GENERAL BABANGIDA’S BRAVADO

General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida made maximum use of a recent opportunities for exposure to re-state his claim as a deserving elder statesman in Nigeria. He used the Daily Trust Annual Dialogue which he chaired to warn that those questioning the unity of the nation will have to fight people like him, the same way they fought him when he was in the military during the Nigerian civil war. He insisted that Nigeria’s unity is a settled issue, and cannot be revisited by forces which have recently emerged around the fiasco over the subsidy removal. Other issues he said are settled as far as the nation is concerned are its federal structure, its republican character and its capitalist economy. General Babangida specifically took on the groups who have emerged in defence of President Jonathan and his policy on subsidy, and who are alluding to the possibility of a break-up of the nation in the event that the President himself, or his administration is harmed. He said he is willing to fight again to preserve the unity of the nation if need be, in spite of the fact that he is 71 years old, and still carries a bullet in his body from the last civil war.

            Ordinarily, former President Babangida’s bravado will amuse the nation and many would have seen his comments as typical of a man who has built a life-long career of remaining politically relevant. But these are not ordinary times, and General Babangida’s comments will only serve to remind the nation of its fundamental weaknesses which are rooted in its poor leadership. Even more worrying is the fact that the elderly General has since lost his national elder statesman toga, owing to his disastrous misadventure in the PDP Northern Consensus candidate saga. He is today largely seen as a northerner with a very tenuous claim even to its leadership. His comments in defence of Nigeria's unity are likely to be interpreted as a defence of northern interests only, and far from serving as a clarion call to patriots to defend the nation, it will be seen in the tradition of a north defending its interests under the cover of national unity.

For the north, it is indeed a cause for serious concerns, that it requires political pensioners like former President Babangida to speak for it. From the moment the ethnic flags began to be raised in and around key sections of the south arising from the failure to deal with the Boko Haram threat and the mismanagement of the decision to remove fuel subsidy by President Jonathan, not a single credible and relevant voice has been raised from the north to defend its position, or counter damaging propaganda and threats which portrays it as the threat, not the victim. The overwhelming outpouring of anger across the land from ordinary Nigerians over the President’s decision to remove subsidy was in the end, reduced to a threat by northerners and the Yoruba to achieve regime change. The strategy worked. The imperatives of the survival of democracy and national security were invoked by the Jonathan administration to scuttle the resistance against the decision on fuel subsidy removal. The West successfully fought back, and ultimately succeeded in reversing the occupation of Lagos, and exposing the administration as lacking in political finesse, and rich in its capacity to use force. But the north suffered one more humiliating defeat, in spite of the fact that it stood to suffer the most, because of its relative poverty, in the implementation of the subsidy removal decision. It was being accused of plotting for regime change because it was unhappy with Goodluck Jonathan as president, and its leaders accepted this damaging accusation by their loud silence.

The frightening escalation of the threat and damage from the Boko Haram insurgency is also being used by groups in the south to demand a radical review of the nation’s structures, or even a future. The crude arguments which inform this position is basically that Boko Haram represents a violent resistance of the North against Jonathan’s presidency. Since the North is unhappy with President Jonathan, to a point where it will unleash a religious insurgency against it, then other groups from the south have a right to question their continued stay in a country where the north will either rule in perpetuity or ruin the nation if they lose control over it. The north can be left with its demand for an Islamic state, its poverty and its millions of northern Christians to sort out its problems, while other parts of Nigeria move on.

The north lost the propaganda war even before the first shots were fired; and its aging Generals such as Babangida have little control over the terrain, and they lack the resources to fight its wars. The north appears to be fighting when it is weakest, and has no strategy to reduce this weakness. It should demand a genuine effort to re-examine the Nigerian federal system in the light of trends which make it progressively poorer, while other regions take away the lion share of the nation’s resources. Instead, it appearing to fight for the preservation of an entity in a manner which will create the impression that it is the only beneficiary of a united Nigeria with its present federal structure.

The north is bleeding from multiple wounds inflicted by its weakness, and the most serious to its political economy is the Boko Haram insurgency. The north is by far the biggest victim of this insurgency, and it is being made to pay the political price for it. People like General Banagida do not speak with the type of noise or effectiveness Boko Haram makes about the north. Northern leaders like Babangida can say that Nigeria’s unity is a settled issue; but they are not engaging Boko Haram which says they will fight the Nigerian state until it accepts to operate only on the basis of an Islamic system, whatever all citizens, muslims and Christians alike, feel about it.

