Our misunderstood President

“Politics – the gentle art of getting votes from the poor and campaign funds from the rich, by promising to protect each from the other.” Oscar Ameringer

During the a better-managed and choreographed media outing on Sunday this week, President Jonathan said he thought he was totally misunderstood when he made comments on the need for complete deregulation if investment in the downstream sector is going to be substantially attracted to the Nigerian oil and gas sector. He had been widely reported a few days ago as suggesting that fuel subsidy will be removed in order to make room for additional investment in areas such as refineries. He said provision for subsidy has been made in the 2013 budget estimates, but insisted that full deregulation will eventually have to involve removal of all subsidies.

Students of communication arts and management of media must be wondering what can be done to mitigate the manner our President is routinely misunderstood. When he speaks directly, he is misunderstood. When he is spoken for, Nigerians see things differently. When he and his spokespersons speak on the same issues, people tend to see different angles. Last Sunday Nigerians saw a President at pains to establish a new level of personal integrity and sincerity in speaking directly with citizens. But the issues he took up, and the positions of his administration on a number of key issues must have left Nigerians perplexed over how they got to their current understanding of some of these issues.

In spite of the widely-reported engagement of the federal government in discussions with the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (a.k.a. Boko Haram) insurgency, the President said there has not been any dialogue anywhere with the group. Although neither the President nor his spokespersons had confirmed the numerous rumoured initiatives and engagements with the insurgency directly, it could not have escaped his attention that much hype had been built around the idea that the insurgency had been engaged in talks with his government through its members in Saudi Arabia, and had even put out a list of mediators which included General Muhammadu Buhari. Is it also possible that the President missed the widely-publicized suspicions that the olive branch of the insurgency was a fiction manufactured by his administration to create the impression of successes against the insurgency, and ensnare General Buhari? Could he have failed to be briefed that even a suspicious olive branch had raised hopes of millions of people over the possibility that this terrible war could be resolved through dialogue soon? Could it have made more sense to allow dangerous speculation, damaging opportunism from the opposition, and crashed hopes from beleaguered communities to subsist, than an earlier repudiation of claims that talks were going on, or were being offered? Who were those faceless people who spoke to journalists with such confidence regarding “back-door” dialogue with the insurgency? Are they the President’s men, or people who exploit huge gaps in the manner his administration responds to critical issues of governance?

Now that the nation knows from the President himself that there is no plan to speak with the insurgency, should we resign ourselves to a long-drawn war, or are there options in dealing with this insurgency being contemplated? In denying that President Obasanjo’s assault on Odi had helped to cripple the Niger Delta militancy, the President implied that force alone is not the antidote to this insurgency. Yet force is the only thing his administration appears set to continue to deploy, even in the face of near-universal acclaim that it is becoming increasingly counter-productive. Just one day after the televised denial of on-going discussions with the insurgency, reports said another video had surfaced showing soldiers shooting civilian captives in Borno. The international media is not likely to relent in digging deep into allegations of extra-judicial killings by security agencies; allegations made time and time again by the community, and routinely denied by the military.

If the President’s answers to questions around the insurgency raised even more questions, his positions on other important issues were no less puzzling. The President gave himself a pass mark in the fight against corruption, citing electoral reforms as evidence. He said Nigerians blamed every failure and every evil in the country to corruption, so the fight against it must be thorough and total. But even as he spoke, civil society groups and labour are flexing muscles and mobilizing to take him up on the failure to deliver on promises that he will free the oil and gas sector from the stranglehold of corruption and powerful interests. Petrol queues are reappearing, and more Nigerians buy petrol from black markets than licensed distributors. Most people know of the on-going battles between importers, and the government, and most Nigerians pay for these battles with high product prices. Would it surprise the President, then, to know that most Nigerians believe he is losing the battle against powerful interests in the oil and gas sector? Is he aware of the damage done to the integrity of his reform process by the drama (and the fall outs) from the presentation of the Nuhu Ribadu report? Should he justifiably expect Nigerians to believe that White Papers prepared by this Ministers on work done by professionals and other people of high levels of integrity on sensitive areas will yield much value in terms of the quality of outputs?

President Jonathan believes he will be judged the best President Nigeria has had by 2015. But he will not know if he will run for another term until 2014. And he thinks it is unfair to ask him if he will run again at this stage. So his penchant for not being misunderstood is likely to be enhanced, if he is still unaware that the popular rejection by Nigerians of the tenure extension proposals discussed during the recent hearings on amendments to the constitution has everything to do with his personal ambition.

