As soon as it became obvious that the combined assault of Libyans who took up arms against the intransigence and arrogance of their leader, Muammar Gaddafi, as well the intense bombing campaign of NATO forces appeared to be tipping the balance of the war against Gaddafi, the Nigerian government announced that it was recognizing the National Transitional Council (N.T.C) as the legitimate government in Libya. The Nigerian government therefore broke ranks with the African Union and key African countries whose opinions and views are vital on all matter relating to developments in Africa. The Nigerian Government must have thought that it was charting a course for the rest of Africa in the manner it rushed to take a position. It must also have assumed that Gaddafi would fall much earlier than now, but he is still fighting. Finally, Nigeria must have assumed that its early recognition will earn it some credit points with NATO countries and the US. Nigeria has been wrong on all three assumptions.
Nigeria’s pre-eminent position in Africa, carved out during decades of sacrifice, statesmanship and courage by former Nigerian leaders, and a steadfast and enlightened support from the Nigerian people has been substantially eroded in the last two decades. From the mid 1970s until the mid 1990s, every step Nigeria took at the African and global stage was well thought-out, and was informed by the core concerns for the integrity and interest of the African people. The African continent and the world cultivated or waited for Nigeria to take a stand on African issues before taking a stand. Nigerian troops and funds were deployed all over Africa to resolve and sustain security and peace, and many lives of Nigerian soldiers were sacrificed so that other Africans can find peace in their countries. The Western world courted Nigeria on all sensitive and strategic issues, and avoided serious disagreements with Nigeria. With other African nations such as Egypt, Algeria, Senegal, South Africa and Ethiopia, among others, Nigeria also consulted widely, and retained the trust and faith of African countries on all vital issues on security and development.
Nigeria lost that pre-eminent position, in spite of it large population, economic clout and strategic importance through sheer incompetence and a succession of leaders who were happier to be applauded by the western nations than by their own people. It also lost its position to other African nations which focussed on real development around their own people, and which recognized that globalization has made it necessary to compete with all nations, or perish. Nigeria’s image of a rich but corrupt and insecure nation, and of it leaders and people who had abandoned the hallowed values of handwork and sacrifice as foundations for real and sustained development, made it easier for Western nations and emerging Asian powers to pitch tents with other smaller, but better-organized African nations. Nigeria became just another African nation, challenged by smaller nations at every forum and occasion, and ignored by the world’s major powers. It was useful only for its oil, and the world worried over the potentials of a serious conflict in Nigeria for the rest of Africa and the world.
The rapidly declining influence of Nigeria in African and world affairs will explain its failure to rally African countries around a common position at the beginning of a civil war in Libya that showed, from the onset, that it will take many casualties in its course. One of its first casualties was African unity of propose and the capacity to limit the potential damage which NATO countries’ involvement in the Libyan civil war will entail. Africa stood watching; and the few nations which took a stand, such as South Africa, acted purely on the basis of informed self interest. Libyan people received no comfort or inspiration from fellow African people, while NATO countries exploited their desperate need for assistance and support to implement a long-standing agenda of removing Muammar Gaddafi. Africa lost an opportunity to reinforce its unity and resolve, and take a position consistent with the interest of Libyan people.
Nigeria’s almost unilateral and hasty recognition of the National Transitional Council (N.T.C) merely highlights the absence of strategic thinking and poor quality of our foreign policy. It is obvious that the rush to support the NTC was informed by the expectation that Gaddafi would fall. He has not, at least not yet, and the NTC is still substantially recognized by NATO countries. It is also by no means clear that the N.T.C will be able to form and lead a nation which will go through many challenges. Certainly, the N.T.C will have to be run by NATO countries, and unless Nigeria wants to be a lackey of these countries, its position needs some distance from their’s. If Nigerian’s hasty recognition of the N.T.C is also aimed at impressing NATO countries, then the administration has badly miscalculated the political space available in the conflict. NATO is in this struggle of the Libyan people for itself and its need for Libyan oil resources, and it will not yeild any ground for Nigeria, particularly now that it has no capacity to bring in the rest of Africa in tow. Even more important, Nigeria's lone position in Africa will not impress the Libyan people, who know only too well that it is too little too late.
Nigeria could have considered a number of options before taking a position which is out of step with the rest of Africa. One option would have been to pursue a vigorous campaign to rally Africa behind one position in relation to the Libyan crisis long before its current stage. Africa needed to take a position on the moral and political imperatives of the conflict, and may have helped in easing Gaddafi out, or negotiating his position with his people. Or it could itself have adopted an aggressive campaign against Gaddafi, and led the mobilization of international diplomatic and, if necessary, a military onslaught against Gaddafi. This way, it could have reduced the scale of involvement of NATO, and therefore the potential damage of long-term Western influence in the Maghreb.
As things stand, Nigeria is being criticised by fellow African nations for its decision on Libya. It could ignore these criticisms, as it appears to be doing, but it will do so only at some cost of the remnants of its credibility as an African leader. Nigeria’s decision to recognise the N.T.C. at a stage when all the factors at play are not yet clear will not yield much dividend. Whatever happens, Gaddafi’s hold as Libyan leader is over. His removal is a victory of the Libyan people and a strategic coup for NATO countries. Africa lost an opportunity much earlier to stand with the Libyan people against a dictator. The Libyan people will remember this in future. They are not likely to remember that Nigeria attempted to make up for lost ground by a diplomatic initiative that is too little, too late.
