PRESIDENT JONATHAN’S DECISIONS

 President GoodLuck Jonathan ended the year 2011 with two decisions that will engage public attention and mobilize the public for much of the new year. Two days to the end of the last year, and obviously in reaction to the shocking bombings of the Christmas day, the President announced his intention to impose state of emergencies in four states which have borne the brunt of Boko Haram or ethno-religious conflicts. Then on the very first day of the year, he finally pulled the plug on petroleum pump prices, and the cost of a litre of petrol went up from N65 to anywhere between N138 and N180. The nation will start the new year with a token attempt to curtail spreading violence which, however, is likely to have little impact; and massive protests around the fuel price increase which will add untold hardship to the rise in the cost of living. Clearly, President Jonathan believes he can handle a mobilized public hostility against him, in the midst of spreading insecurity.  Combining the two challenges is an act of supreme courage or frightening foolhardiness. Either way, they suggest poor decision-making process, and substantial alienation from mainstream public opinion.

The decision to impose state of emergency in selected Local Government Areas in four States of the Federation will be seen largely as a panic response to the deteriorating security situation, for which the administration has no better alternatives. There will be little dispute over whether the President has constitutional powers to impose state of emergency in parts of the country which are under actual or perceived threats involving public or state security, subject to the approval of the legislature. Similarly, few will quarrel with the assessment of the Boko Haram insurgency, or those who operate under its cover as a dangerous threat to the security of citizens in many parts of the country. The problem is that the decision itself will be severely criticised on many valid grounds. Procedurally, the state of emergency does not come into effect until the National Assembly ratifies it. The National Assembly is on recess, so in effect, the actual imposition of the measures to give substance to the declaration of the state of emergency will have to await its resumption. Although it will be difficult to see the National Assembly refusing to support the President’s action, delays may arise as legislators argue over whether it is enough as a measure to deal with the threat. Then, the actual logistical and security requirements will take a while to mobilize and be given effect. The enemy, which is the target of the declaration may take advantage of these delays and substantially relocate or re-strategise. This will render the decision virtually useless. Events since the President announced his intention to declare the state of emergency show that Boko Haram will be unlikely to be impressed by the measure. The group has spread its murderous activities to Gombe, Jigawa and Adamawa States, perhaps to show the futility of the decision. Those constructing conspiracy theories which claim that others, and not Boko Haram insurgents, are responsible for the increased attacks will see the measure as even more ineffective, since they may be spread right across the country.

There are also basic questions regarding the practical value of imposing state of emergency in selected Local Government Areas in four States. It is clear that the declaration will leave Governors and Chairmen of Local Government Areas unaffected. What the decision will mean is simply that the Federal Government will intensify its operations in these L.G.As. New measures may be introduced or old security measures will be intensified. There are likely to be restrictions in movements in and out of the affected areas; and the population in the areas are likely to come under closer physical scrutiny and surveillance. The President may have received advise and briefing from his security chiefs that possibly suggested that this strategy will work. But the nation will not know how effective it will be until it does or does not work. If the new measures involve heavy-handed treatment of the local population, they could very well raise hostility against the government and security agents and defeat the goals of the strategy, as the Borno State experience shows. Government and local level officials are likely to stay away from the new security measures, in the event that they become unpopular with local citizens. This will deprive security personnel of valuable political support and goodwill.

There will be many sceptics around the new security measures. Many people will point out that Boko Haram has been elusive and mobile, and that it may simply change its bases as the Federal Government’s security agents settle down in particular locations. Others will ask why the state of emergency is required when the federal government has had no difficulties in reinforcing or raising its levels of mobilization in all the affected States. People will say that the federal government merely wishes to reinforce its strength and lock up portions of the country where it believes the threats to national security are most acute, a strategy which has consistently backfired in Borno and, to a lesser extent, Yobe and Plateau States in the past. There are yet others who will say that the assumption of direct and presumably exclusive security in selected LGAs by the federal government is a severe indictment of the capacity and relevance of state governors and LG chairmen, who however, will not pay any penalty for their failures to curtail local Boko Haram activity. Governor are likely to give token support for Mr President’s decision, largely because they cannot be seen to oppose the fight against Boko Haram and because they will bear little responsibility for actions of the federal government.