The recent televised outing of the President revealed a man thrust into power who is grappling to justify his status. There was no evidence that he was engaged in sophisticated double-speak or elaborate schemes to fool Nigerians. With President Jonathan, what you see is what you get. Unfortunately, what Nigerians get is the impression of a man who genuinely thinks that history has a place for him, but is finding it increasingly difficult to exercise a firmer hand on the levers he requires to shape that history. At this stage, Nigerians generally think he is too far removed from the actual events going on in the name of his administration; and he is too far removed from them.

White Paper, whitewash

“If you can keep your head, when all about you are losing their, its possible you haven’t grasped the situation”. Jean Kerr 

A White Paper is a document usually prepared by governments which outlines their positions on major policy issues or initiatives, some of which sometimes culminate in legislations. Derived from the old tradition of being printed or covered in white paper, this administrative instrument is usually a detailed outline of decisions and plans of government, and is, in most cases, released to the public. White papers are products of elaborate politicking, and every stage from the selection of the committees to draft them, to the deliberations of the drafting committee, to the discussions of the draft by the highest decision-making body is informed by powerful interests of the administration which started the process in the first place. Drafts of white paper are purely advisory, and governments at the highest levels accept, amend or reject proposals made at drafting stages.

A popular misconception is that all reports submitted by committees of inquiry, technical or administration panels, advisory committees or task forces must be further processed by white papers. Government can choose whether to deliberate upon and take decisions on reports directly, or set up an advisory committee, which is really what White Paper Drafting Committees are, to suggest lines of action. The work of a drafting committee becomes a White Paper only when government deliberates on it, and decides on its recommendations. In some instances, many decisions in white papers require legislation, while others only outline intentions and plans for further administrative action or policy initiation or review. In almost all instances, White Paper drafting committees do not undertake activities beyond advising on recommendations or other contents of reports, even if there are good grounds for doing so. They do not, for instance, undertake additional investigation, or verification, and they do not undertake fresh assignments. They can, and do advise on additional work on parts of reports.

White Papers therefore almost never offend the basic interests of leaders which appoint them. Generally, the degree to which governments respond positively or negatively to recommendations and other submissions of reports is largely a reflection of their perception over how their core interests will be affected. White Papers serve the purpose of availing governments the benefits of additional technical or administrative advise before it takes decisions. They also help to buy time, a precious commodity which can always be invoked to delay decision-making. They are also used to totally discredit reports governments do not like.

The White Paper Drafting Committees recently appointed by President Jonathan on the report submitted by Malam Nuhu Ribadu and two others represent one of the extremes in terms of the value which administrations attach to the work of white paper drafting committees. This is the extreme that will make them the least useful in terms of adding value to the decision-making process, as opposed to those which maximize the quality of the output. White Papers drafted by Ministers suffer from the basic drawback that the views they contain are essentially those the administration holds already. All White Papers come back to the Federal Executive Council for deliberations and decisions, the same Council where Ministers who draft them will be sitting, facing other Ministers and the President whose decisions, interests and fates hang on their recommendations. They will all be drafted in a fairly familiar context, in circumstances known to those who draft them, and with a mindset which cautions that when dealing with Ministers of Petroleum, Finance and Justice, and powerful people like Steven Oronsaye, it is best to toe the familiar line. The work of these White Paper drafting Committees is to reinforce government position on deregulation, on refineries, on financing of operations, on payment of subsidies, on recoveries of funds, and on a number of other issues on which the position of the administration is already familiar.

The White Paper drafting committee which is to look into the report shot down by Mr Steven Oronsaye during presentation is likely to have the easiest task of the three. Both Mr Oronsaye and the President’s spokespersons have said the report is fatally flawed from carrying data which is incomplete and unreliable. Key organizations implicated by the report such as the NNPC have taken up pages to cast doubts on the reliability of the report. The media has been awash with justifications for the action of Mr Oronsaye, who referred to the committee in the third person when discussing its work. Other members of the committee insist that accusations of a flawed process used in compiling the report is to divert attention from its substance.

It is very likely that the Ministers who will draft a White Paper for consideration of the President and their colleagues will pay appropriate attention to the fall-out and media war being waged around the report. They are most likely going to focus attention on the contents of the report, but will without doubt accord substantial importance to a paragraph in the forwarding letter which suggested that not all the data in the report could be verified owing to lack of time. They will not have the time, the capacity or the approval to undertake such verification. They are likely to toe the line of least resistance by drawing attention to what is already widely known: the position of government to the effect that it cannot compel persons and organizations to refund money because there is no sufficient basis to do so.