The comments by General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida regarding the unity and survival of Nigeria can at best be summed up as an attempt by the elderly general to remain politically relevant. If the north had an effective and courageous leadership, there will be little room for people like General Babangida to speak for Nigeria or the north. If the north had leaders, they would have resisted every effort to punish the north for the incompetence of President Jonathan or the frightening damage being wrecked on the nation by the Boko Haram insurgency. The north is weak because it cannot engage Boko Haram and take away the political centre stage from it. It cannot demand a radical review in the manner national resources are being distributed because it appears to have accepted that it has no right to do so. It cannot engage other parts of Nigeria in the debate on current challenges and future of the Nigerian federal state, because it lacks the quality of the leadership to do. Because it lacks good leaders who can take up its current challenges and deal with them, it makes room for elderly politicians like General Babanagida to assume roles for which they are currently ill-suited.

MISGOVERNMENT 101

“Governments Never Learn. Only People Learn.”`

(Milton Friedman, 1912 – 2006).

Students of politics are often told that democracy is government of the people, for the people, by the people. Sadly many of them believe it. They also mouth it so often, that millions of people untutored in the nature and dynamics of power believe it as well. The tragedy, as billions of people who live under systems they believe are democratic have found out, is that democracy is very often just a means of changing leaders who do more or less the same things to the people. Leaders emerge from elections which may or may not be credible; and they exercise mandates within the limitations of their personal capacities, and the demands of the very few who influence what they do. The only time people are substantially involved in democracies is during elections, and even these are so choreographed or fixed that they successively alienate more of the electorate at every successive election.

President Goodluck Jonathan is re-writing the basic rules of leadership, such that established theories, strategies and ideas about governance, accountability and competence will have to be re-evaluated. On the face of it, you would think that he has read the late British statesman, C.R Atlee (1883 – 1967), who said: “Democracy means government by discussion, but it is only effective if you can stop people talking”. Or that he has literally taken the view of P.S. Buck (1892 – 1973), the American writer who said, “People on the whole are very simple-minded, and in whatever country one finds them. They are so simple as to take literally, more than not, the things leaders tell them”. Perhaps his long-term vision on the outcome of his contest with the Nigerian people over the fuel subsidy is informed by the insight of August Bebel, (1840 – 1913) the German politician who said that “All political questions, all matters of right, are at the bottom only questions of might.” If he believes that brawn alone will win him this battle, he clearly has not read Machiavelli, who said that a good leader should be both a fox and a lion, because a fox is defenseless against lions, and a lion is defenseless against traps.

If President Jonathan has a strategy for victory against all the battles he is currently engaged in, it is possible that at its heart is the assumption that the more problems you take on at the same time, the better your chances of victory. And the bigger the problem, the more you are likely to succeed against it. Just when he is being swamped by the insurgency of Boko Haram and a nation demanding that he acts decisively against security failures all over the nation, President Jonathan lights another fire around fuel subsidy. He abandons his “consultations with stakeholders” – please note that these are not defined as the Nigerian people – on his plans to remove subsidy, and decides to go it alone. Convinced of the validity of his position, he repudiates the position of the National Assembly, labour, civil society organizations, mothers, young people, the unemployed, the wealthy and the urban poor and just about everyone else. He obviously disagreed with Milton Friedman (1912 – 2006) the American economist who said that “The government solution to a problem is usually as bad as the problem”. Perhaps he paid little attention to history, and the experiences of his predecessors, virtually all of whom burnt their fingers very badly when they tinkered with pump prices.  

Or perhaps he had read Hegel (1770 – 1831) the German philosopher who said, “But what experience and history teach is this, that peoples and government have never learned anything from history”. Alone and isolated, he stands against a torrent of hostility from a nation which cannot understand or forgive him for serious miscalculations and serial ineptitude on vital issues around governance. Perhaps his advisers have convinced him that Andrew Jackson (1974 – 1826), a former US President was right when he said, “One man with courage makes a majority”. His economic advisers who sold him the dummy on subsidy removal as beneficial in the long run may have ignored John Maynard Keynes (1883 – 1946) who said, “This long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.”

