Who Wants Boko Haram?

“Politics is the systematic organization of hatred.”

                                      Henry Adams.

You did not hear it from President Goodluck Jonathan, his deputy and the highest ranking northerner, Namadi Sambo, or any Minister, or Special Adviser, but it is now official. The initiative by some Nigerians led by Dr Datti Ahmed, President of the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria to broker some discussions between the Federal Government and the leadership of the Boko Haram insurgency has failed. Dr Ahmed says he and his colleagues are withdrawing from the efforts which they undertook at great risk to their lives, because they do not believe in the sincerity of the Federal Government. He said that they were given guarantees of secrecy and confidentiality by the President personally, but have had all their progress and discussions leaked. He said he cannot trust government to honour its word if it cannot deliver on guarantees it gave over the confidentiality of the talks.

The Boko Haram leadership also put out its own statement, saying that it had only agreed to the initiative to participate in the exploratory talks with government reluctantly, and in spite of an earlier betrayal. It said only intense pressure and its high respect for the Datti people convinced it to submit to the talks. When Dr Datti threw in the towel, holding the federal government entirely responsible, they said to him, and to other Nigerians, we told you so. They also said many more things, along their usual rhetoric, but ominously, they say no more peace talks: it is now a fight to finish.

You could say that we are back to the trenches, and it is difficult to see how another initiative acceptable to both parties can be put together, and by whom. The northern establishment is timid, fractured and badly wounded by the insurgency; and it has little respect in the Villa – at least as far as the Boko Haram issue is concerned. As things stand, a fight to finish will quite likely involve more bombs, bullets, arrests and killings. There will be more army and police barricades, more restrictions on the rights and freedoms of Nigerians in the name of security, and more damage to the economy of the north. The nation as a whole will be more threatened, and will throw more money and other resources at the problem. A finish may involve total capitulation by the insurgency, or an acceptance of a substantial amount of the demands of the insurgency. Both will take many casualties before they happen.

So why, we must ask, should President Jonathan have allowed the initiative of Dr Datti Ahmed to fail? My view is that the failure is not just a reflection of incompetence or indifference although they may be factors. There are powerful vested interests which will be badly hurt by a resolution of the Boko Haram insurgency, or even the initiation of some peace-making overtures. Not necessarily in order of importance, these interests will include:

(i)                Interests that will advise against settling with the insurgency before its is defeated by superior force. These interests will draw substantially from the fact that late President Yar’Adua was cautioned over granting amnesty and embarking on an expensive rehabilitation of people who committed serious crimes against the state and citizens before their military and support infrastructure is defeated. Examples will be drawn from the fact that even as we speak, MEND and sundry groups are still a threat. These interests may be involved in advising the President that he is at the point of defeating the insurgency, given recent arrests; and any talks or negotiations will only benefit them;

(ii)             Interests around the huge financial benefits which the fight against the insurgency provides. These include billions being spent around intelligence gathering, logistics, administration, allowances, hardware etc. It will also include nations and other foreign interests which sell security equipment and train our personnel. In 2012, more than N1trillion will be spent on security alone, and much of this will go towards dealing with this insurgency. These interests are likely to be hurt if the insurgency were to be contained, one way are another;

(iii)           Interests which suspect that the Boko Haram insurgency is the manifestation of a much bigger problem: either a regional agenda by northern muslim politicians against the Jonathan Presidency, or the manifestation of a deep incursion of Al-Qa’ida into northern Nigeria. In both cases, there will be arguments to sustain the pressure on the insurgency until it shows its real hands and faces;

(iv)           On the part of the Boko Haram insurgency itself, there will be resistance to submit to negotiations in case it leaves the table with next to nothing. Having put its basic demands at a most difficult point to achieve, the insurgency could end up with little to show for all the lives and pain it has caused. It will also worry over whether all the groups or factions within it will be part of any agreement; and whether a settlement by a faction will expose it to rivals and the government in the long run;

(v)              There may also be other interests which hide behind the Boko Haram franchise to wreck havoc, steal, plunder and threaten the Nigerian state and citizens, which may be hurt by the cessation of the hostility by Boko Haram itself. These may include fringe groups, outright criminals with loads of guns, bomb-making know-how and good intelligence, or even rogue Boko Haram factions which are operating on their own;

(vi)           There may be interests which see the Boko Haram insurgency as the most potent political weapon to use against the North. After all, it is destroying largely northern lives and limbs, its economy and its cultural and political cohesion. What better ways to keep the north on its knees, and why fix a problem in the north when it solves the problem of many parts of Nigeria moving on?

