governors collectively responsible for the state of the north today. You can go on and on.

Not much is likely to come out of the current attempt at constitutional amendments. Governors oppose some of the key issues at stake such as L.G or state legislature autonomy, and are divided over others, such as state creation or state police, or sharing of resources. This means, effectively, that much of the status quo will remain. This includes all matters related of the powers and responsibilities of governors. In fact, the basic structure of the federal system is unlikely to be affected at all. This leaves Nigerians with the only option of electing better quality of leaders into offices. Improving the quality of the electoral process will be a vital step in this direction, but even this is contingent on the disposition of governors. So it appears that you cannot do anything of value to the polity or economy with our governors; and you cannot do anything legally without them. How did the fate of our federal system come to depend on just 36 citizens?

Saturday, January 26, 2013

Scapegoating Achaba



“After we fry the fat, we see what is left”. Yoruba Proverb

Very few phenomena highlight unique class differentiations and perception in Nigeria more clearly than the ubiquitous commercial motorcyclist. If you can read this piece, chances are that you belong to the privileged group which finds the Achaba (or Okada) worker an irritating and dangerous nuisance that should be either extremely regulated, or banned altogether. You may have a car or cars, and therefore been spared the harrowing experience of surrendering your life or limbs to a young man in constant hurry to make a living, armed only with contempt for laws, rules, and those privileged to share the road with him in cars. You will be least likely to speak against the widening clampdowns on this mobile threat, even in cities like Kano and Lagos where life for majority of people will be drastically affected by it. You are the elite, and you would rather have an increase in the cost of living, than live with Achaba riders.

If, on the other hand, you are one of millions of Nigerians who make use of this necessary evil, your relative poverty will be much more compounded in areas where the only means of transport you can afford is either banned or severely restricted. You may already have suffered previous injuries or had close shaves with your rider who is impervious to pleas or fear. You have become used to having your heart in your month, and by now live with the numbing uncertainty that no trip on  commercial motorcycle is guaranteed to end safely. You are a one of the Nigerians who will be bitter at governments that provide no alternative for the Achaba, have failed to regulate it at the point when it was both necessary and possible, and are now reacting in a manner that makes life more difficult for everyone, except the elite. You are the lumpen element, and a victim of a state run by elites. Your life will be more difficult, and you will fight for the Achaba rider.

If you are an Achaba rider in areas where your lifeline is viewed as the prime source of threat to national security, or in parts of the country where state governments clamp down on you more for political reasons than for purposes of improving public safely or public welfare, you would be made even more desperate. Your life on the margins of legality and safety, hanging on an investment of less than N100,000, (quite possibly made by someone else), is about to change for the worse. If you have been banned altogether, you would have lost your only source of living. If you have been curfewed, your income is severely slashed, and you are exposed to the predatory tendencies of the police and other regulatory agencies when you attempt to stretch the curfew a bit. The return you make to the owner will be lower; your own income virtually wiped off, and the informal sector of the economy to which you provide a lifeline would have shrunk with your fortunes.

If you are one of the many governors who take decisions to curtail, regulate or ban Achaba riders, it is very likely that you would not have found the decision easy to take. If you have advisers with the courage to tell you, you would have heard that Achaba is a vital part of the economy which supports large sections of the population, provides essential services to millions as they move around, and that any measure against the service is politically sensitive. You would have heard that night time bans on Achaba will virtually wipe out night economies, and young people who live off the service are likely to be pushed into desperation, crimes or become foot soldiers of the insurgency.

It is also likely that security agencies have advised that limiting the operations of Achaba will reduce attacks on them; or on other targets. They may have provided evidence that Achaba riders are used to ferry intelligence and conduct surveillance, and they are difficult to track before, during or after attacks. The evidence may or may not be conclusive on whether partial banning, curfews or outright bans improve security, but as a decision-maker, you need to be seen to be acting in the interest of security. You may also have heard from one or two advisers that banning or regulating Achaba has never worked; is not the source of insecurity; and that the decision cannot be enforced owing to difficulties of enforcement and weaknesses of state regulatory organs.

