THIS ELUSIVE DRAWING BOARD

“Truth exists; only lies are invented”.
G. Braque, 1882 – 1963

Barely twenty four hours after the influential cleric Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi claimed that he has been mandated by the Federal Government to negotiate with the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ) and that he was already on talking terms with the insurgency, the group released a statement repudiating his claim, and closing the door against any future negotiations with the government of Nigeria. The JASLIWAJ warned the cleric with quite possibly the largest following among muslim clerics in the north to stay clear of its conflict with the Nigerian State, and not to allow his revered name to be dragged in the mud. The statement confirmed what the Sheikh denied, which is that Dr Datti Ahmed did initiate some mediation which later collapsed.

The blaze of publicity which announced the entry of Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi into the tricky waters of relations between JASLIWAJ and the Nigerian government had raised hopes that the crippling confrontations between the insurgency and the government may abate soon. Perhaps the manner the Sheikh chose to announce his involvement, with a torrent of details and a tinge of doctrinal celebration should have alerted people knowledgeable in these matters that it was all too good to be true. Certainly, a letter from a state government official and a press conference in which the Sheikh bares all was highly unlikely to build confidence. In fact, the press conference itself was held amidst one of the longest and most bloody confrontations between the JASLIWAJ and security forces in Maiduguri which reportedly took lives on both sides. It was held one day before the assassination of a retired Deputy Inspector-General of Police in Kano took place, for which the group later claimed credit. For good measure, JASLIWAJ says it will continue to attack the “who is who” in the country.

Ordinarily, you would say we are back to the drawing board. But is there a drawing board, and if there is one, who is drawing what on it? The federal government has not confirmed that it mandated Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi to negotiate on its behalf; and it is most unlikely to, particularly since its security spokespersons and ministers keep telling the nation that the back of the JASLIWAJ has been essentially broken, which is why attacks and bombings are becoming less frequent. The statement which denied that the Sheikh has the ear of the JASLIWAJ was concluded in the usual combative language of the insurgency, with claims of unreported victories over security forces and threats to media organizations which show bias against the group.

Now we have two outstanding and respected Muslims who have got their fingers burnt. These are the ones we know. Our traditional rulers are engaged in unending meetings and contacts which they hope will limit the damage of the insurgency, but there are no results to show for these efforts. Only two weeks ago, a powerful northern group of elders demanded that President Jonathan reins in his rampaging security forces, and re-opens negotiations with JASLIWAJ. That visit was the clearest statement they could have made to the effect that northern elders have no solution for this crippling insurgency. Northern governors are limited to mouthing meaningless platitudes and throwing bits and pieces of relief at victims of the conflict because they are themselves prime targets of the insurgency. They spend huge amounts in support of security task forces, but have no influence over how they operate. Citizens do not look up to governors to protect them either against the insurgency or security forces. They bear the brunt of a conflict without recourse to relief or restitution.

What about the Muslim clergy, then? The fundamental basis of JASLIWAJ dispute with the Nigerian State is doctrinal. The insurgency is pre-eminently a repudiation of mainstream Muslim doctrines which essentially accept that it is possible to be both a good Muslim and live in a secular nation. Every once in a while, these tensions have resulted in uprisings and other forms of conflict. They have in fact, become a permanent feature in the history of Muslims in the north of Nigeria. These tensions are what produced the Maitatsine and similar uprisings, and they were remotely behind the attempts to expand the scope of Sharia in the north.

The deep-seated sectarian divide in the north as well as the weakness of the Muslim clergy in mainstream political activities have precluded a comprehensive approach to understanding the nature of these tensions, and how they should be approached. The JASLIWAJ is the worst case scenario for a weak Muslim leadership. Now you have a movement which has its roots in abuses by a secular state, and a historical tradition which periodically chart throws up group that a course for Nigerian Muslims. How should the leadership of Nigerian Muslims react to this insurgency, if it can react at all, that is? Does it have the capacity to take on the insurgency at the doctrinal level, and provide a lead in the manner Nigerian Muslims relate to it? Right now, a relatively-small group of young Muslim men and women has taken the center stage and are putting forward an agenda on behalf of Nigerian Muslims. Even if he can–and the records so far shows that he cannot–President Jonathan is not likely to be the best source of resolving this problem. The response of the Nigerian state will continue to be to meet force with force, and simple, God-fearing Muslims and Christians pay the price. How long will people in the north live like this?

The real tragedy in the JASLIWAJ – government confrontation is that virtually everyone who should raise his voice one way or the other is retreating. The arena has been abandoned to combatants of the insurgency and security forces. Hundreds of innocent Muslims and Christians die, or suffer constant and debilitating damage to their lives and livehood. Security forces behave as if all communities which habour insurgents are the enemy, perhaps encouraged by the assumption that at best they are guilty by association; and worst, are active collaborators in a war against the state. The only way this type of conflict can end is if one side achieves an outright victory, at an extremely high, but avoidable cost. There is an alternative. It involves the active and voluntary involvement of religious leaders who have respect and clout in the search for answers to questions which the JASLIWAJ is forcing on the Muslim Umma. The lesson to be drawn from the brief incursion of Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi into this conflict is that Nigerian Muslims must be more actively involved in engaging both the Nigerian state and the JASLIWAJ. This business of waiting to be assigned a mediatory role before you act is both dangerous and opportunistic. Muslim clergy should close ranks and find the courage to take up the basic doctrinal issues which appear to feed this insurgency. There is a drawing board, but no one is working on it.