The multitudes of challenges which President Jonathan has chosen to deal with at the same time are making him new enemies by the day. Book Haram makes Christians and Muslims feel he is not protecting them enough. Christians particularly feel vulnerable when they are attacked by a group that says all Nigerian Christians are guilty of the mass murders of Muslims in Plateau, Kaduna, Bauchi and Lagos, and they and their churches will be attacked at every opportunity. Muslims are angry that they are being blamed and made responsible for everything Boko Haram does by both the government and many other Christians. Security agencies are stretched and stressed, and it would not help their morale much when the Commander-In-Chief says they are infiltrated by Boko Haram sleepers. By his utterances and actions, President Jonathan has united former foes, adversaries and irritants into a formidable enemy. He has ignored Machiavelli’s advise, when he said, “All well-governed states and wise princes have taken care not to reduce the nobility to despair, nor the people to discontent.”

In the next few weeks, the nation will know whether President Jonathan has succeeded in transforming the live of Nigerians by making sure that everything they buy costs a lot more. Or the nation would be relieved that it does not have to go through this type of transformation. Either way, there will be a loser. Jonathan will do well to learn the lessons of dealing with enemies which Machiavelli put forward: “Men are either crushed, or pampered. They can get revenge for minor injuries, but not for fatal ones.” If he yields ground on the subsidy issue, his adversaries will punish him over and over for his weakness. If he sticks his ground, he may break the back of the popular resistance, but his opposition will warn Nigerians about their lives in the same manner Neil Kinnock, the former labour opposition leader in Britain warned his countrymen over Margaret Thatcher: “If Margaret Thatcher wins – I warn you not to be ordinary. I warn you not to be young. I warn you not to fall ill. I warn you not to get old,”

Students of power have great opportunities to re-visit conventional wisdom under current developments. They may reach the same conclusions about the PDP and did Baron de Montesquieu (1689 – 1755) who said, “when a government lasts a long time, it deteriorates by insensible degrees.” If they seek to find an answer to the riddle that Jonathan says he is removing subsidy because of corruption, they will be further confounded by Jonathan Swift (1667 – 1745) the British writer who said, “Politics, as the word is understood, are nothing but corruptions.” When we are faced with a choice of supporting the retention of the subsidy (and, Jonathan’s people will say, supporting the “cabal”) or supporting Jonathan, we could be further confused by the humor of George Carlin who said, “Politics is so corrupt, even the dishonest people get screwed.” Perhaps all Nigerians are coming to terms with the leadership which they elected to govern them. Henry Youngman, a comedian said, “Personally, I’m against political jokes. Too often they get elected to office.”

DEMOCRACY WITHOUT PEOPLE

The piece you are reading was written five days ago, on the fifth day of the national resistance against the decision of President Goodluck Jonathan to remove subsidy on petroleum. Many things are likely to have changed as you read this, perhaps for the better, perhaps for the worse. We live in troubled times. Our city of Kaduna has been under curfew since the second day of the protests, so we have been locked out of the national resistance. We are being let out for a few hours today to breathe some fresh air, and for those who have some little money, to scramble over very little and extremely expensive scarce commodities. Like citizens in Niger, Nassarawa, Kano, Zamfara, Kebbi and a few other States, we are paying the price for the overzealousness of a few, mostly young people who thought that we are having our equivalent of the Arab Spring. No one can say when we will be let out for good, but there is much restiveness from behind gates and walls. People are angry that they have been confined without food, water or other essentials, and when they are eventually released, they will come out to find that their lives have been radically altered by the removed subsidy.

The curfews being placed in large parts of the country contrast sharply with the massive protests we see on television by fellow citizens who are still free to protest. We also see empty streets in most parts of the country, and widespread lamentations from people who are suffering over strikes, lockouts and poverty. Every time we see mammoth crowds in Lagos and Abuja, citizens here jubilate in the hope that President Jonathan will be touched to reverse his decision on the removed subsidy. Then, either his Minister of Finance or Governor of the Central Bank, or Minister of Petroleum Resources comes on the screen to say the subsidy will stay, and Nigerians just don’t get it. Labour leaders come on the screen to say it will be a fight to finish. Panels on television shows reel out statistics, facts and figures and arguments to confuse us even more. Many say Nigerians do not understand what the subsidy issue is all about. And they are right. Others say the governments is involved in a grand deception over the subsidy, and we think they are right. Yet others say there is much more to this matter than removal of subsidy; that issues about accountability, transparency and the competence of the administration are at stake. And we think they are right.

