Sunday, July 8, 2012

NIGERIA: THIRD QUARTER TOP 10 WATCH LIST


“You can tell a good Friday from the Wednesday preceding it”.
Hausa Proverb
This watch list focuses on issues, activities, developments or actors with the potential to affect the Nigerian political economy in the period, July to September, 2012. It is not exhaustive, and the criteria for selection have been informed by current national concerns, developments and linkages with other issues outside the list. The watch list is meant strictly as a guide towards areas or issues that may inform government policy or shape public opinion.
10. The Rainy Season
The rainy season in Nigeria has always had two contradictory impacts. It is the period during which the nation’s major investments in agriculture are made. It is also the season which tends to expose the weaknesses and limitations of basic physical and social infrastructure, as well as the capacity of the state to respond to them. The rainy season in this quarter will bring widespread damage to socio-economic infrastructure which governments have ignored to fix; and widespread complaints, particularly from the northern part of the country, that fertilizer is still too expensive for small producers to access.
9.   Ngozi Ononjo-Iweala
The Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister for the Economy is potentially a very powerful person in the management and reform of the nation’s economy. Her first year in office has been marked by massive turbulence around issues relating to deregulation and liberalization policies. This quarter should indicate the degree to which she is succeeding in pushing the frontiers for reform, or accepting the limited space and scope with which she has operated so far.
8.   The Sovereign Wealth Fund
The fate of this instrument intended to shield national resources from endemic plunder and creating a stable resource base for real investment may be decided this quarter. The deadlock between the federal government and governors over the size of the fund and the existence of serious political issues around a consensus towards achieving at least $10b in the fund will either cripple it substantially, or be resolved by more effective political negotiations.
7.   The Federal Cabinet
There has been much speculation over the fate of many ministers in a rumoured shake up. Elaborate details have been leaked and denied by the administration, leading to intense lobbying and loss of morale among ministers. The period under review should indicate whether the President is willing to bring on board fresh and more capable hands, or even sack untouchables in his cabinet who represent major sources of weaknesses in his administration.
6.   Fuel Subsidy Investigation
The federal government has just set up another committee to investigate, verify and reconcile the findings of the technical committee earlier established by the Federal Ministry of Finance to conduct a detailed review of all subsidy claims and payments that were made in 2011. The committee has only one week to conclude an assignment into an issue over which many other committees have also been involved. The national assembly’s effort have registered a major casualty among its ranks, which has quite possibly fatally injured its own report. There are many other reports of investigations, and even the E.F.C.C. is supposed to have received information which could be acted upon to prosecute those involved in the subsidy scam.
This period should indicate the sincerity of the federal government in exposing those involved in the scam, and willingness to tackle widespread corruption in the oil and gas sector.
5.   National Security Adviser
The new National Security Adviser may substantially improve the prospects for some type of truce and commencement of engagement with JASLIWAJ (a.k.a Boko Haram), or he may turn out to be even more powerless than his predecessor. The frenzy of contacts, visits and media engagements in which he has been involved since his appointment suggest that he believes that governors, traditional rulers and public opinion are critical to his success. If he is wrong in identifying these as sources for the resolution of the issues raised by the insurgency, he would have missed a critical period within which to make an impact. Major indicators for gauging his success include the degree to which he influences activities of security agencies, and whether he represents a credible mediatory avenue, either on his own or with others. The caliber, clout and pedigree of the person to be appointed Minister of Defence will also be an important success factor for the NSA.
4.   Jama’atu Ahlil Sunnah Liddaawati Wal Jihad (a.k.a Boko Haram)
With the Ramadan fast starting in July and a new National Security Advisor vigorously waving olive branches, this period should indicate whether this insurgency has the cohesiveness and foresight to take political decisions that go beyond fighting state agents and christians. If it calls a truce during the Ramadan period, and it is able to sustain it, it could strengthen its hands in any discussion with the government. Its continuing threat and potential to cause widespread havoc has been amply demonstrated in Kaduna State recently.
3.   The Elections in Edo State
All the indices for a bitterly-fought gubernatorial election in Edo State have been registered. The PDP is desperate to defeat the sitting governor, and even President Jonathan has had to undergo a personal humiliation at the palace of the Oba of Benin in his bid to enlist influential support. The governor himself will throw everything at the PDP, and the electoral process will be severely stressed in this election. The fallout of these elections will be registered well beyond the elections themselves, and politically-related violence will most likely rise. The Edo elections are critical because they have a direct relationship with 2015.
2.   Northern Governors
Northern governors have retreated substantially from effective governance since the middle of 2011. Serious incursions of JASLIWAJ (Boko Haram) activities in many parts of the north have introduced a heavy and crippling federal presence through security agencies’ activities in the North. Declining resources to make any real impact, (especially with the N18,000 minimum wage burden) have made northern governors largely irrelevant in terms of development and politics in the north and Nigeria. The period under review should either see an initiative to recapture lost ground by the governors through populist rhetorics or use of proxy groups, or a further decline in their influence as they retreat from the threat and damage of JASLIWAJ and the poverty of their citizens.
1.   President Goodluck Jonathan
President Jonathan has not demonstrated a strong political will and character to lead this nation out of its severely crippling challenges and limitations so far. Deepening and expanding corruption and the increase in the scope and damage of the JASLIWAJ insurgency have created the image a weak and ineffective President. This period should indicate whether the President can generate and deploy a stronger will and demonstrable competence in managing the affairs of state; or he will continue to operate in a manner that suggests that the solutions to the nation’s problems may come from anywhere else, but him.
     General Overview
The third quarter of 2012 is likely to be marked by intensification of violence by the JASLIWAJ insurgency and efforts to frustrate genuine efforts to expose and deal with corruption which occurs substantially around the administration. There are likely to be issues around ineffective and weak implementation of the budget, and wider clamour for improvements in accountability by leaders. Real improvements in the quality of governance or effectiveness of policies to eradicate poverty and insecurity are not envisaged.

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