Nigerians should not expect much from the three White Paper drafting committees set up to advise government on what to do with extremely important reports on reforms of the oil and gas sector. The White Papers will buy government a little time, but are unlikely to change positions of government. But the report of the Nuhu Ribadu committee cannot be salvaged by a White Paper. The only way it can be of any value is if the administration hands it over to another committee with sufficient integrity, competence and capacity to assess its value, and undertake whatever additional verification is needed. A White Paper on the Nuhu Ribadu committee report is very likely to be heavily influenced by the same interests that torpedoed it, and to describe it as whitewash will do an injustice to whitewashing exercises.  

The babel from Sokoto

“A dog with a bone in his mouth does not bark.” Ghanaian Proverb.

The Sokoto Zonal Public Hearing conducted by the Senate on 14^th and 15^th of November on amendments to the constitution were profoundly revealing. The symbolism of holding the zonal hearing in a State and city which serves as the springboard of much of the ethno-religious tendencies which dominate much of the north today appeared lost on the vast majority of the people who participated in the hearings. Although it was mentioned by one or two speakers as a deliberate choice, in reality the choice may have been informed more by security considerations than anything else. Certainly the venue was very far from Kano and Kaduna, the western frontlines in the war against an insurgency which itself claims substantial legitimacy from the spiritual fountain which Sokoto represented. It was also safe as a PDP stronghold, and V.I.Ps and Senators need not have feared hostile mobs or environments. There is the possibility that the choice of Sokoto was informed by the idea that it represented a political fortress of the people of the region, or, in any case, majority of them.

Those who made the journey to participate in what turned out to be an expensive charade would have noticed how peaceful and serene Sokoto and neighbouring states are, compared to others in the zone or in the north. You would think that the people have never heard of Boko Haram; and even the few police and military checkpoints that are barely visible are looking out more for rampaging mobs which have terrorized villages in Zamfara and Kaduna States than insurgents.

Northern leaders may have been lulled by the idea that there was no pressing need to be at Sokoto at the hearings. Certainly, only the Governor of Kano State of the seven governors in the zone attended. The Sultan and the host governor were absent. The Emir of Gwandu and a sprinkling of traditional rulers put up an appearance, and one of them made a presentation on behalf of traditional rulers. There were no prominent clergy; no politicians save the senators whose participation was apparently mandatory and paid for; no intelligentsia and very few young people, except for those who followed senators around fighting each other for little money. The women there were the usual retinue which followed politicians around; except for one or two very brave women who insisted on being heard. The multitudes of northern groups which sprang up in the last two three years were absent, except for groups such as the CODE Group and the Arewa Reawakening Forum who braved odds and a noisy and chaotic atmosphere to have their voices heard.

What the Sokoto zonal hearing lacked in political muscle and quality was more than made up by a surfeit of pedestrian and self-defeating presentations. The vast majority of the presentations made cases only for creation of states in the northwest zone. The vast hall in which the hearing held was taken up by placed-carrying people bussed-in from especially Kano, Jigawa, Kaduna and Katsina states to make cases for creation of additional states. These cases made, at great expense to the public and with active support and funding by Governors and some of the senators in the hall received loud ovations from mobs that took over the hall. Presentations which attracted attention and applause, which were few, included those which made cases for full autonomy for Local Governments, removal of immunity clause against elected persons, and those related to sharing of national assets and resources.

The governor of Kano State made maximum use of the passing presence of the President of the Senate, David Mark, to raise the bar in the case he has been making for review of the onshore-offshore dichotomy, and the fact that the southeast has no special right to demand additional state(s) in a manner that suggests that it is a do-or-die affair. He played to a very popular gallery, and his no-holds-barred stance may have contributed to the painstaking assurances given by Senator David Mark that the review exercise was going to be fair and thorough.