All in all, you could say that the Nigerian people are pretty much out of the picture in this epic battle over their welfare. Government insists that the removal of subsidy is central to its ability to transform the Nigerian economy and society, and the retention of subsidy will virtually destroy the economy. The opponents of the removal – this is virtually everyone now, whether they understand the issues or not – say they want subsidy to remain, and President Jonathan should find other means of transforming Nigeria. President Jonathan says Nigerians do not understand how serious the issue is. Nigerians say he does not understand how serious they are over the issue.

Labour takes up the gauntlet, and has succeeded thus far in tapping into a massive national sentiment and anger against the President’s decisions. The resistance however goes way beyond labour’s populist posturing. The protests thus far have assumed a dimension that cannot be controlled or determined by labour alone. The labour movement may find that the people have gone too far ahead of it, when it attempts to, as it is accustomed to do, “negotiate” with government. It may find that the people are unwilling to accept its solution, and it may even be part of the problem as people may say it has sold out. Labour may, in the end, be just another victim of the fire it helped start.

And all this is going on in a democratic system which says that the people should have the final say in terms of how leaders emerge and how they govern. President Jonathan is digging in because he believes the people have failed to understand the real benefits of the subsidy decision; and that ultimately, he is right, and they are wrong. Perhaps President Jonathan sees himself here in the mould of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who took on the old union-based, labour-dominated British economy and turned it around in spite of the most awesone resistance. If he does, he will be tragically wrong. Mrs Thatcher had a solid conservative support for a radical change in the British economy; and a weakening working-class hold on British politics which she understood very well. President Jonathan has no solid popular support for his policy; and has been spectacularly unsuccessful in building one. It is now clear that this failure to build up critical support may have been the reason behind his decision to pull the plug around the subsidy in January, and then attempt to weather the storm.

Perhaps President Jonathan sees himself in the mould of former USSR leader Gorvachev, who took on the decaying communist establishment and changed the nature of Soviet Union’s politics and economy on a scale not seen since Stalin. But he will be tragically wrong if he does. Gorvachev had an acute sense of history and a solid support from key institutions such as the military and the Communist Party to push through massive changes in the structure of the country and its economy. He also had support from a large urban-based emerging middle class, and an understanding from former foes in the West that they will stay off his internal problems which the reforms will engender.

President Jonathan’s decision on removal of subsidy is a study on how not to undertake key changes in a system, which has neither institutional nor social foundations for it. There is everything wrong in the manner subsidy on petroleum was being administered. But President Jonathan failed to show Nigerians what it was. When he says corruption and waste are the reasons behind the removal of subsidy, he did not think Nigerians will ask him to remove the corruption and waste around the subsidy, and not the subsidy itself. After all, that is his job as President, and he asked for it, didn’t he?

President Jonathan prepared badly for this battle. His intelligence over the nature of the enemy is very limited and compromised. His troops are few, poorly trained and poorly-equipped. His generals have little understanding of the terrain, or influence over the troops. The battle plan is poorly designed. There is no plan B, no contingencies, reserves or options. No leader has taken on the Nigerian people in the manner President Jonathan is attempting to do. Certainly, none has done so being as isolated as President Jonathan is. His party, the PDP is virtually an on-looker. Every leader worth his salt has advised him against removing subsidy in the manner he has just done. The first few days of the national resistance showed clearly that he was pitting himself against the entire Nigerian people. So what could be the inspiration behind President Jonathan’s position? It is possible that he believes he is right, the entire nation is wrong and he can hang on while the people rant and rave and then tire and submit. Risky strategy, because the resistance may be stronger than he imagines, and the damage it will cause will be worse than the benefits of his decision. Or he may be counting on some resurgence of primordial sympathy from sections of the country such as South South and South East who see him with his back against the wall, and who will adopt an opportunistic position to try to bail him out. Self-defeating strategy, because he would have done even greater damage to the current perception of his Presidency being purely a South South affair. He could hold on for as long as he can, and then negotiate a compromise with labour. This will leave him and labour exposed to the possibility that Nigerians will not accept a compromise. He would also have exposed a vulnerability which will haunt him in many other areas of governance.

