Peace makers, mischief makers

“I must follow them. I am their leader.” A. B. Law 

Not surprisingly, General Muhammadu Buhari’s party and allies have expressed reservations over the possibility that he will accept the nomination to mediate between them the JASLIWAJ (a.k.a Boko Haram) insurgency and the government. The Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) says the PDP created Boko Haram, and will use Buhari’s acceptance to mediate as evidence that he is the sponsor of the insurgency.

It can safely be assumed that this is General Buhari’s final position on this matter. If, therefore, the JASLIWAJ genuinely does have a spokesman who nominates mediators for government, and the group, and then lists preconditions for the talks, he will by now know that the insurgency has to look for a replacement for General Buhari. It is not clear what the reactions of the other people nominated will be; although it is safe to assume that they will all have some very difficult questions to ask, and quite possibly some concerns regarding perceptions over their qualifications to mediate, or chances for success.

Many cynics were quick to dismiss the genuiness of the claim by the insurgency that it is now ready to negotiate, and that it has confidence in a number of Nigerians to broker some talks with the government. In the light of the evidence that the insurgents were intensifying activities in Damaturu, Potiskum and Maiduguri, many people thought the Saudi Arabia angle was a ploy by the government to cause disaffection within the insurgency, or create the impression that it was making progress in its search for peace. The battles between the insurgency and security agencies have never been more intense or bitter, and from all appearances, the two sides are locked in a no-win situation. The international observer community and media are raising voices over horrendous crimes they claim are being committed by both sides. Prominent politicians from the region are reliving the bitter feuds between the ANPP and PDP which provided the roots of the insurgency in the days when it was made up to young clerics, idealists and political muscle.

So, in addition to the context of the offer to talk, the timing is also suspicious. Except for State governments, it would appear that the JTF has completely alienated the entire community’s support from it. A few functionaries of government whisper into the ears of the JTF some words of caution in the manner it relates with the community, and then says publicly that it is doing a good job. PDP Senators and ANPP big-wigs accuse each other of being active sponsors of the insurgency. In the meantime, bombs go off, bullets find targets and young men are arrested and taken away.

In the midst of this escalation, the offer of peace talks from the insurgency will suggest that it is feeling the heat more than the government. The devil in this assumption is in the details. First, the demands for restitution, rehabilitation and reconstruction are not new, or impossible to meet. The question is whether these should happen before, during or as outcomes of the talks? There is also the demand for release of all detained members; humane treatment, feeding of detainees, the rights for visitation and worship and cessation of molestation of wives. Detention of children and women held in lieu of husbands should not even constitute an item for discussion at a peace talk: if they are being held, they must be released immediately and unconditionally. There is also the tricky demand for the prosecution of the former Governor of Borno State Ali Modu Sheriff, a man who curries a lot of favour from the administration and is covered in many political layers.

The real problem is with the demand that all detainees must be released, presumably before talks are held. Almost certainly, government will be advised against releasing all detainees by security agencies, battling and losing men by the day. They will also advise government against letting go its trump card, particularly when dealing with an insurgency that places very high premium on the welfare and freedom of its members. Of course, some negotiated, staggered releases of detainees can be arranged; but government will demand commensurate concessions from an insurgency whose credibility lies in its sustained capacity to fight the state. What will the insurgency give in return?

But by far the most questionable aspect of the offer to talk is the inclusion of General Muhammadu Buhari among the people who the insurgency wants to negotiate for it. Given the persistent claims and perceptions in many official and quasi-official quarters that the General somehow has a hand either in the origin or current dimension of this insurgency, it is difficult to believe that this offer will be accepted by him. If indeed the offer was made by the JASLIWAJ, it shows a poor understanding of the Nigerian political situation. Even assuming that the General will put aside his considerable political antenna which advises against unpopular and risky ventures to take up the assignment, how will it affect his ambition to either lead this nation in future, or facilitate the emergence of a leadership that will radically differ from the PDP administration? Does he share or accept the vision and strategy of the insurgency? If he does not, how much justice is he likely to do to its cause? If he declines to take up a questionable offer to mediate, the administration or the insurgency, or both, will accuse him of refusing to help when asked.

It is altogether easier to believe that the nomination of General Buhari to broker peace talks between JASLIWAJ and government is either the product of poor judgment or outright mischief. If someone thought that linking the General with the insurgency in a manner which suggests that he has some credibility with or influence over it will damage his standing, they are also guilty of some very lazy thinking. His personal qualities of integrity and honesty are not in doubt; but he has not availed Nigerians of his detailed thinking on the philosophy, tactics and goals of the insurgency. What is clear is that if he had won the 2007 or 2011 presidential elections, he would have had the unenviable task of protecting the Nigerian constitution, a document and a symbol which the insurgency repudiates.

In spite of all the shortcomings of the purported offer of the JASLIWAJ, it serves as a reminder that prominent politicians and other citizens, and the leaders of the muslim community have not played as effective a role in mediating this conflict as they should. Northern and Muslim leaders have let their people down very badly, to the extent that they sit in their comfort and relative security waiting for JASLIWAJ or government to ask them to get involved in mediating. General Buhari is a highly respected Nigerian. There must be other Nigerians like him. Why do they need Boko Haram or the government to invite them to broker peace?