For a two-day event which addressed the fundamentals of the Nigerian nation held in a part of the country being increasingly defined by poverty and violence, those who thought they will hear presentations or suggestions on how the constitutional amendment exercise could mitigate the problems of the north were sorely disappointed. Not one single presenter mentioned Boko Haram, or the crippling levels of corruption and insensitivity which is alienating the bulk of the citizenry from the democratic process. There were elder statesmen, many of whom should have stayed at home and sent their grandchildren to the hearing, with their contribution if necessary. There were submissions from regional groups, and elderly members who are part of regional groups who chose to present their own views. Groups from Kaduna State showed the deep disunity around the clamour for another state by the unseemly scramble for Kaduna city in all their demands. Proposals were presented to create two or three states from states which daily claim that they can barely invest in infrastructure and human capital development after paying salaries. Governor Kwankwaso who made a passionate case for review of revenue sharing formula and the weakness of the north had three delegations from his state looking for their own states, apparently with his blessing.

The Sokoto zonal hearing exposed the lack of vision and cohesion in the north. It exposed the contempt of governors and other prominent politicians for the democratic process in the manner they boycotted a popular avenue to work with the people, principally because they have the powers to shoot down any proposed amendment they do not like. The biggest contribution made at the Sokoto zonal hearing was towards the cause of the southeast zone for additional state(s). Now that northerners are falling over themselves for additional states, the coast is clear for the southeast. If one additional state is created in the southeast, a major political goal would have been achieved by leaders from that zone. But two, three or four additional states in the north will crippled the region further, and compound its poverty and the fragmentation of its leadership. The rest of the nation must be lamenting the disastrous collapse of leadership in a region which a few years back basically set the rules of the game. No northern leaders led with vision, or competence during the entire preparations and conduct of these hearings. Little wonder, therefore, that the vast majority were left to believe that state creation is what the entire exercise is about.

Still, when all is said and done, the lack of leadership and foresight in the north may have inadvertently saved the region and the nation from a very expensive blunder. Every state for which a case is made is as deserving for consideration as others, including those from the southeast and south-south. Since you cannot create 19, 27, or 43 new states, the solution lies in creating none. Similarly, since the nation appears to have ignored the clamour from the southwest for substantial devolution of power to states (and the implied strengthening of zonal arrangements and greater autonomy), this too will not enjoy an overwhelming national endorsement in the end. The case being made by the south-south for larger share of revenues from oil and gas will also fail, as it confronts a nation which also wants more, not less from them.

The political fortunes of the north are dwindling by the day. The rest of the nation will be increasingly exasperated by a region which merely presents itself as a spoiler, a weak and divided people who cannot even decide what they want. If any evidence is needed that the region needs to radically improve the manner it organizes itself, it was all there in the open to see in Sokoto, Makurdi and Gombe last week.

Rules of disengagement

“Victory in this war will not determine who is right, only who is left” Anonymous graffiti 

 

The dust raised by the chilling indictment of the Nigerian security agencies and the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Diddaawati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ) (a.k.a. Boko Haram) by Amnesty International had hardly settled down when the war was taken up to new levels in Yobe and Borno States. In one skirmish alone, over 40 people were reported killed, and morgues were reported to be overflowing with bodies. A bombing mission which appeared to have targeted a resumption of ethno-religious mayhem in Kaduna took lives, and was contained only by a rising awareness among locals that they are being goaded into fighting someone elses’ war. Then the war took its most prized casualty: a living war legend, General Muhammadu Shuwa. Shot in his home amidst friends in broad daylight in an area littered by military checkpoints, the killing of General Shuwa was the most conclusive evidence that this war is being escalated by both sides, and its implications should worry more than just the administration.

 

Not all the speculations over coincidences in the manner this conflict is unfolding are idle. There are questions being asked about linkages between the quarrels between PDP and ANPP leaders in Borno State over who is the real sponsor of the insurgency, and what links they may have with the murder of General Shuwa who was a prominent ANPP chieftain. There are questions around the purported offer of peace talks between the JASLIWAJ and the government, and preconditions which included the prosecution of governor Sheriff. There have been one or two murders of other prominent ANPP leaders in the State, so speculations are being made with regards to the possibility that the offer to talk peace may be an olive branch from ANPP. Again, there are speculations that the entire peace gesture is all a ploy to create the impression that the insurgency wants peace, while putting forward conditions which are virtually impossible to accept. Finally, there are speculations that the offer to talk is a trap to rope in General Muhammadu Buhari and one or two respected elders, and is being made by interests far from the insurgency.

 

The denial of responsibility for the murder of General Shuwa by the same spokesman who put forward the peace offer adds another twist. It reinforces the suspicion that there are factions of the insurgency which are active; or are entirely independent of known leaders; or rogue elements on the fringes of the insurgency; or interests which have hijacked its franchise and modus operandi to weaken the state. These suspicions only serve to make this problem altogether much more serious.