There is a popular misconception that in a democratic setting, leaders do what citizens want. They do not, and should not. They should do what in their judgement, is in the best interest of the nation. This means that many citizens will be unhappy over many decisions, but they must be able to live with them. If leaders have to please very citizen, they will not be leading a democratic system. In fact, they will not be leaders, but just people in an anarchy. But in democratic systems, leaders take decisions after an assessment of what is best for the most. If they get it right, they get the support of most people. If they get it wrong, the people turn their backs on them. President Jonathan’s decision on removal of subsidy is a study on how a leader can try to run a democratic system without the people. In democratic systems, leaders also go wrong, and accept that the voice of the people must be listened to. More will be lost than gained by a position which insists that the subsidy on petroleum must be removed. If President Jonathan can come to a position that leaves him some credibility and capacity to continue to govern, he should consider it. It was J.K Galbraith (1908 – 2006) the American economist who said, “Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable.”

NIGERIA: ARMED AND DANGEROUS

          Another American is once again getting Nigerians all worked up over an opinion on the state of  our nation and its future. Another American, John Campbell, last year caused quite a stir when he predicted that the 2011 elections were going to be conducted in an atmosphere of chaos and violence owing to the loss of control of the political process by the Nigerian political elite. This time, a professor of history and a lady very well known in the corridors of influence over United States policy on Nigeria, Jean Herskovits, published an article in an influential US newspaper in which she said basically that Boko Haram is not the problem in Nigeria. In the context of deep concerns that the Boko Haram insurgency is raising a new and dangerous threat which is both largely unknown and unprecedented in its nature and dimensions, the American professor’s position naturally raised the level of discourse around the issue. It has also exposed some interesting positions and reactions regarding the Boko Haram phenomenon, some of which were only being whispered a few weeks ago. The Nigerian government has condemned the article as ill-informed and misleading, which is not surprising. Nigerian informed opinion is however still confused over what to make of professor Herskovits’ thesis, although it is safe to assume that it is targeted more at the US State Department and Defence strategists than the Nigerian government and population.  Sadly, one view about our situation from the distant is providing more substance for debate and more heat than all the combined analyses and studies about matters that really matter to us in Nigeria.

Professor Herskovits’ main thesis is that the US government is being pushed to adopt a formalized position which will list Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, and this will be dangerous both for the US and Nigeria. She warns that the adoption of a policy which classifies and treats Boko Haram as a terrorist organization by the US government will suck the US into a war against a group which is more political than terrorist, in a country where many Muslims already believe the US government is biased in favour of a Christian President from the south. She draws attention to the history and mutation of Boko Haram from a small band around a religious leader who was murdered by the police, into a movement which now fights the Nigerian state. Significantly, she says the group’s name and tactic is now a franchise used by criminal gangs and sundry interests who ape its penchance for attacking Christian churches. The response of the Nigerian state to the scandalous levels of poverty in the catchment area of the Boko Haram insurgency, and the multiplier effect of the high-handedness of security forces on the fortunes of the group, the professor says, have not been addressed by government of Nigeria. Indeed, she say, 25 percent of Nigerian budget for 2012 is being allocated for security, and that many Nigerians fear the army more than they fear Boko Haram. She concludes by advising the US government not to be misled into a situation that will make it an enemy of the Nigerian people. You could say that professor Herskovits says that Boko Haram is not the problem in Nigeria. The problem is the Nigerian government; and the US government should be wary of misunderstanding this, and taking the wrong steps in responding to pressures.

The immediate reactions of Nigerians to Herskovits article were revealing in terms of the current disposition of the elite and the leadership in a complex nation. The government and many leaders in the Christian community were shocked by a position which basically says Boko Haram is not a real problem; that it is now the cover for huge spending on security; for many criminal activities totally unrelated to its goals; and that the Nigerian government is to blame for its growth and expansion, if indeed it does exist. This perspective sees Herskovits’ essay as apologetic, dangerous and misleading, a virtual legitimization of a dangerous insurgency by an American who should know better. Saner comments asked how anyone with a deep knowledge about Nigeria as Herskovits does could dismiss the threat of Boko Haram as the manifestation of endemic poverty and injustice when there is evidence all over the place that an insurgency does exist around it with very clear goals and spectacular successes in their pursuit. The Nigerian government which obviously would want the group formally classified as terrorist because this will open up a whole range of new relationships and access to assistance by the US has been the most disappointed by Herskovits comments.

