FIGHTING TERROR: PROBLEMATIC SOLUTIONS.

          The National Assembly is reported to be planning to procure full body scanners, which are equipment used to detect bombs and other weapons on people, but only by exposing a person’s full nakedness. The equipment had caused much controversy in Europe and the United States when it was first introduced, despite the overwhelming clamour for better security from citizens. The main grouse against the equipment is that it violates the fundamental privacy of people, which is the sanctity of their bodies. The same equipment is already being used in our airport in Lagos and Abuja, so a public outcry against its installation will have little effect. Legislators and persons visiting our legislature will have to surrender part of their dignity and privacy in exchange for the hope that the equipment will prevent bombers from passing through gates and scanners to harm them.

A few days ago, the Senate President assured the leadership of the Armed Forces that the Senate will support the case for improved funding for additional activities and challenges, such as the massive deployment against terror and ethno-religious activities in the country. This support for additional funding will shield the normal and routine funding of the Armed Forces which is made annually, and which, under the present circumstances, is being diverted to new or additional activities. These additional funds will pay for allowances, purchase of equipment and will provide improved logistics. Nigerians are therefore likely to pay a lot more for the involvement of the military in the war against terror.

Two weeks ago, the National Assembly decided that it will probe the controversial expenditure around the installation of Closed Circuit Television (C.C.T.V) Cameras in and around Abuja. The arguments over the absence of transparency in the procurement of the equipment; its reliability and utility have been public knowledge since some competitors apparently lost out in the lucrative deal to install C.C.T.V as a weapon against terror in Abuja. Although it is difficult to ascertain the motive and genuiness of the criticisms against this high-tech weaponry against a human enemy, the complaints against it say it is far too expensive for its value; its deployment and installation is not informed by considerations of quality and safety; and that it is the wrong equipment for the purpose.

It is safe to assume that there are other measures, expenditure and strategies being adopted by the government and security agencies, most of them involving equipment, which are being undertaken at great cost to the public, all in a bid to stem the tide against spreading terror, principally from Boko Haram. Certainly, the visible expansion of detection equipment in the hands of our security agencies, the massive deployment of military personnel and police on highways, in and around major cities and vital installations must be costing Nigerians many billions.

These solutions threaten to be worse than the problem. Nigerians have a legitimate right to demand proof or evidence that these massive expenditure and severe restrictions on our movements and privacy are yielding, or are likely to yield results. At this stage, they do not show evidence that they can stop the threat from Boko Haram, or other crimes suspected to be committed with its modus operandi. The cases of bombings, shooting of security personnel and selected civilians, robbing of banks using explosives and attacking police stations are not showing signs of being contained. Not a day passes without some sensational violation of our security and peace, and the new dimension being added is the suspicion that armed robbers now adopt Boko Haram tactics and invade entire towns without resistance due to the sophistication of their weaponry and huge numbers.

A cynic will argue that there is a correlation between the rising expenditure around security equipment and level of deployment of security personnel, and the levels of violent activities from Boko Haram or those who operate like it. Those who are less cynical will ask how this present strategy of throwing technology and erecting checkpoints against terror will bring an end to the threat of the Boko Haram insurgency. What is clear is that Nigeria has now become a huge market for all sorts of security equipment, and many countries which specialize in reaping benefits from conflicts are laughing all the way to their banks. And they will sell more of the same; or even sell more sophisticated equipment if we need them. But ordinary folks in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Kaduna, Jos, Delta or Lagos are not necessarily going to feel their effect. The enemy against whom all these equipment and weaponry is being ranged is not lending himself to their effectiveness. So the nation arms itself against an enemy, who however, can see very clearly that it is poorly defended.

In one respect, it can be said that terror has already won two battles against the Nigerian State. The first battle it won was to put the nation on notice that it is capable of hurting it. It did this times without number, and this, in a way, is responsible for this panic response which is in part, the basis for this frenzy around high-tech defence. The second victory of terror is to sustain this initial success and induce permanent fear and a sense of insecurity among the population. Perhaps unwittingly, the leadership has fallen into the trap: its highly visible and intrusive reaction frightens the population as much as it is frightened by terror. The deployment of equipment and personnel around many parts of the nation creates the impression that the enemy is always just around the corner. Terror has succeeded in tying up the State’s extensive security assets around its objectives; and has induced fear among the population which may actually be unrelated to its actual capabilities. A small band of citizens with a grievance has been transformed into a formidable enemy by the Nigerian State through a combination of ineptitude and insensitivity. Foreign nations looking for markets to dump security equipment are milking the situation. Nigerians are no safer than they were six months ago, and Boko Haram is still a major threat.

An enlightened strategy to contain the threat of Boko Haram will involve a number of tactics, but none will make a case for spending hundreds of billions in high-tech equipment alone. One tactic will involve an intensification of the search for genuine access to the leadership of Boko Haram, and engaging it in a dialogue. Its demands from the distance, and its public posture may appear difficult or impossible to meet, but it is vital that it is engaged. It says its members in detention should be released. It wants the killers of its members prosecuted. It wants to see the application of shari’a in Nigeria. These are not issues that cannot be discussed, but it requires evidence of genuiness to negotiate with some levels of sincerity on both sides. What both sides need are trusted mediators. This is where government needs to focus its attention and search upon.

The second tactic should be to address the massive poverty and hopelessness which pervades the Borno-Yobe axis. A President who comes from a region where only massive infusion of funds and the application of a policy which pardons known criminals succeeded in bringing peace in the region should know how much massive investment in schools, hospitals, roads and jobs will shift the ground away from Boko Haram. As things stand, the citizens in this axis are under threat from three sources: Book Haram, the overbearing weight of security operators, and crushing poverty. The battle for hearts and minds will be won by the side which makes a tangible difference in the lives of the people. If Boko Haram consistently uses the peoples’ poverty and the traditional grievances over an unjust State, it will limit the access of the Nigerian State into the lives of ordinary citizens. If, on the other hand, the Nigerian State adopts a policy which addresses poverty, and an open-ended attitude to discussing residual issues around which Boko Haram builds its case, it is likely to limit its damage. Without a doubt, even half of the amount being spent on the C.C.T.V in Abuja will make a huge difference in the lives of citizens of Borno and Yobe States if it spent on providing potable water, building good schools and opening up rural areas. If this amount was spent on the people by the federal and state governments, substantial portions of the population would have been enlisted in the fight against terror that uses poverty of the people as one of its weapons.

The strategy of throwing sophisticated technology at the Boko Haram insurgency and other criminal gangs who copy its tactics is expensive and ineffective. It shows no tangible evidence that it will eliminate terror, although it gives leaders and other V.I.Ps some level of comfort. It plays into the hands of perpetrators of terror who seek to tie up security and other resources of the State around their activities and objectives. President Jonathan needs to move beyond the search for physical security for leaders, to a genuine search for a comprehensive resolution of this problem. What we have at present are solutions which could be worse than the problem.