There is a dangerous mindset among Nigerians who live far away from the bombs and bullets of the Boko Haram insurgency that this is basically a northern problem, and should be sorted out by northerners. This mindset may be responsible for the lack of nationwide reaction to the disastrous setback which the failure of Dr Datti Ahmed’s initiative represents. The Boko Haram insurgency is a threat to national security; it is spreading its impact in more ways than many Nigerians understand, and its end is by no means certain. This is the reason why we must demand that President Jonathan intensifies the search for a solution to this problem, and this must include more efforts to find avenues to engage this insurgency. Nigerians who live daily in fear of bombs and bullets; or suffer the harrowing indignity and discomfort of countless checkpoints and other security measures, and whose economy is crumbling by the day are already victims of this insurgency. They have a right to demand that an end is sought for their plights. Whatever the reasons were behind the failure of the attempts to broker talks between Boko Haram and the government, Nigerians will hold our leaders responsible for them. We should also demand that they find additional, or new sources for a comprehensive resolution of this conflict.

THE NAYS HAVE IT.

“It will be a big clash between the political will and the administrative won’t”  

Jonathan Lynn

It is now official that the attempts to broker an engagement between the Boko Haram insurgency and the Federal Government have come to an unsuccessful end. Last week the leader of the team which volunteered to facilitate the engagement, Dr Datti Ahmed, the President of the Supreme Council of Sharia in Nigeria, put out a statement in which he said he and his colleagues were withdrawing from the efforts because government was not sincere. He cited leakages of confidential talks between the three parties in spite of solid assurances from President Jonathan himself that some secrecy will be guaranteed during the attempts to engineer some discussions between the insurgents and the government. Dr. Ahmed said he had no faith that government could keep any promise it makes to them or to members of the insurgency, if it cannot be trusted to keep its word about confidentiality. These who know Dr Datti Ahmed know that he does nothing in half measures. He must have assumed the role of a voluntary facilitator, with all the risks it involves, and with all the seriousness it required. It is also the reason why his statement withdrawing his team’s services is full of anger, indignation and finality.

The leadership of the insurgency then puts out its own statement saying, we told you so. It said it agreed to the facilitation of Dr Ahmed and his team only after intense persuasion and out of respect for them; but it had huge reservations regarding the sincerity of the government to submit to a serious negotiation. Needless to say, the statement said this is the last time Boko Haram leaders will accept any offer of discussion; it is now a fight to finish.

From the government itself, it was a studied silence, except for the puzzling comments of Mr Presidents Political Adviser, who initially said Dr Ahmed has no right to demand secrecy over the talks; and then later, that government still wants Dr Ahmed to continue to broker the talks. Others, including the largely symbolic Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) have waded in with advise on resumption of the talks, but they have no influence over Dr Datti’s group, President Jonathan or Boko Haram, and they cannot start another initiative.

The failure of these talks is a major setback for the nation. The fact is that it leaves only one option, which is the continuation of the killings and destruction of the social and economic infrastructure of much of the North. The questions why this important initiative failed must be raised. Could they have failed because of the characteristic incompetence of the administration to handle sensitive issues and engage is strategic thinking? Tempting as it is to answer in the affirmative, the more likely explanation is that powerful interests have been at play to scuttle these initiatives, even if they also drew on the transparent weaknesses of the administration. Now what reasons would some interests have to prevent a settlement with the Boko Haram insurgency?

In my view, there are many. From a strategic standpoint, there will be many who will make the case that the insurgency needs to be defeated comprehensively, or it will fight back in one form or the other. This thinking will be supported by empirical evidence that the recent activity by MEND is a vindication of the caution offered to, but ignored by late Umaru Yar’Adua not to settle with Niger Delta militants until its basic support structure and capacities are defeated. The late President was persuaded by the dwindling export of crude, and the argument that the militancy couldn’t be defeated, as well as a rather naïve faith in the words of Governors and other leaders from the region that an expensive amnesty would replace the threat of the militancy. Second, there will be many in security circles who will see negotiations and compromise as a betrayal, and capitulation by the state, and as evidence of their failure in spite of huge expenditure and lives of many comrades lost. Third, we have a whole army of beneficiaries, from foreign countries which offer advice and which supply equipment, to security agencies which receive huge amounts for intelligence, logistics and other support, to a legion of advisers and political appointees which exist around the problem, and have become part of it.