Nigeria’s pre-eminent position in Africa, carved out during decades of sacrifice, statesmanship and courage by former Nigerian leaders, and a steadfast and enlightened support from the Nigerian people has been substantially eroded in the last two decades. From the mid 1970s until the mid 1990s, every step Nigeria took at the African and global stage was well thought-out, and was informed by the core concerns for the integrity and interest of the African people. The African continent and the world cultivated or waited for Nigeria to take a stand on African issues before taking a stand. Nigerian troops and funds were deployed all over Africa to resolve and sustain security and peace, and many lives of Nigerian soldiers were sacrificed so that other Africans can find peace in their countries. The Western world courted Nigeria on all sensitive and strategic issues, and avoided serious disagreements with Nigeria. With other African nations such as Egypt, Algeria, Senegal, South Africa and Ethiopia, among others, Nigeria also consulted widely, and retained the trust and faith of African countries on all vital issues on security and development.
Nigeria lost that pre-eminent position, in spite of it large population, economic clout and strategic importance through sheer incompetence and a succession of leaders who were happier to be applauded by the western nations than by their own people. It also lost its position to other African nations which focussed on real development around their own people, and which recognized that globalization has made it necessary to compete with all nations, or perish. Nigeria’s image of a rich but corrupt and insecure nation, and of it leaders and people who had abandoned the hallowed values of handwork and sacrifice as foundations for real and sustained development, made it easier for Western nations and emerging Asian powers to pitch tents with other smaller, but better-organized African nations. Nigeria became just another African nation, challenged by smaller nations at every forum and occasion, and ignored by the world’s major powers. It was useful only for its oil, and the world worried over the potentials of a serious conflict in Nigeria for the rest of Africa and the world.
The rapidly declining influence of Nigeria in African and world affairs will explain its failure to rally African countries around a common position at the beginning of a civil war in Libya that showed, from the onset, that it will take many casualties in its course. One of its first casualties was African unity of propose and the capacity to limit the potential damage which NATO countries’ involvement in the Libyan civil war will entail. Africa stood watching; and the few nations which took a stand, such as South Africa, acted purely on the basis of informed self interest. Libyan people received no comfort or inspiration from fellow African people, while NATO countries exploited their desperate need for assistance and support to implement a long-standing agenda of removing Muammar Gaddafi. Africa lost an opportunity to reinforce its unity and resolve, and take a position consistent with the interest of Libyan people.
Nigeria’s almost unilateral and hasty recognition of the National Transitional Council (N.T.C) merely highlights the absence of strategic thinking and poor quality of our foreign policy. It is obvious that the rush to support the NTC was informed by the expectation that Gaddafi would fall. He has not, at least not yet, and the NTC is still substantially recognized by NATO countries. It is also by no means clear that the N.T.C will be able to form and lead a nation which will go through many challenges. Certainly, the N.T.C will have to be run by NATO countries, and unless Nigeria wants to be a lackey of these countries, its position needs some distance from their’s. If Nigerian’s hasty recognition of the N.T.C is also aimed at impressing NATO countries, then the administration has badly miscalculated the political space available in the conflict. NATO is in this struggle of the Libyan people for itself and its need for Libyan oil resources, and it will not yeild any ground for Nigeria, particularly now that it has no capacity to bring in the rest of Africa in tow. Even more important, Nigeria's lone position in Africa will not impress the Libyan people, who know only too well that it is too little too late.
Nigeria could have considered a number of options before taking a position which is out of step with the rest of Africa. One option would have been to pursue a vigorous campaign to rally Africa behind one position in relation to the Libyan crisis long before its current stage. Africa needed to take a position on the moral and political imperatives of the conflict, and may have helped in easing Gaddafi out, or negotiating his position with his people. Or it could itself have adopted an aggressive campaign against Gaddafi, and led the mobilization of international diplomatic and, if necessary, a military onslaught against Gaddafi. This way, it could have reduced the scale of involvement of NATO, and therefore the potential damage of long-term Western influence in the Maghreb.
As things stand, Nigeria is being criticised by fellow African nations for its decision on Libya. It could ignore these criticisms, as it appears to be doing, but it will do so only at some cost of the remnants of its credibility as an African leader. Nigeria’s decision to recognise the N.T.C. at a stage when all the factors at play are not yet clear will not yield much dividend. Whatever happens, Gaddafi’s hold as Libyan leader is over. His removal is a victory of the Libyan people and a strategic coup for NATO countries. Africa lost an opportunity much earlier to stand with the Libyan people against a dictator. The Libyan people will remember this in future. They are not likely to remember that Nigeria attempted to make up for lost ground by a diplomatic initiative that is too little, too late.
Well put, Hakeem. Let's hope we have all learnt from this faux pas. Incidentally, I did anticipate the Libyan debacle in my latest book, HEGEMONY AND SOVEREIGN EQUALITY. Interested readers may wish to follow the links:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.noguff.com/exopolitics/products/International-Relations.html
http://books.google.com/books/about/Hegemony_and_Sovereign_Equality.html?id=Iyfvu8UZwQEC
http://www.booksamillion.com/p/Hegemony-Sovereign-Equality/M-J-Balogun/9781441983329