Above all, many Nigerians will ask why President Jonathan does not impose a state of emergency on his own security machinery instead. The same people who advise him on what measures to take are also the very people who have failed so spectacularly to make any impact in the fight against Boko Haram or ethno-religious conflicts. It is possible that they have convinced him that their hands had been tied in the past, and only the declaration of state of emergency in parts of the country will give them the leverage and freedom to curtail the frightening levels of violence and endemic insecurity. If this is the case, then the nation has much to worry over what the security agencies will do under the emergency powers they will get. The sad record of the administration is that it has not imposed any sanction against the dismal records of its security chiefs who have responsibilities for advising it, or implementing its decisions. Yet these same security chiefs will be responsible for administering the state of emergency measures in selected LGAs in four states. Borno State in particular is virtually an occupied State. It is reasonable to wonder what the state of emergency will entail in its present circumstances. The same can be said of Jos.

Many people will also ask what criteria the President used in selecting areas in which he intends to impose the state of emergency. Kaduna State which is excluded is a prime candidate by all standards of judgement as a host to endemic ethno-religious conflicts. Why wasn’t the state of emergency imposed on Zangon Kataf and Jama’a LGAs, where hundreds of lives were lost last year, and in which communities presently live almost daily with fear of attacks? After all, only a few days ago, the State government was asking the federal government to establish more mobile police and military barracks in the area because of the endemic nature of conflicts in the region. Most important, Nigerians will ask what other measures the administration is taking to neutralize the threat of Boko Haram beyond the use of force; and the achievement of lasting peace among the communities in Plateau and Kaduna States.

If the effects of the imposition of state of emergency in a few L.G.As in four States are of questionable value, the effects of the rise of petroleum pump price from N65 to about N140 will be as profound as predicted. The decision has placed the entire nation on the war path with President Jonathan, and prices of all commodies have already skyrocketed. The poor and rich alike will fight this decision, and it is going to be a bruising and difficult battle. Organized labour will almost certainly carry out its threat to shut down the country, in spite of resort to the courts by the federal government. The most potent force against the decision is the massive involvement of citizens of all categories, ages, gender and professions in the resistance. Overwhelming public opinion is hostile to the increase; and the public is likely to remain hostile as President Jonathan digs in. The protests against fuel increase will open up other questions regarding his competence and the future of his administration. Prices of all basic commodities will rise. The National Assembly may pander to the gallery and delay passing the 2012 budget. With universities closed over ASUU strike, other teachers may join strikes and shut downs. Banks and hospitals may be affected. Life, on the whole, will be very difficult for the poor in the next few weeks, and it will be difficult to convince them all this pain they feel is in their long-term interest. If he reverses his decision in the face of overwhelming public opposition, his credibility will be fatally damaged as a leader. If he stands his ground, he risks widening confrontations with Nigerians which may go way beyond the issues of subsidy removal.

Nigerians will ask President Jonathan why, in spite of overwhelming opposition from citizens who elected him, he went ahead to remove the subsidy on petroleum. He does have answers, but he missed the opportunity to make his case well before he acted. He will be left with a hostile citizenry which will be cynical over his rationalizations; and which will be willingly mobilized against his administration. These are not the best times for the President to seek for popular support behind the declaration of state of emergency in selected L.G.As in four states either. Many people will see the measure as too little, too late. Nigerians will see it as a panic response with severely limiting potentials to deal with Boko Haram’s insurgency or endemic ethno-religious conflicts. At a time when he needs to rally all Nigerians around him in the fight against escalating threats to national security, the President goes and makes enemies of the very public he needs behind him. President Jonathan’s advisers should have warned him that good generals do not fight on too many fronts.