Another popular reaction came mostly from many northerners who had suspected for a while that powerful and more sinister forces have hijacked the Boko Haram brand and are now waging their own battles. According to this perspective, prime suspects in this category include subversives fighting the administration of President Jonathan who are not Boko Haram; heavily armed criminals copying its tactics; trained Christians who bomb state security agents and Christians to give Muslims a bad name; and even western powers – read the US – which want to dismember Nigeria, isolate and “deal” with its large (and potentially threatening) Muslim population. Then there is also the lingering suspicion that much of the violence being credited to the insurgency is being sustained by the agents of the Nigerian state and security agents because the fight against Boko Haram is just too lucrative to give up.

Both perspectives are worrying, and only compound the problem. Those who see only an armed insurrection which can be brought down by billions and bullets, to the exclusion of all other strategies are wrong. The manner Boko Haram is understood and responded to is very important in this respect. If Boko Haram is understood as a terrorist organization, its most effective antidote will be force, and not tinkering with socio-economic policies which may reduce poverty and re-integrate vast portions of the population into the democratic process. So far, force alone has not affected its effectiveness, and concentration on huge mobilization of security personnel on highways and massive expenditure around technology and arms have tied up Nigeria’s almost entire security asset around Boko Haram. On the other hand, those who are relieved that they have found vindication in their suspicion that Boko Haram is a cover for all sorts anti-Islam activities are dangerously off the mark as well. Even where a case could be made for the suspicion that the original grievances of the followers of the late Yusuf Muhammad have been hijacked by all and sundry forces, it will be foolish to dismiss Boko Haram as non-existent. Certainly, the group has gone through some transformation; and it is quite possible that it has received support and training from organizations with a longer track record in terror. Muslims particularly who are in deep denial over the existence or goals of Boko Haram give themselves false comfort and overlook how much damage is being claimed in the name of their faith. The distance many Nigerian Muslims try to put between their faith and Boko Haram does not relieve them of the burden of finding a solution to a problem which affects them   in its impact as much as it affects non-muslims. Worse, denying the existence of Boko Haram, or foisting a conspiracy theory around it does little to address the worry that either Boko Haram or someone acting in its name is targeting the break-up of the Nigeria state exploiting Muslim-Christian differences and pitting them against each other. Some sections of Nigerian public opinion may give greater credence to Herskovits position because it is raised by a foreigner. But we do have to ask her motives as well. Could it be as dispassionate as some would believe or is part of a wider debate around US core interests in the gulf of Guinea and Africa?

So Jean Herskovits article really should not be seen by Nigerians as a tool towards finding solutions to a problem which is ours. The US government for which it is meant will of course give it its own interpretation. Here, it is likely to do much damage unless it is seen purely as one opinion of an American – no matter how informed – over our problem. The lady is wrong to say Boko Haram is not the problem. Even if, as she says, it is a symptom of a deeper problem, it is today the single biggest threat to our collective security. So it is both the symptom and the problem. She is right when she advises the US government to be wary of being sucked into an essentially Nigerian problem. But we could overate her contribution in this direction. Many Nigerians and a few foreigners have drawn attention to the unacceptable levels of poverty and political alienation which has become even more pronounced in the last one year in many parts of the north. The failure or refusal of the Jonathan administration to recognise the need for some decisive intervention in terms of real investment in economic and social infrastructure in this region is feeding the problem. Similarly, the spectacular failure to seek for hard political and security intelligence in and around the communities for the source, dimensions and roots of Boko Haram has left the administration with little choice than to send in more soldiers, mount security checkpoints and C.C.T.Vs and spend hundreds of billions on high-tech equipment with dubious value.

