THE NAYS HAVE IT.

“It will be a big clash between the political will and the administrative won’t”  

Jonathan Lynn

It is now official that the attempts to broker an engagement between the Boko Haram insurgency and the Federal Government have come to an unsuccessful end. Last week the leader of the team which volunteered to facilitate the engagement, Dr Datti Ahmed, the President of the Supreme Council of Sharia in Nigeria, put out a statement in which he said he and his colleagues were withdrawing from the efforts because government was not sincere. He cited leakages of confidential talks between the three parties in spite of solid assurances from President Jonathan himself that some secrecy will be guaranteed during the attempts to engineer some discussions between the insurgents and the government. Dr. Ahmed said he had no faith that government could keep any promise it makes to them or to members of the insurgency, if it cannot be trusted to keep its word about confidentiality. These who know Dr Datti Ahmed know that he does nothing in half measures. He must have assumed the role of a voluntary facilitator, with all the risks it involves, and with all the seriousness it required. It is also the reason why his statement withdrawing his team’s services is full of anger, indignation and finality.

The leadership of the insurgency then puts out its own statement saying, we told you so. It said it agreed to the facilitation of Dr Ahmed and his team only after intense persuasion and out of respect for them; but it had huge reservations regarding the sincerity of the government to submit to a serious negotiation. Needless to say, the statement said this is the last time Boko Haram leaders will accept any offer of discussion; it is now a fight to finish.

From the government itself, it was a studied silence, except for the puzzling comments of Mr Presidents Political Adviser, who initially said Dr Ahmed has no right to demand secrecy over the talks; and then later, that government still wants Dr Ahmed to continue to broker the talks. Others, including the largely symbolic Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) have waded in with advise on resumption of the talks, but they have no influence over Dr Datti’s group, President Jonathan or Boko Haram, and they cannot start another initiative.

The failure of these talks is a major setback for the nation. The fact is that it leaves only one option, which is the continuation of the killings and destruction of the social and economic infrastructure of much of the North. The questions why this important initiative failed must be raised. Could they have failed because of the characteristic incompetence of the administration to handle sensitive issues and engage is strategic thinking? Tempting as it is to answer in the affirmative, the more likely explanation is that powerful interests have been at play to scuttle these initiatives, even if they also drew on the transparent weaknesses of the administration. Now what reasons would some interests have to prevent a settlement with the Boko Haram insurgency?

In my view, there are many. From a strategic standpoint, there will be many who will make the case that the insurgency needs to be defeated comprehensively, or it will fight back in one form or the other. This thinking will be supported by empirical evidence that the recent activity by MEND is a vindication of the caution offered to, but ignored by late Umaru Yar’Adua not to settle with Niger Delta militants until its basic support structure and capacities are defeated. The late President was persuaded by the dwindling export of crude, and the argument that the militancy couldn’t be defeated, as well as a rather naïve faith in the words of Governors and other leaders from the region that an expensive amnesty would replace the threat of the militancy. Second, there will be many in security circles who will see negotiations and compromise as a betrayal, and capitulation by the state, and as evidence of their failure in spite of huge expenditure and lives of many comrades lost. Third, we have a whole army of beneficiaries, from foreign countries which offer advice and which supply equipment, to security agencies which receive huge amounts for intelligence, logistics and other support, to a legion of advisers and political appointees which exist around the problem, and have become part of it.

From a political standpoint, there will be many who see the Boko Haram insurgency as the most effective weapon against the North. Whose schools, churches, markets and other assets are being bombed? The North’s. Whose lives are being taken daily by bombs and bullets? Mostly northern. Whose economy is being destroyed by bombs, curfews, restrictions and checkpoints? Northern. Whose old problem of managing inter-religious and inter-ethnic pluralism is being made worse? North’s. Whose political fortunes are being damaged, and whose leaders have retreated in the face of ineffectiveness over the Boko Haram problem? Northern. If the worst political enemy of the North had written a script to keep it disorganized, weakened and vulnerable, they could not have chosen a better strategy then to let loose the Boko Haram insurgency.

But the insurgency itself has many reasons why it is not in its interest to settle. What would it go down on record or in history as achieving if it accepts a resolution of its conflict with the Nigerian state at this stage? What would happen to its members, and what guarantees do they have that government will follow through what is agreed? Are all groups and/or factions in the insurgency amenable to a resolution? What will happen if some settle, while others hold out and continue fighting? True, some of these questions are what the talks would have answered, but there are serious questions over whether this insurgency has one voice. There is also the possibility that many other interests which have hijacked its franchise, will not welcome a cessation of the conflict because this will expose them.

It is important that Nigerians demand from President Jonathan a stronger effort to find a resolution to this conflict. The fact that he had initially committed himself to some peace-making initiative suggests that he recognizes its values. He must go back to the drawing board and see if he can regenerate this initiative. Similarly, in spite of its tough talks there must be some value and benefit to the Boko Haram insurgency in participating in the talks being brokered by Dr Ahmed. It must know that Nigerians, particularly northerners are being punished with its terror, and it is not winning the battle of hearts and minds either. If, as it says, it is now fight to finish, it should know that most of the casualties in this conflict will be people on whose behalf it claims to be fighting.

The failure of the initiative to broker some talks between the government and Boko Haram insurgency is a victory for those who want to see more blood and pain. These vested interests should not be given a free hand. The north and other Nigerians are paying a very high price for this insurgency. The north in particular is being brought to its knees, and it could sink even lower. Leaders, particularly in the north, should get more involved in the search for some mediation.