From a political standpoint, there will be many who see the Boko Haram insurgency as the most effective weapon against the North. Whose schools, churches, markets and other assets are being bombed? The North’s. Whose lives are being taken daily by bombs and bullets? Mostly northern. Whose economy is being destroyed by bombs, curfews, restrictions and checkpoints? Northern. Whose old problem of managing inter-religious and inter-ethnic pluralism is being made worse? North’s. Whose political fortunes are being damaged, and whose leaders have retreated in the face of ineffectiveness over the Boko Haram problem? Northern. If the worst political enemy of the North had written a script to keep it disorganized, weakened and vulnerable, they could not have chosen a better strategy then to let loose the Boko Haram insurgency.

But the insurgency itself has many reasons why it is not in its interest to settle. What would it go down on record or in history as achieving if it accepts a resolution of its conflict with the Nigerian state at this stage? What would happen to its members, and what guarantees do they have that government will follow through what is agreed? Are all groups and/or factions in the insurgency amenable to a resolution? What will happen if some settle, while others hold out and continue fighting? True, some of these questions are what the talks would have answered, but there are serious questions over whether this insurgency has one voice. There is also the possibility that many other interests which have hijacked its franchise, will not welcome a cessation of the conflict because this will expose them.

It is important that Nigerians demand from President Jonathan a stronger effort to find a resolution to this conflict. The fact that he had initially committed himself to some peace-making initiative suggests that he recognizes its values. He must go back to the drawing board and see if he can regenerate this initiative. Similarly, in spite of its tough talks there must be some value and benefit to the Boko Haram insurgency in participating in the talks being brokered by Dr Ahmed. It must know that Nigerians, particularly northerners are being punished with its terror, and it is not winning the battle of hearts and minds either. If, as it says, it is now fight to finish, it should know that most of the casualties in this conflict will be people on whose behalf it claims to be fighting.

The failure of the initiative to broker some talks between the government and Boko Haram insurgency is a victory for those who want to see more blood and pain. These vested interests should not be given a free hand. The north and other Nigerians are paying a very high price for this insurgency. The north in particular is being brought to its knees, and it could sink even lower. Leaders, particularly in the north, should get more involved in the search for some mediation.

THE NORTH: MANY TREES, NO FOREST.

“Ordinarily, elders like us would take comfort in the belief that God Almighty has rewarded our past endeavours with successors who should worry over matters of national security, the state of the economy and governance generally. It would have been their lot to find solutions to problems that confront our people today; and ours would have been to pray for them, and where necessary, offer some general advise...

                        But these are not ordinary times…”

-General Abdussalami Abubakar declaring open a Peace Seminar at Minna, 15^th March, 2012.

It is arguable if there have ever been ordinary times for the north and Nigeria, but the frenzy of activities around the politics, economy and security of the north in the context of its relations with the rest of the nation will certainly qualify for its being treated as a development worth some attention. Suddenly, this frenzy of meetings and consultations, many involving the same interests or persons is gripping the nation’s attention. Many northerners are even daring to believe that the sleeping giant in the sun is about to wake up, but many more are worried that it will wake up to find that there is very little room for giants who slept badly, and for too long.

It is tempting to interprete this flurry of political activities as a reaction to the contempt and insults daily being thrown at a region and its people who are being blamed for wasting an opportunity to be great, and is now irritating the rest of the nation with its bombs, bullets and begging bowls. These insults and derision, and the seeming resolve in some parts of the country to keep the north permanently where it is today, or expunge it from the nation altogether do hurt. But they hurt even more when they come from its youngest generation who hear of huge opportunities leaders from the north had, but failed to steal the resources of other people and bring them to the north for development; or leaders who did steal, but kept it to themselves; or leaders who governed without vision, patriotism or honesty, and frittered away opportunities to develop the huge potential of the north in its land and people.

But there are more basic reasons behind these activities than the contempt with which the north is held today. Most of the key players in convening these meetings recognize that a loud statement was made by many parts of the north following the general elections in April 2011. No one yet has bothered to understand the nature of that statement, or is taking steps to address its roots, or ensure that the political and electoral process is fixed before 2015. Certainly, there are hints that ordinary folks have lost faith in a democratic process where offices are allocated; mandates bought or stolen, and the population is only useful around election times. The Nigerian electoral process has never been removed from a pronounced influence of violence; but 2011 marked a new high in the linkages between elections and widespread violence.