In nations where public opinion is a vital tool of democratic governance, matters such as banning, regulating or restricting Achaba riders will be hotly debated. Politicians and policy makers will weigh the consequences of decisions very carefully. Studies into the phenomenon of a transport service which fills critical gaps and endangers millions of lives would have been undertaken to support policies. Major stakeholders, (who are basically the relatively poorer citizens, but by far the largest majority) and the Achaba riders, mechanics, operators of the large informal sectors of the economy, security agencies, health managers, youth groups, civil society organizations and community elders would all have had a say in the matter. Studies would have been conducted to establish how and why the motorcycle has become such as vital element in our society and economy; and indices on demographic changes, urbanization and changes in the structures of the national economy would all have been assessed. Hearings may have been held by legislators, where experts and advocates would have testified on what the Achaba represents.

But we are not one of such countries. Achaba riders and related stakeholders are only useful around election times. We are the type of countries which are perennially on the defensive, and our decision-making is almost always aimed at dealing retroactively with problems that have become intractable. So Lagos State government comes down heavily on Achaba ostensibly as part of its social and environmental sanitizing campaign, but in reality as a measure to create the false image of a state which has moved beyond the need for the motorcycle taxi. Governor Fashola will not be happy to hear the complaint that his decision will be that much more difficult to implement if the majority of the Achaba (Okada) riders in Lagos come from his state; or that the service will resurface sooner than later, because it is need-driven.

Now Kano State government orders suspension of the service in Kano city and environs until they go through a registration exercise, a few days after the Emir of Kano survived a day-light assassination attempt. It admits it acted on recommendations by security agents. Perhaps the security agents told the Kano State government something new or specifically related to the attempted assassination of the Emir that made Achaba riders suspect, but it would have been useful to learn lessons from attempts to ban or restrict motorcycles in Borno, Yobe, Plateau and one or two places, and the impact of those decisions on levels of insecurity and poverty.

In plain terms, the tendency to clamp down on Achaba riders is related to the practice of using motorcycles to assassinate people, attack security agents or escape. Motorcycles are easy to maneuver, difficult to identify and control and they raise little suspicion. The problem is that there are, in any one city, hundreds of thousands of motorcycles, and only a few of them are used by insurgents or assassins. The rest are used by honest young men to earn lawful living. Even in areas where night time bans on motorcycles have been placed, attacks have not ceased. Nor is it evident that even total bans on motorcycles will obliterate the threats of the insurgency.

Achaba riders are being scapegoated by governments which are desperate to find solutions. They represent the most vulnerable members of society, the group that insists on a slice of the cake even if they have no political clout and live on the margins of poverty and legality. Majority of them should be in schools, technical colleges, working in trades or engaged in agricultural production, but these are not available. If the economy expands fast enough to provide taxis and buses for the public, Achaba will not exist. If the Nigerian state had accorded due recognition to providing quality education, skills acquisition and expansion of opportunities in agriculture, the army of unemployed who ride Achaba with such reckless gusto and fill massive gaps in the economy will hardly exist.

Kano State’s decision to register Achaba may be a ploy to limit their operations in Kano. No one needs to tell Governor Kwankwaso that he may have to revisit the decision in the very near future. Kano state economy is already severely affected by the insurgency. The host of further restrictions and other social problems which the restrictions will impose will make life more difficult. Even the security situation in Kano could get worse. The alarming failure of security which was exposed in the attempted assassination of the Emir of Kano will take more than tinkering with the operations of Achaba to fix. Kano state is chasing shadows. There is a real problem in dealing with insecurity in a large, densely-populated city like Kano, but scapegoating the poor is not the solution. Nonetheless, Achaba riders in Kano should cooperate with Kano State Government, so that those involved in legitimate search for livehlihood can resume. They are, after all, as much victims of the insecurity as any Kano citizen.

Monday, January 21, 2013

Raising the stakes



“A stubborn person sails in a clay boat.” Tanzanian proverb

The miraculous failure of gunmen to assassinate the Emir of Kano last week should serve to raise questions and hopefully find answers to the alarming intensification and spread of violence by an insurgency which still has capacity to inflict spectacular assaults on the Nigerian state. Miraculous is the correct word to use here, because, the nation would be mourning the loss of an icon, an event that would have dwarfed even the bombings of the National Headquarters of the Nigeria Police or the U.N building in Abuja. That the Emir is alive today will not be to the credit of the Nigerian security agents, or the action of the citizens who love the Emir so dearly. Even the brave bodyguards of the Emir who put their bodies in lines of fire to protect him could not have entirely prevented the attempted assassination. The assassins had all the time to mount an ambush, shoot targets at will, and conclude that they had achieved their mission, after which they melted away. All this in a city crawling with police and soldiers.

