A DESERVED END FOR GADDAFI

It now appears certain that Muammar Gaddafi has been defeated by a combined force of his own people and the bombs of Europeans operating under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO. He may, or may not be captured alive by rebels who have broken into his residence, and are in control of most of Tripoli. In the next day or two, it will be all over for a man who has ruled Libya with an iron fist for over 40 years, and who believed, to the last moment, that he will survive the resistance of his own people and their demands that he step down. The fire that was lit in Tunisia last year by an unemployed man in protest over his economic travails has now burned right across the Maghreb and the Arab world. Gaddafi is its latest casualty, but it is by no means certain that Syria, Jordan, Yemen and other monarchies such as Saudi Arabia are going to be safe from its far-reaching impact.

          The end of the road for Gaddafi was predicted by many who followed his career as a long-term dictator, and his psychological disposition which gave him the impression of being a life-time leader of Libya and, eventually, all of Africa. While Ben Ali fled Tunisia just a few days into his people’s uprising; and Mubarak succumbed after a few months of spirited resistance, Gaddafi dug in. It was clear from his response to the initial demand of the Libyan people that he step aside that Gaddafi was going to resist to the end. His strategy of throwing his considerable military might against unarmed citizens who rebelled against him, and the elaborate attempt to split his people along ethnic and regional lines delayed his ouster, and cost many more lives and damage to his nation than would have been the case if he had accepted that the will of a people can be resisted, but not defeated.

          Gaddafi’s end is a most ignominious one for a man who could have gone down in history as leading the transformation of a backward, but potentially rich North African nation into prosperity and sustained development. He started very well, earning the Libyan people’s admiration and respect for investing in massive social and economic infrastructure, and periodically provoking the West and the US over the weaknesses of Africa as a consequence of their dominance. His maverick character offended many, and earned him many friends. Often, he switched both in one fell swoop. He led the Libyan people into many confrontations with neighbours and the West, and when he and his officials were accused of shooting down an American passenger aircraft, the West fought him with awesome arsenals. He survived with his life and his position, but the citizens of Libya suffered a long period of isolation and deprivation. He used the period of his isolation to build up a military arsenal of his own, which reportedly included weapons of mass destruction, at great cost to the welfare and progress of citizens of Libya.            

          Then the maverick in Gaddafi decided to befriend the old enemy, the West, once more and he did this in a dramatic manner, by destroying his considerable military arsenal in public, and paying over $2b in compensation for the shooting down of the US plane. He then went on a campaign to woo the West further, which was not a difficult task, given the fact that he had considerable oil resources to continue to offer. He turned his attention south to Africa, and intensified his campaign for a continental government under his leadership. Gaddafi was sitting smugly under the false impression that the West now liked him; Africa will succumb to the aggressive pursuit of his ambition oiled by huge handouts to select African leaders; and his people will love and follow him forever.

          Then the wind of change blowing across the Mediterranean and Arab countries reached Libya. Gaddafi never for one moment believed he will lose a war against his own people, and he dismissed the initial demands from some citizens in Libya and an influential group of Libyans in exile that he step down, as the antics of a small group of traitors. He badly misjudged the mood of the Libyan people, and the opportunism of the West which now saw a chance to redeem its record of supporting dictators by siding with the people in North Africa. Western nations pushed through a resolution in the UN ostensibly to protect civilians against Gaddafi’s forces, but the world knew it was the signal for an all-out assault to remove Gaddafi from Libya. NATO forces, led by France and Britain pounded Gaddafi’s forces, provided critical intelligence to Libyans fighting him, and crippled his troops substantially from fighting back. A rag-tag army with strong support from the air succeeded in pushing Gaddafi’s forces to Tripoli and defeat, and it is likely that Gaddafi may pay the supreme price for his folly, and may take his children with him.

          Now that Gaddafi is out of the picture, Libyans will have to meet many new challenges. The most important challenge is to secure the military victory, and convert it into a political asset that will hold Libya together and create some semblance of a government. Then the task of building civil institutions and the elementary structures of a democratic system will have to commence. Disarming the population and building bridges between those who fought against and those who supported Gaddafi will also require a strong authority and very delicate handling.

          Then there will also be the issue of the pay back to the West to be considered. The Western allies in NATO who sent planes to bomb Gaddafi and Libyans who fought for him are already falling over themselves to recognise and strengthen the National Transition Council, the leadership which is likely to claim legitimacy as a government in post-Gaddafi Libya. Libya’s huge oil revenues and the prospects of huge contracts in rebuilding Libya and in other long-term projects will now be cornered by France and Britain. They will demand that Libyans show appropriate appreciation in economic terms; and they will be actively involved in shaping Libya’s future political directions. Some Libyans will resent the incursion of Western Europe into their lives, and many will be reminded of the re-appearance of the Crusades in Europe against Islam some centuries ago.

          Gaddafi’s folly has opened an opportunity for Europe and the US to take a major stranglehold in the affairs of Africa. It has also further weakened Africa, which watched as European countries, which turned a blind eye on the excesses and abuses of leaders like Gaddafi for decades, now turn to support their ouster, because their own people had had enough. Nigeria’s early recognition of the Libyan rebels will have very little diplomatic effect, because it should have come during the struggle to remove Gaddafi, not after. Other African countries’ hesitation in recognising the new leaders will also further weaken Nigeria’s position, and portray Africa as weak, divided and ineffective. If we could not identify a just cause until a victor emerged in Libya, Libyans will dismiss Africa’s response as belated, opportunistic and secondary to that of Europe and the US.

The success in removing Gaddafi is the victory of the Libyan people. But they have many more challenges in transforming a military victory into a political one. There will be new threats to their unity, security and survival as a nation. They will have to find a way to deal with so-called allies who will now present economic and political bills for settlement. They will have to build a new, democratic Libya. This is not going to be easy, but the manner they have struggled to free Libya of Gaddafi suggests that they can succeed. If Nigeria and the rest of Africa could not or would not help them during that struggle, they should now stand with them, and assist them to rebuild their nation on the basis of the interests of Libyans, not NATO countries.