Then, of course, in the past one year, the escalation of violence under the generic cover of Boko Haram has assumed center stage in setting a political agenda of its own, and since the north has none of its own, this agenda written in blood has become the only game in town. It raises issues about injustice, corruption and impunity, but the solutions it provides are impractical, non-negotiable and do not seek a political process to be actualized.

The Boko Haram insurgency has up-staged the old northern establishment by repudiating it altogether. Its methods and goals are taking many casualties. Political careers are at risk, to the extent that elected persons, influence peddlers and fixers have all retreated in the face of its contempt for the political process. It is destroying what little there is left of the economy of the north, engineering massive capital flight and scaring away any prospects for investment. It is damaging inter-faith and inter-community relations, and re-introducing violence as the only method in resolving disputes.

The collateral damage of the post-election violence and the Boko Haram insurgency is just as disastrous. Most of the north is under virtual siege of military and police personnel, and the basic rights of citizens to decent treatment has been jeffisioned. Northern highways are a study in inept security management, and the vast majority of citizens believe that the countless military and police checkpoints are intended only to humiliate and inconvenience northerners. Night-time economies in many cities have been destroyed because of the banning or restrictions on two wheel transport or imposition of curfews. More people are therefore joining the ranks of the desperately poor and bitter. Religious, community and other leaders have shrunk in size because they cannot influence how the Nigerian state responds to the threat of the insurgency, or how genuine grievances of innocent citizens against security personnel can be processed. The rest of the nation has defined this insurgency as a northern problem, which, at worst, is a self-defeating position and at best, is an additional weapon to use against the north in this historic battle to permanently reverse its political fortunes. A nation which spends one quarter of its annual budget on security, much of it targeted at an insurgency cannot be indifferent to it, or treat it as someone else’s. It is also a bad mistake to assume that Boko Haram will cripple the north permanently, unless this thinking is informed by a plan to keep the insurgency alive for the foreseeable future.

Will all these activities which seek to limit the political and economic damage to the north produce the results they seek? To answer this question, the real interests behind them need to be understood. The Dr. Junaidu Group has a clear idea that the north will have to fight itself out of its corner by trading punches and adopting new techniques for avoiding being pinned against the ropes again. It has many people vastly experienced in the nuances and volatility of northern and Nigerians politics, and they are not shy to look the rest of Nigeria in the eye and say we want more resources because we are entitled to more. This group says the north wants any type of conference to discuss Nigeria, on its own, or on anybody’s terms. It plans to tap into the intellectual resources of the north, its political assets and its diversity to find northern solutions to northern problems. Its biggest liability is the appearance that it is a front for northern governors who do not have the guts or the autonomy to take on their fellow governors over resource allocation; or mobilize the north around political reforms. And northern governors are known for how little credibility they have, and are reminded at every turn that they are largely responsible for the recent misfortunes and setbacks of the north; or being the architects of the present poverty of vision and muscle to tackle its economic and social problems. Many people of goodwill are warning the people in the Junaidu Group that liaison with northern governors is dangerous to the health of their personal integrity, and the fortunes of the north.

The Danmasanin Kano initiative, which a friend jokingly referred to as the geriatric ward is also extremely suspect. It taps into a generation, that has very little say in what happens, and very little influence over those who determine what happens to people in the north: President Jonathan, northern governors and Boko Haram. These elders are a sad reminder of the leadership deficit of the north, and even for an African community which places premium and value on age and experience, and outing by these elders suggests either of two things. One, they are unwilling to yield space for a generation which should be trusted to take over from them. Or, two, they have no generation behind them  which can be trusted to take over from them. Either way, it says a lot about the leadership question in the north, and raises serious questions over the wisdom of elders entering the ring, instead of coaching young wrestlers over the secrets of a successful fight.

The General Abubakar initiative falls somewhere between the bring-it-on spirit of the Junaidu initiative, and the lamentation of elderly men who insist on having a say in a different conversation. It has a foot in both initiatives, so it can suffer from the weaknesses of both. Its major asset is General Abubakar himself, although there are people who say you only need to look behind the General every time to see General Babangida. But he has a good record of staying out of the fray, and is trusted by many of the political elite. Its biggest drawback will be if it fails to cash in on the goodwill it enjoys across a wide spectrum of the northern political environment.