It is chilling to reflect over what is now obvious. Assassins had intelligence over the movement of the Emir, and all the time they needed to move weapons and people, and ambush him in a densely-populated area. The decision to assassinate him may have been part of a well thought-out plan, or the result of an assessment of an opportunity that was immediately available. Either way, the manner the attempt was made on the life of the Emir suggests a level of audacity which can only be informed by elaborate intelligence and awareness of critical gaps in his personal security and the nature of the local environment.

The coincidence of the attack on the Emir and the commencement of Nigeria’s role in rolling back a militant Islamic-based rebellion in Mali should not be discountenanced. The military has acknowledged that Nigerian troops suffered fatalities in an attack in Kogi state on their way to Kaduna to fly to Mali. Ansar Al-Din has claimed credit for this attack. Nigeria’s involvement in Mali should have suggested that the nation braces itself for more attacks; afterall, the Chief of Army Staff has acknowledged that some insurgents have received training in Mali.

The assault on rebel positions in Mali is likely to have ripples far beyond Mali. In Algeria, lives of European hostages have already been lost. The extensive network of sympathy and local grievances, coupled with the vulnerability which all Sahelian nations suffer from the uniqueness of the Sahara is likely to sustain the Mali campaign beyond the next few weeks. France and Europe are likely to draw the line at the dispersal of the northern rebels, and may attempt to encourage some form of rapprochement between the fragile Malian government and the rebels, under the supervision of ECOWAS. Many ECOWAS states, however, will be hard put to sustain a prolonged military campaign and a peace-building process that may expose them to the same, or similar problem facing Mali. Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad are particularly vulnerable to a backlash and domestic opinion which may be hostile to a deeper involvement. Algeria and Libya will also be keen to limit the damage to neighbours to the south, and the involvement of France, NATO allies and the US is likely to inflame local passions against them in the longer term.

Nigeria took a gamble on Mali it need not have taken. We have a credible record of sacrificing life, limb and huge resources in shoring up failing states and defeating rebellions in West Africa. Mali differs from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Chad. French leadership and the acquiescence of ECOWAS states and the African Union to it puts a different complexion on Mali. Nigeria should have played the role France is playing, but it has missed that opportunity. It could have led a more effective intervention through ECOWAS, rather than meekly submitting to the rallying call of France. It is doubtful if the short and long-term goals of France in the Malian adventure are shared by all the countries involved, particularly Nigeria. The moment it became clear that Nigerian insurgents were receiving training, inspiration and material support from Malian bases, a strong Nigerian leadership should have rallied neighbouring countries to strengthen the Malian leadership and military, and lead an ECOWAS assault against rebels.

As things stand now, Nigeria’s participation in the Malian adventure is likely to expose it to further assault by insurgencies with links or sympathies with the Malian rebels. It is unlikely that the Malian crisis will evaporate with the dispersal of the rebels. Much of the northern territory will have to be held and protected. The fragile government in Bamako will have to be strengthened, and the military’s domineering role over it reduced. Peace-building strategies involving the Tuaregs and the rebels have to be designed and implemented, and the unique challenges of the Sahara which make it easy for arms, drugs and militancy to move with ease have to be addressed. France and Europe are not likely to wait around long enough to see through all these critical stages in the effective resolution of this problem.

All these suggest that Nigeria now needs to address its own strategy in dealing with variants of the insurgency. Government should radically improve the coordination of activities of security agencies, and redress genuine grievances of the public which creates more enemies than friends for security operatives. It should expand its search for mediation with the insurgency, and evolve strategies which should address poverty and alienation among the youth in areas where the insurgency has taken root. Our involvement in Mali should be watched very closely, and radical improvements need to be made between the conduct of our foreign policy and our national security.