Raising the stakes

“A stubborn person sails in a clay boat.” Tanzanian proverb

The miraculous failure of gunmen to assassinate the Emir of Kano last week should serve to raise questions and hopefully find answers to the alarming intensification and spread of violence by an insurgency which still has capacity to inflict spectacular assaults on the Nigerian state. Miraculous is the correct word to use here, because, the nation would be mourning the loss of an icon, an event that would have dwarfed even the bombings of the National Headquarters of the Nigeria Police or the U.N building in Abuja. That the Emir is alive today will not be to the credit of the Nigerian security agents, or the action of the citizens who love the Emir so dearly. Even the brave bodyguards of the Emir who put their bodies in lines of fire to protect him could not have entirely prevented the attempted assassination. The assassins had all the time to mount an ambush, shoot targets at will, and conclude that they had achieved their mission, after which they melted away. All this in a city crawling with police and soldiers.

It is chilling to reflect over what is now obvious. Assassins had intelligence over the movement of the Emir, and all the time they needed to move weapons and people, and ambush him in a densely-populated area. The decision to assassinate him may have been part of a well thought-out plan, or the result of an assessment of an opportunity that was immediately available. Either way, the manner the attempt was made on the life of the Emir suggests a level of audacity which can only be informed by elaborate intelligence and awareness of critical gaps in his personal security and the nature of the local environment.

The coincidence of the attack on the Emir and the commencement of Nigeria’s role in rolling back a militant Islamic-based rebellion in Mali should not be discountenanced. The military has acknowledged that Nigerian troops suffered fatalities in an attack in Kogi state on their way to Kaduna to fly to Mali. Ansar Al-Din has claimed credit for this attack. Nigeria’s involvement in Mali should have suggested that the nation braces itself for more attacks; afterall, the Chief of Army Staff has acknowledged that some insurgents have received training in Mali.

The assault on rebel positions in Mali is likely to have ripples far beyond Mali. In Algeria, lives of European hostages have already been lost. The extensive network of sympathy and local grievances, coupled with the vulnerability which all Sahelian nations suffer from the uniqueness of the Sahara is likely to sustain the Mali campaign beyond the next few weeks. France and Europe are likely to draw the line at the dispersal of the northern rebels, and may attempt to encourage some form of rapprochement between the fragile Malian government and the rebels, under the supervision of ECOWAS. Many ECOWAS states, however, will be hard put to sustain a prolonged military campaign and a peace-building process that may expose them to the same, or similar problem facing Mali. Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad are particularly vulnerable to a backlash and domestic opinion which may be hostile to a deeper involvement. Algeria and Libya will also be keen to limit the damage to neighbours to the south, and the involvement of France, NATO allies and the US is likely to inflame local passions against them in the longer term.

Nigeria took a gamble on Mali it need not have taken. We have a credible record of sacrificing life, limb and huge resources in shoring up failing states and defeating rebellions in West Africa. Mali differs from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Chad. French leadership and the acquiescence of ECOWAS states and the African Union to it puts a different complexion on Mali. Nigeria should have played the role France is playing, but it has missed that opportunity. It could have led a more effective intervention through ECOWAS, rather than meekly submitting to the rallying call of France. It is doubtful if the short and long-term goals of France in the Malian adventure are shared by all the countries involved, particularly Nigeria. The moment it became clear that Nigerian insurgents were receiving training, inspiration and material support from Malian bases, a strong Nigerian leadership should have rallied neighbouring countries to strengthen the Malian leadership and military, and lead an ECOWAS assault against rebels.

As things stand now, Nigeria’s participation in the Malian adventure is likely to expose it to further assault by insurgencies with links or sympathies with the Malian rebels. It is unlikely that the Malian crisis will evaporate with the dispersal of the rebels. Much of the northern territory will have to be held and protected. The fragile government in Bamako will have to be strengthened, and the military’s domineering role over it reduced. Peace-building strategies involving the Tuaregs and the rebels have to be designed and implemented, and the unique challenges of the Sahara which make it easy for arms, drugs and militancy to move with ease have to be addressed. France and Europe are not likely to wait around long enough to see through all these critical stages in the effective resolution of this problem.

All these suggest that Nigeria now needs to address its own strategy in dealing with variants of the insurgency. Government should radically improve the coordination of activities of security agencies, and redress genuine grievances of the public which creates more enemies than friends for security operatives. It should expand its search for mediation with the insurgency, and evolve strategies which should address poverty and alienation among the youth in areas where the insurgency has taken root. Our involvement in Mali should be watched very closely, and radical improvements need to be made between the conduct of our foreign policy and our national security.