All these activities around the heart and soul of the north are evidence of real concerns to improve its capacities and fortunes  to deal with its problems. But they avoid asking many awkward questions, which will be their major undoing. Any initiative to deal with security or economy of the north, or to prepare it to engage Nigeria as a strong partner must ask about why the PDP which controls 16 of the 19 State Governments, and northern governors who monopolize the machinery to dispense patronage, facilitate real change and development, and engage the Presidency and the rest of the country are not directly involved in the search for answers to the problems of the north. Unless all these initiatives intend to supplant our Governors and their Party, or push them into meaningful action, they will remain trees looking for a forest.

THIS CREEPING MADNESS

“Some men go through a forest and see no firewood”

A Fulani Proverb

Governors from South South states are angry with the north over its temerity to hint that their States are sitting on, and developing on resources to which they are not strictly entitled. They express a widespread indignation across much of the oil and gas producing region which has followed the publicized intention of Northern Governors to demand for a review of the formula for allocation of revenue from oil and gas derived from off-shore resources of the nation. The anger of the governors from the South South is being further stoked by the utterances and posture of a group led by Dr. Junaidu Mohammed, to the effect that the north’s claim to a share of the off-shore resources is legitimate, non-negotiable and realistic. The governors think that Dr. Junaidu’s recent statement over the issue is insulting, provocative and ill-informed, and represents the type of arrogance which is “symptomatic of a pattern of thinking that has not helped the unity, stability and progress of this country.” They are particularly irked by the insinuation that revenue from derivation which goes to oil-producing states cannot be adequately managed by them, and the implied suggestion that it will breed corruption, while other parts of the country which deserve it as a matter of right wallow in poverty and insecurity.

Just to the north, the socio-political group, the Ohaneze Ndigbo has also challenged northern leaders to declare their true intentions behind the flurry of meetings on the insecurity situation in the north. The North has indeed been going through a frenzy of meetings and consultations in the last few weeks. First, the shoot-from-hip Junaidu initiative which sets a very visible agenda: prepare the north better to deal with its many problems, and engage the rest of Nigeria more constructively from a position of strength. To do this, it says it is willing to go where few would: to demand for a review of the manner off-shore revenues are shared out; and announce the willingness of the North to discuss all options on the structure and future of the Nigerian nation. It brought together an impressive array of northerners who defy partisan, cultural or religions boundries, a rare feat in the north these days.

Then very old people from the north, many long thought to have retired from any public or political outing on behalf of the north, met to look at its current security, economic and political situation. It was the type of meeting the nation had to take note of, and it said either of two things. Either the north is finally waking up to its damaging limitations and is now willing to find northern solution to its problems; or, the leadership deficit in the north is so acute that it requires these elders to step forward. That meeting was followed a few days later by another in Minna convened by General Abdussalami Abubakar, which had in attendance some people and interests that were involved in the Junaidu and Alh Maitama Sule initiatives, a many other. This initiative also had a similar goal: stop the bleeding of the north, salvage and rebuild its economy, and prepare it to engage more constructively with the rest of Nigeria. Seeing all these meetings, Ndigbo wants the north to say what they are all about. Many people will not miss the irony that northern leaders are being suspected for concerted efforts to deal with insecurity, when a few months ago all you heard was their silence and inactivity over it.

These are indeed very interesting times in Nigerian politics. They also challenge students of Nigerian history to find some puzzling answers to many questions. The quarrels around the questions over sharing revenue is taking place among governors and other interests almost entirely defined by membership of the PDP. Between the South South and the North, the PDP ¾ of Government of the nation, the vast majority of legislators and about over 70% of the resources of the nation. Yet the PDP cannot provide a framework for discussions on sensitive matters such as this, so that the nation’s temperature is not further raised unnecessarily. What does this say about the largest party in Africa, now being increasingly referred to as the cult of a few which is only good enough to buy and allocate offices? What do these quarrels say about Governors themselves, who are either hiding behind groups to demand for a few more crumbs or who are defending huge wealth without showing what they actually do with it? What is Ndigbo afraid of when it sees Northerners running around trying to put out a fire ravaging its economy and society? Could its curiosity be the result of its worry over where the 2015 PDP ticket will go, South-East or the North? Could there be some discomfort that finding a solution for the insurgency of Boko Haram, the decaying economy of the north and improving its capacity to negotiate a good deal in a Nigeria of the future may reverse the plan to keep it permanently on the margins? Are northern Governors in any position to raise issues regarding the fortunes and rights of the north, when they are largely responsible for so spectacularly bringing it to its present position? Would all these meetings, committees and resolutions issuing from many groups succeed in healing the damaging divisions which exist in the north; re-building its economy and re-inforcing its social and cultural structures to deal with the Boko Haram insurgency, which is prima facie an insurrection against the northern establishment?