These are what make Boko Haram the problem. It is a problem because every citizen in Nigeria today lives in fear of the bombs and bullets of Boko Haram insurgents or groups who hide behind their grievances and their tactics to wreck havoc on our lives. It is a problem because violence is threatening us even more. Government is arming itself for a war with an enemy it cannot see who lives in our midst. The enemy is arming itself to fight government and citizens alike. Criminals are arming themselves with dynamites, bombs and bullets to rob and maim and kill. Ordinary citizens are arming themselves just in case they have occasions to defend themselves. Communities are arming themselves against other communities. Our nation is armed and dangerous, but we aim our weapons against each other. This is the greatest danger Nigeria is facing since the end of since our civil war. We do not need an American professor of history to tell us: Boko Haram is the problem; but then so is the Nigerian government.

PRESIDENT JONATHAN’S DECISIONS

 President GoodLuck Jonathan ended the year 2011 with two decisions that will engage public attention and mobilize the public for much of the new year. Two days to the end of the last year, and obviously in reaction to the shocking bombings of the Christmas day, the President announced his intention to impose state of emergencies in four states which have borne the brunt of Boko Haram or ethno-religious conflicts. Then on the very first day of the year, he finally pulled the plug on petroleum pump prices, and the cost of a litre of petrol went up from N65 to anywhere between N138 and N180. The nation will start the new year with a token attempt to curtail spreading violence which, however, is likely to have little impact; and massive protests around the fuel price increase which will add untold hardship to the rise in the cost of living. Clearly, President Jonathan believes he can handle a mobilized public hostility against him, in the midst of spreading insecurity.  Combining the two challenges is an act of supreme courage or frightening foolhardiness. Either way, they suggest poor decision-making process, and substantial alienation from mainstream public opinion.

The decision to impose state of emergency in selected Local Government Areas in four States of the Federation will be seen largely as a panic response to the deteriorating security situation, for which the administration has no better alternatives. There will be little dispute over whether the President has constitutional powers to impose state of emergency in parts of the country which are under actual or perceived threats involving public or state security, subject to the approval of the legislature. Similarly, few will quarrel with the assessment of the Boko Haram insurgency, or those who operate under its cover as a dangerous threat to the security of citizens in many parts of the country. The problem is that the decision itself will be severely criticised on many valid grounds. Procedurally, the state of emergency does not come into effect until the National Assembly ratifies it. The National Assembly is on recess, so in effect, the actual imposition of the measures to give substance to the declaration of the state of emergency will have to await its resumption. Although it will be difficult to see the National Assembly refusing to support the President’s action, delays may arise as legislators argue over whether it is enough as a measure to deal with the threat. Then, the actual logistical and security requirements will take a while to mobilize and be given effect. The enemy, which is the target of the declaration may take advantage of these delays and substantially relocate or re-strategise. This will render the decision virtually useless. Events since the President announced his intention to declare the state of emergency show that Boko Haram will be unlikely to be impressed by the measure. The group has spread its murderous activities to Gombe, Jigawa and Adamawa States, perhaps to show the futility of the decision. Those constructing conspiracy theories which claim that others, and not Boko Haram insurgents, are responsible for the increased attacks will see the measure as even more ineffective, since they may be spread right across the country.

There are also basic questions regarding the practical value of imposing state of emergency in selected Local Government Areas in four States. It is clear that the declaration will leave Governors and Chairmen of Local Government Areas unaffected. What the decision will mean is simply that the Federal Government will intensify its operations in these L.G.As. New measures may be introduced or old security measures will be intensified. There are likely to be restrictions in movements in and out of the affected areas; and the population in the areas are likely to come under closer physical scrutiny and surveillance. The President may have received advise and briefing from his security chiefs that possibly suggested that this strategy will work. But the nation will not know how effective it will be until it does or does not work. If the new measures involve heavy-handed treatment of the local population, they could very well raise hostility against the government and security agents and defeat the goals of the strategy, as the Borno State experience shows. Government and local level officials are likely to stay away from the new security measures, in the event that they become unpopular with local citizens. This will deprive security personnel of valuable political support and goodwill.