 

In the midst of these conflicting scenarios, it may be safe to isolate issues which may be reasonably assumed as making sense. One is that General Buhari is most unlikely to take up the nomination from an insurgency he has been variously accused of creating, sustaining or supporting. His party says the entire offer is a ploy to link him up with the insurgency. It is unlikely that a man who aspires to lead the nation, will take up an offer from a group which fundamentally repudiates the concept and existence of the Nigerian state as it exists. He will be accused of refusing to help, of course, but that will be a cross he will have to bear. He will be damned if he does accept; and damned if he doesn’t. Others on the list “nominated” by the insurgency will also very carefully weigh the full implications of their nomination, both in terms of the conditions set forth by the insurgency, and by the chances of any success.

 

Another dimension which could be considered settled is the fact of the existence of a full blown war which neither government nor the insurgency is likely to win without massive, additional damage to the citizenry and economy of the nation. The civilian population in the epicenters of Yobe and Borno States, as well as major towns in Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa Taraba, Kano and Kaduna State and even Abuja are now effectively hostages of an insurgency which is intricately woven into the fabric of communities that pay huge penalties for it. The security agencies, in spite of periodic complaints from community elders, Amnesty International and much of the international media, will most likely sustain their aggressive pursuit of the enemy, and lean very hard on young men, wives and children until the insurgency is wiped out. That, from all appearances, will take some time, and massive casualties to accomplish.

 

It is obvious that government and this insurgency both need the active involvement of leaders with credibility and courage to intervene and facilitate the beginnings of a resolution. The claim by a spokeman of the insurgency that it is ready to talk will be welcomed, but the conditions for it are not likely to be accepted by the administration. To the extent that it represents a genuine offer to talk, it is a serious step which should be considered. The manner it was made, however, is likely to scuttle it, and will make subsequent attempts to engineer negotiations in future more difficult. Government also needs a breathing space, and must be acutely conscious that the insurgency has succeeded in creating massive hostility against security agents in the active frontlines of this war. With the community harassed and hostile, a scorched earth policy by security agents is exactly what the insurgency needs to create enclaves and sustain campaigns.

 

A disengagement strategy should now be initiated by northern leaders with politicians, including Generals Buhari, Babangida, Abdussalami, Atiku, Ribadu, Maitama Sule, Ali Munguno, Ango Abdullahi, Jibril Aminu and others getting off the fence and rallying around other leaders to the cause. They should work with respected muslim and community leaders from Borno and Yobe States to engage northern governors and other leaders of political groups in the north. A coherent and practical outline of a planned resolution, starting with a three-month moratorium, should be discussed with the President. The Vice President must be actively involved in all stages of these discussions. Northern christian leaders should also be closely briefed on progress and should play active roles in the search for resolution. Ultimately, a national momentum towards full and final resolution should be created.

 

Matters relating to release of women and children, treatment of detainees, release of suspects who have no cases to answer should be prioritized. Government should be prevailed upon to address these as signs of good faith, and as evidence that it can respond to the grievances of communities. Positions on limiting collateral damage in or around communities, as well as those which encourage insurgents to reduce or stop attacks on security agents should be discussed with government.

 

Once a credible and genuine framework has been established in which respected community and religious leaders are involved, comprehensive peace talks should take place, and should target cessation of hostilities, rehabilitation and restitution demands of the insurgency as well as other issues it raises. It should be made clear to the insurgency that the talks and the resolution efforts are not merely meant to accommodate its demands and appease it unconditionally: the Nigerian state and all citizens also have demands and rights which the talks must table and protect as well.

 

The north is facing its biggest and most destructive challenge. Its leaders who sit and wait for Boko Haram or the government to invite them to mediate in this horrific war have no claims to leadership. They should get out of their comfort zones, and shape its destiny.

Back to the trenches

“It is a good thing to follow the First Law of Holes; if you are in one, stop digging.” Denis Healey, 1983

The President’s men are busy putting out lengthy repudiations of allegations and suspicions that he has an agenda to scuttle the numerous initiatives towards arresting corruption and waste in our oil and gas sector. They say he has no personal interest or agenda in the outcome of the various investigations into the subsidy regime, recovery of funds, reorganization of the sector, or the prosecution or other punitive action against proven fraud. The media blitz is intended to repair major damage arising from the publicized fall-out over the report submitted by Malam Nuhu Ribadu and his colleagues, and which was ambushed and trashed by Steven Oronsaye, (a member of the committee who did not participate in its work), and a member of the Board of the NNPC and the CBN. The presidency must also be doing a good job feeling the pulse of the nation regarding many other developments over which there is rising frustration over seeming lethargy or indecision, or over moves to scuttle progress earned only through massive public outcry.