There is a worrying vacuum at critical points in the Nigerian political system, which is why many worrying quarrels and posturing by people who should know better are compounding the problems of Nigerians. President Jonathan appears to have drawn rigid lines around his willingness to mediate in some of these quarrels before they become additional sources of insecurity. By the time Nigerians know whether he plans to run again in 2015 or not, the environment may be entirely beyond his capacity to handle. The polarization of the nation along political lines is becoming more pronounced, in spite of the dominance of the PDP in the political process. The failure of the north in managing its political and social pluralism, its economy and its security is providing an additional impetus for other parts to grow and develop. If the north can fix itself, it may challenge the position of some regions and groups which believe that it is history. But the nation as a whole will be the better for it. What represents the biggest threat to a holistic solution to a national problem, of which the poverty and insecurity in the north is only one aspect, is this creeping madness which is taking control of leaders. Tinkering with structures or revenue formula will not solve the national leadership deficit. A wholesale replacement of this quarrelsome group who fight each other when we are scared and hungry may be the most useful steps to take.

Chidi’s Assets, a bridge and a prayer

“There is no end to what you can accomplish if you don’t care who gets the credit”

 –Florence Luscomb

 

I have never met Professor Chidi Odinkalu, the Chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in person, although I hear he is the type of Nigerian I should list among my friends. Chidi and I belong to a cyberspace group which has many other people I know very well, most of whom think very highly of Chidi. Every time Chidi says or reacts to something someone says, you see evidence of learning, grooming and an open-mindedness rare even among educated people these days. Our group is passionate about most things important, and we often get all worked up for days when there is something to argue over. Chidi is always in the thick of it, even when the matter involves Islamic theology, Fulani marriage customs, the place of Ojukwu in Nigerian history, or the worrying tendency for the younger generation to see everything through very narrow and destructive prisms. You could tell Chidi has spent much of his life in foreign lands, but he does not have that see-me-here diaspora mentality.

So why is Chidi on the title of this column today? Because, on 23^rd of November, 2011, he, as is required by law, went and declared the totality of his assets and liabilities with the Code of Conduct Bureau. So what? You say. Everyone does that. And you might even say many deliberately increase their assets to make allowances for what may “accrue” during the periods they hold offices; and then pray that the severe lack of capacity of the Code of Conduct Bureau to verify such exaggerated declarations will remain severe. They will then stay on the shelves of the Bureau until an exit declaration is made, which may not be cross-checked with the entry declaration either.

Chidi did not just go through the statutory ritual of declaring all his assets. You would think this former lecturer in Law at the Havard Law School and a man vastly experienced in the frailties of the human character will be wary of telling relations, friends, in-laws and the entire public what he is worth, as well what he is owing. Some people who will say even your spouse(s) should not know what you are worth (but will make allowances for telling them your liabilities) will be shocked that Chidi went the extra mile of requesting that his declaration should receive full public disclosure. In other words, even though the law does not compel him to disclose his assets and liabilities to the public, and most people will be reluctant to do this for fear of opening floodgates to relatives and sundry persons; kidnappers, armed robbers, and enemies who may reveal the lies in the declaration, he asks that his own declaration should be made public. Many people will say it is fine to do this, if you do not own much. But judge for yourself whether Chidi’s assets and liabilities are the type you declare quietly or the type over which you will be indifferent if everyone knows of them.

A Non-Governmental Organization, R2K (Right to Know) said details of Professor Odinkalu’s assets and liabilities were:

i.                    Personal Earnings from two standard Bank Accounts with balances of N94,000 and $11,700;

ii.                  Two Barclays Bank accounts in the U.K containing £7,752 and £4,542;

iii.                A mortgaged 3-bedroom house in Edmonton, London;

iv.               A 4-bedroom house in Lekki, Lagos;

v.                 A Toyota RAV4 bought in 2004;

vi.               A Kia Rio car bought in 2005;

vii.             Shares and stocks worth about N3m;

viii.           A personal pension plan managed by Friends Provident;

ix.                A 27 KVA Nioda generator;

x.                  7.5 KVA Inverter;

xi.                10,000 Books which the Professor described as “invaluable.”