There will be many sceptics around the new security measures. Many people will point out that Boko Haram has been elusive and mobile, and that it may simply change its bases as the Federal Government’s security agents settle down in particular locations. Others will ask why the state of emergency is required when the federal government has had no difficulties in reinforcing or raising its levels of mobilization in all the affected States. People will say that the federal government merely wishes to reinforce its strength and lock up portions of the country where it believes the threats to national security are most acute, a strategy which has consistently backfired in Borno and, to a lesser extent, Yobe and Plateau States in the past. There are yet others who will say that the assumption of direct and presumably exclusive security in selected LGAs by the federal government is a severe indictment of the capacity and relevance of state governors and LG chairmen, who however, will not pay any penalty for their failures to curtail local Boko Haram activity. Governor are likely to give token support for Mr President’s decision, largely because they cannot be seen to oppose the fight against Boko Haram and because they will bear little responsibility for actions of the federal government.

Above all, many Nigerians will ask why President Jonathan does not impose a state of emergency on his own security machinery instead. The same people who advise him on what measures to take are also the very people who have failed so spectacularly to make any impact in the fight against Boko Haram or ethno-religious conflicts. It is possible that they have convinced him that their hands had been tied in the past, and only the declaration of state of emergency in parts of the country will give them the leverage and freedom to curtail the frightening levels of violence and endemic insecurity. If this is the case, then the nation has much to worry over what the security agencies will do under the emergency powers they will get. The sad record of the administration is that it has not imposed any sanction against the dismal records of its security chiefs who have responsibilities for advising it, or implementing its decisions. Yet these same security chiefs will be responsible for administering the state of emergency measures in selected LGAs in four states. Borno State in particular is virtually an occupied State. It is reasonable to wonder what the state of emergency will entail in its present circumstances. The same can be said of Jos.

Many people will also ask what criteria the President used in selecting areas in which he intends to impose the state of emergency. Kaduna State which is excluded is a prime candidate by all standards of judgement as a host to endemic ethno-religious conflicts. Why wasn’t the state of emergency imposed on Zangon Kataf and Jama’a LGAs, where hundreds of lives were lost last year, and in which communities presently live almost daily with fear of attacks? After all, only a few days ago, the State government was asking the federal government to establish more mobile police and military barracks in the area because of the endemic nature of conflicts in the region. Most important, Nigerians will ask what other measures the administration is taking to neutralize the threat of Boko Haram beyond the use of force; and the achievement of lasting peace among the communities in Plateau and Kaduna States.

If the effects of the imposition of state of emergency in a few L.G.As in four States are of questionable value, the effects of the rise of petroleum pump price from N65 to about N140 will be as profound as predicted. The decision has placed the entire nation on the war path with President Jonathan, and prices of all commodies have already skyrocketed. The poor and rich alike will fight this decision, and it is going to be a bruising and difficult battle. Organized labour will almost certainly carry out its threat to shut down the country, in spite of resort to the courts by the federal government. The most potent force against the decision is the massive involvement of citizens of all categories, ages, gender and professions in the resistance. Overwhelming public opinion is hostile to the increase; and the public is likely to remain hostile as President Jonathan digs in. The protests against fuel increase will open up other questions regarding his competence and the future of his administration. Prices of all basic commodities will rise. The National Assembly may pander to the gallery and delay passing the 2012 budget. With universities closed over ASUU strike, other teachers may join strikes and shut downs. Banks and hospitals may be affected. Life, on the whole, will be very difficult for the poor in the next few weeks, and it will be difficult to convince them all this pain they feel is in their long-term interest. If he reverses his decision in the face of overwhelming public opposition, his credibility will be fatally damaged as a leader. If he stands his ground, he risks widening confrontations with Nigerians which may go way beyond the issues of subsidy removal.

Nigerians will ask President Jonathan why, in spite of overwhelming opposition from citizens who elected him, he went ahead to remove the subsidy on petroleum. He does have answers, but he missed the opportunity to make his case well before he acted. He will be left with a hostile citizenry which will be cynical over his rationalizations; and which will be willingly mobilized against his administration. These are not the best times for the President to seek for popular support behind the declaration of state of emergency in selected L.G.As in four states either. Many people will see the measure as too little, too late. Nigerians will see it as a panic response with severely limiting potentials to deal with Boko Haram’s insurgency or endemic ethno-religious conflicts. At a time when he needs to rally all Nigerians around him in the fight against escalating threats to national security, the President goes and makes enemies of the very public he needs behind him. President Jonathan’s advisers should have warned him that good generals do not fight on too many fronts.