We are at war

“History is littered with wars which everybody knew would never happen.” Enoch Powell

An uprising by followers of a young preacher followed altercations with police and authorities about five years ago in Yobe and Borno States. The leaders of the uprising, leaders of the community and politicians involved in this uprising were well known to each other, and had been partly spawned by bitter partisan politics between the ANPP and PDP in the Borno and Yobe States. The vast majority of the followers of late Yusuf Muhammad believed they were involved in a venture that will purify their communities and their faith of imperfections, abuse and corruption; or least create enclaves where they can live their lives as good Muslims. Many were well-educated in western and Islamic knowledge, and quite a few were attending schools and universities. Some of their leaders had been exposed to partisan politics, and had received promises that politicians would support their passion for improved sensitivity by the state to the demands of the Islamic faith on Muslims. Many others had been armed, funded, or supported in one form or the other against oppositions in the past.

That uprising, the twin product of naivety and overconfidence on the part of Yusuf and his followers; and tragic failure of the state to react to it in a manner guaranteed to contain and eliminate it and its sources, blew up into the present insurgency. Security agents of the Nigerian state, with experiences from Zaki Biam, Odi, Kano and some parts of the Niger Delta, as well as a mentality of “peace-keeping” in parts of Africa where brute force alone made impact, tore into the uprising, killing hundreds and murdering its leaders. They demolished mosques, homes and lives, and retreated in the confidence that they had solved the problem. A few voices were raised against heavy-handedness and killings of innocent people which were all duly denied. The local community buried its dead. Followers of Yusuf who survived run away, and like all Nigerians, heard and watched the gruesome murder of their leaders as reported by a foreign television network many months after the events.

Yusuf’s supporters regrouped, more bitter and better organized. Their former political godfathers became their targets, and every agent of the Nigerian state became the enemy. The community watched as more and more of their young defied parental and social restraints to join a growing movement that promised to make them heroes in this world, and martyrs in the eyes of Allah. The State responded by flooding communities with soldiers and policemen, and an insurgency grew out of the inability of the state to defeat it totally, as well as the tendency of the JTF treat the entire community as the enemy.

Key turning points were missed in the course of the development of this uprising into an insurgency, with which the nation is now at war. Reported overtures at negotiations by the insurgency were dismissed by an administration which was convinced that it could crush it. Efforts by people with credibility to negotiate were scuttled by people who quite possibly benefitted more from its continuation than from ending it. Spectacular successes by the insurgency and its persistent efforts to undermine sensitive ethno-religious faultlines drew attention of the international community, which generally advised against evident strong-arm strategies, and in favour of negotiated settlements. Demands by community leaders that security agents should be restrained from offending the basic rights of citizens were dismissed as exaggerated falsehood from the very people who haboured and nurtured the insurgency.

As the insurgency grew, more and more breaches to national security began to be registered using its franchise. Some attacks were blamed on people other than the insurgents. There were allegations that subversives were attempting to pitch muslims against christians in a war with partisan political objectives. Claims were being made that the incredible amounts being spent around national security, a lot of it specifically on fighting the insurgency, will make it difficult to defeat it. Security agencies fell over each other competing for resources and attention, and the war has taken as casualty a Minister of Defence, a National Security Adviser and one or two Senators and a former Governor who are being investigated or prosecuted.

The epicenter of the battles shows all the scars of a bitter war. Hundreds of thousands of the civilian population have relocated. The economy in Borno and Yobe States has all but collapsed, and Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe and Adamawa State are being crippled by the day. Thousands of young men have died, or are in detention. Hundreds of soldiers and other security agents have died, and many more have been injured. Prominent politicians, civil servants and community leaders are being shot in broad daylight, and they have no hiding place. Citizens are have no privacy, rights or security as they are searched, humiliated or taken away by security agents. Bodies are deposited at morgues without explanations, and citizens live in fear of both the Joint Task Force (JTF) and the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lid Diawati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ). Politicians trade blames, and every now and then, the deep roots of this conflict in partisan politics are exposed. International media and monitoring groups say horrific crimes against the civilian population are being committed. Government says it is not involved. By any standard of judgment, our military is fighting a bitter war, and both sides are taking no prisoners.

Now this uprising which exploded into a seemingly intractable insurgency has taken the life of General Muhammadu Shuwa, a man who successfully contributed in the execution of the Nigerian civil war. Amnesty International says the Nigerian security agencies are involved in extra-judicial killings, and the activities of the JASLIWAJ will qualify for being crimes against humanity. A spokesman of the JASLIWAJ claims that he has the authority of the insurgency to offer to negotiate, but makes pre-conditions for the negotiations virtually impossible to accept by government. It is also doubtful if those nominated by the insurgents will accept to participate in the search for settlement on its behalf. Security advisers are unlikely to advise President Jonathan to release all detained suspects as a precondition for talks.

Our nation is at war, and has long forfeited the legal luxury of declaring it to be so. The way it has developed to this stage, it will be difficult to assume that either the government or the insurgency will win this war. Government is more likely to intensify doing things the same way it did them before: return fire, and lean hard on the community to fight an insurgency which is intricately interwoven with it. The insurgency will draw inspiration from its success in pinning down the might of the Nigeria state; and the progress it is making in creating hostility against the agents of the state in the communities. Huge numbers of the population moving out of Yobe and Borno States, and the insurgency reminds the nation every now and then that it can strike in places like Kaduna and Kano when it wants.

Prominent Nigerian citizens, the leadership of the Muslim community and civil society organizations should now engineer a platform which should assist both government and the insurgency to explore genuine options to end this war being waged around us without any ground rules. The times for lamentations, trading blames or fence-sitting are over. It should be clear by now that government has no clear strategy to win this war without creating more of the enemy. It is equally clear that the insurgency cannot defeat the rest of the nation, and its tactics of hurting the very constituency it claims to be fighting for will not win it this war. Let us begin by challenging those politicians who think they can run this country better than President Jonathan to rally around other people of goodwill and love for peace and progress to see if they can create a national momentum to bring this war to an end.