If the men who have responsibility for evaluating their public relations outings do their jobs well, they should know that they are fighting a lost battle. Indeed, the frantic efforts to assure Nigerians that reforms of the oil and gas sector are on track, and President Jonathan’s commitment is beyond question are evidence of some awareness that most Nigerians feel that they have lost all the advantages they gained through one of the most popular acts of resistance against entrenched corruption and impunity around the Nigerian state by citizens. The national uprising against the removal of subsidy provided a rare opportunity to subject the entire sector to a most rigorous scrutiny and genuine reform. The nation watched as the President set up committees with people of registered levels of competence and integrity, and set in motion reforms towards improving transparency and accountability in an industry which had resisted reforms for decades. Additional costs of petroleum products were tolerated on the basis of arguments that the long-term benefits will be well worth the pains of the removal. Doubts regarding the credibility of an exercise superintended by some of the very people that had overseen the industry were assuaged by assurances that President Jonathan himself will take charge of reforms.

It did not take long before cynics began to be proven right. The strategic Petroleum Industry Bill became subject of intense debate, and its many variants were still being influenced by the awesome powers of industry players and even foreign nations directly. As we speak, the national assembly is set to conduct public hearings on it, and no one should hold their breadth over its outcome. It is almost certainly going to be a rehash of the same arguments over its weaknesses and limitations from key industry players; and the need to verify its authenticity and implement it by civil society groups and labour unions.

The Farouk Lawal-Otedola bribery saga which is still being investigated had all the hallmarks of an ambush, and appears to have succeeded in tainting the efforts of the House of Representatives to isolate and submit massive fraud around subsidy to the demands of the law. Then the battle moved to the heart of government itself: skirmishes involving powerful ministers of finance, justice and petroleum over what steps to take against which people suspected, being investigated, or proven to have received illegal payments for importing revenues threatened to scuttle the whole exercise. Persons who have become intimately involved with the political fortunes of the administration faced threats of being hung out to dry, and therefore began to manipulate the many fault lines in the supply chain they are extremely familiar with. When the state threatened to lean hard on then, they pressed buttons which instantly created long quenes, or ran to shadowy, powerful power-brokers for relief. Token attempts at prosecution of a few importers became spectacles as expensive legal firms battled to secure bails and stall commencement of trials.

In the midst of all these bewildering summersaults, budgets began to bear hallmarks of the past. Amounts budgeted for payments for subsidy showed little gain from removal, whichever figure was used. Queues began to emerge and then disappear. Refineries worked and failed, and Nigerians in most parts of the nation bought petrol at anywhere between N120 to N150 per liter. Government says it is exporting more crude than it has ever done, and admits that crude theft is now the biggest organized crime, depriving the nation of billions. Benefits of the removed subsidy show little impact, and youth unemployment in particular was spectacularly highlighted by the engagement of doctorate degree holders as drivers by Dangote.

Just when you think things couldn’t get worse, they do. Government spokesmen now say that Steven Oronsaye’s denunciation of Nuhu Ribadu committee’s report as incomplete and unreliable is its official position. There is a lot of apprehension over the outcome of the House of Representatives’ investigation into the Farouk-Otedola bribery saga, with a new twist added when Otedola sued the Speaker recently. Carefully crafted insertions into newspapers as news stories hint at serious in-fighting at the top achelons of government over directions of policy and strategy for the entire industry. Personal security of key ministers is reportedly an issue, and there are planted stories of serious resistance from colleagues against attempts by some ministers to affect real change in the sector.

Now civil society groups are beginning to mobilize and reclaim lost ground. They believe that they have the high moral ground to say that the administration of President Jonathan is insincere and undeserving of any more trust from Nigerians. If they do succeed in generating sufficient interest and support to re-engage the presidency and the national assembly on any scale approximating the popular resistance of January 2012, then the nation is in for another bruising, but quite possibly more prolonged encounter. For a nation already face-to-face with an expanding insurgency, various threats to life and property and dwindling opportunities for employment particularly among the young, mass action against the administration on any issue at this time will be disastrous. The nation is back in the trenches, but there may still be time to salvage the benefits which were won with lives, blood and sweat around this time last year.