Now, if you are among the 80% of Nigerians who earn less than N300 a day, Professor Chidi will be an incredibly wealthy man. But if you were an Ibori, or many of his former colleagues whose cases before the EFCC and the Courts appear unlikely to ever be concluded, what the Professor has may be the value of what you could dash a girl friend. Even if you are a serving Governor, Minister or some powerful person in the corridors or bedrooms of power,  the total value of Chidi’s assets are what your wife could spend on a two-day trip to Dubai or London.

The voluntary publication of Chidi’s assets and liabilities has raised the bar in accountability and openness. It is a challenge to all those who hold positions of trust to accord some respect to the Nigerian public and the values and rules governing probity and honesty by making public what they own, and are owed. Even as I say this, I know it is a challenge that will not be taken up. I was close to the take-off of the late Umaru Musa ‘Yar Adua’s administration, and I remember the panic he caused when he decided, against the most vociferous advise, not to publish his declared assets and liabilities. His decision was ground-breaking in terms of its impact, and it really set the cat among the pidgeons. Panic run right through all the political office holders and the hundreds angling to be appointed Special Advisers, Ministers, Chairmen of Boards etc. Will he demand that they did same, even against existing law? Will he change the law to compel the publication of declared assets and liabilities? Will he hold it against them if they did not? Would it be worth holding a public office under Yar’Adua if one had to declare his entire assets (or some of it, and then risk exposure from those who know better)? In the end the late President said it was a personal decision of his publish, and he was not going to compel anyone to do so. His number two, now President Jonathan, also published his own declaration. I do not recall anyone else doing same. And the nation lost the opportunity to raise the moral standards of leadership.

The loudest message sent by Chidi is that those in position of responsibility should be responsible. And there are no boundries to this responsibility. Its foundations are in the manner we conduct our lives and treat public assets and trust. There should be no reasons why people who sit in judgment over how billions of public funds are spent should not tell the public what they are worth. If you have a reason for hiding your real personal worth, you have no business approaching an elective office.

The failure to appreciate the burden of responsibility is the reason this nation is crumbling before our very eyes. It is the reason why the Dundaye Bridge which links Usumanu Danfodio University, Sokoto (U.D.U.S) where I am a Visiting Lecturer and Sokoto City could collapse again with the coming rains. The absence of the required levels of responsibility by the Federal Government is the reason why the patch-patch work done on the bridge when it first collapsed two years ago will give way. This bridge which links Sokoto with one of the biggest universities in the North, whose student population is about 70% north and 30% south, which links Sokoto with six L.G.As and even with Niger Republic; and which is a vital economic asset may collapse again because neither the Federal Government nor the State Governments will bother to mobilize the funds to reconstruct it. When it does collapse again, we will close the University again. Children of the rich and powerful will continue their studies in the U.K, Malaysia, Ghana and Ukrain, while those of the poor who go to U.D.U.S will sit at home. They will curse and hate the leaders whose personal wealth will build ten Dundaye Bridges. They will resent authority, resent their circumstances, and resent children of the rich and powerful who do not go to U.D.U.S.

Professor Chidi Odinkalu has challenged Nigerians who hold positions of trust and responsibility to take steps towards submitting themselves beyond ritual legal requirements, and to actually commit to one of the most important steps to fight corruption and official impunity. I have serious doubts over whether our leaders today will even notice, not to talk of being shamed. How I wish a wealthy northerner will shame the Federal Government and catchment States whose young people attend U.D.U.S, by reconstructing the vitally strategic Dundaye Bridge.

AND NOW THIS

When Professor Chidi Odinkalu’s declared assets and liabilities was published, my younger brother, Mouftah, posted this prayer: “Maulana Chidi, May your shadow never grow shorter. By di grace of God, school fees no go deplete those £12k and $11k. Mortgage interest and repayment sef, no go chop dem. Dat N94k no go go down…. Na so so e go increase, with legit earnings. Keke NAPEP no go scratch either dat RAV4 or di Kia Rio. From dat Kia na to Range Rover….. and from dat RAV4 na straight to aeroplane… Dat Lekki house go born for Banana Island. E go born country house…. Your two generators no go knock. Mechanic and rewire no go come near dem.. Dat pension plan and those stock shares no go experience 2008 meltdown… and may you never use BUPA insurance.” Could there be a better prayer?