Ghosts with guns

I and the public know

What all schoolchildren learn,

Those to whom evil is done

Do evil in return.

W. H. Auden

Words and phrases a have away of assuming lives of their own in this country, largely because we are too lazy to interrogate them. Language is not an innocent medium of communication. It is a very powerful tool in social relations, which is why we need to be very careful about how we say what we mean. In recent months, President Jonathan's tendency to refer to insurgents as ghosts when discussing issues around resolution of the conflict has become an accepted currency in official circles. Similarly, the term, “amnesty”, has become popular since it was used to cover up what now looks like the large-scale abdication of responsibility by the Yar’Adua/Jonathan administration in the Niger Delta. Now very senior politicians and leaders use the term in a manner that suggests that very little attention has been paid to its full implication. For the purposes of clarity, ghosts are used by the President to refer to insurgents whose anonymity is standard weaponry. Amnesty refers to legal pardon for people who have broken laws of the land, but it is valueless to people who reject the legitimacy of the state.

A few days before the visit of President Jonathan to Borno and Yobe States, the Sultan of Sokoto chaired a meeting of Jamaatu Nasril Islam, and thereafter called on the President to grant amnesty to those elements of the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ) who have offered to negotiate a ceasefire with the Federal Government. It could have been a coincidence, or an effort to give the president an agenda as he set to visit a part of the country many had criticized him of abandoning to the military. Either way, the Sultan’s suggestion for an offer of an amnesty was significant in terms of the position of a critical segment of northern Muslim opinion regarding the conflict. It was the first time the Sultan will make a public statement with a weighty suggestion, the type that ought to have been the product of considerable thought. It is also safe to assume that the Sultan would have expected that the Abdulazeez group which he apparently referred to as those holding up the offer of negotiation would not be classified along with others as ghosts by the President. After all, they had made numerous appearances as humans, albeit with hooded faces, made specific demands, and even had northern governors claim credit for their creation.

As President Jonathan embarked on his visit, many people expected that the Sultan’s advise would carry some weight. To be sure, it had lost some of that weight between when it was made, and when Jonathan landed in Maiduguri. The Christian Association  of Nigeria (CAN) and some traditional rulers in the Niger Delta had condemned the idea of amnesty for JASLIWAJ, and had denounced the parallels with Niger Delta militants who were granted amnesty. A chorus of condemnation of the Sultan’s suggestion followed from many other quarters, mostly pointing out the injustice involved in granting amnesty to people who murdered and maimed Christians.

It is now history that the President has ruled out amnesty for the insurgents because, as he had always said, they are ghosts. You grand amnesty to, say, the Niger Delta militants who crippled the nation’s oil and gas industry, and who all came out of the creeks with faces showing, after the late Umaru Yar’Adua called them. Boko Haram, on the other hand, are unknown; they do not come when you call them, and they do not communicate except with violence.

So there. The people who have murdered over 3000 Nigerians and foreigners, and who continue to do so, are ghosts. These ghosts bomb and shoot Nigerians and kidnap foreigners. They put out information regularly on the Internet or distribute material to media. Hundreds or thousands of them are incarcerated by the police and the military. Even the US has declared some of them as terrorists. They, or some of them even give press conferences in persons. Only a few days ago, northern governors were gloating that they were responsible for creating the circumstances in which Abdulazeez came forward with offers of a ceasefire. They let out copious details on how the committee they set up on security and reconciliation met with Boko Haram militants who gave terms and conditions for cessation of violence, including details of a meeting in the governor’s residence in Maiduguri.

In fairness to Mr President, it must be said that Imam Ibrahim Shekau himself had denounced Abdulazeez and the entire developments around him. This was the same Abdulazeez the Sultan was encouraging the President to grant amnesty to; the same one northern governors are beating their chest over. So Mr President’s position may be that Shekau is the ghost who cannot be communicated with, and Abdulazeez is a human with a covered face who is not worth discussing with. This leaves everything pretty much where they are. Those who thought President Jonathan will make more than a symbolic damage control visit to Borno and Yobe by making some profound statements about amnesty and the JTF will be disappointed. On the other hand, those who think the President should not provide a blanket pardon to murderers will see his act as some evidence of personal courage, and a statesmanly posture against evil.

So what possible good could the visit have done, other than to marginally reduce the embarrassment caused to the President by the visit of the A.P.C governors? Difficult as it is to believe, the only good to come out of the visit is that Nigerians are reminded that the problem with the insurgency is as bad as it has been in recent times, and no one should be fooled by claims of breakthroughs. The President was right not to have been convinced to throw a few words on amnesty at the general direction of people who were the cause of the total lockdown of two cities just so he can visit. The insurgency is alive and real, as his security chiefs and quite possibly even the governors may have reminded him, and a gesture as important as a forgiveness, even a conditional one, will most likely amount to nothing. A few insurgents may abandon the battle, but unless you deal directly and comprehensively with the leaders, those who break ranks will be prey to those under arms, and they may not be protected by the state. Even acceptance of amnesty terms by factions will trigger even more bloodletting than is now being seen with slaughters and shootings.

What could the governors of Borno and Yobe have advised the President to do? An offer of amnesty which is ignored, or carries unacceptable preconditions will amount to a setback, and preclude another offer in future unless the conditions for it radically improve. Does he offer amnesty (forgiveness without prejudice, if you lay down your arms and renounce further violence) before discussions, or does he offer, as he has done before, to discuss resolution which may include amnesty? Since the President does not accept Abdulazeez as a credible discussion partner, should he just offer amnesty and sit back and see what happens? It is not inconceivable that governors of Borno and Yobe states who successfully managed a 2-day security cover for APC governors have had a say in the Presidents’ position. Perhaps they know that the conditions on the ground will make the demands for amnesty impractical and valueless, because the insurgency is not interested in amnesty. Perhaps the security advise has drawn attention of the President to the futility of a major policy initiative which will be repudiated for a propaganda purposes by the insurgency. Perhaps there are other reasons behind a rehash of the old position that Boko Haram are ghosts even on a symbolically important occasion like the visit.

The issue for the President and the nation now is that the Sultan and a few prominent northerners think that offering amnesty to the insurgents will make a major impact. That he disagrees with granting amnesty in the manner being suggested will further pitch the President against leading opinion in the North. Those who were being offered as possible bridges to the others by the Sultan and others will now most likely retreat into irrelevance. Those who have denounced them (and denounced the Sultan, the President and the entire Nigerian state) will feel vindicated that they (the ghosts) are the only game in town.

The president would have left the people of Borno and Yobe states with the depressing feeling that this conflict will drag on for quite a while. Northern opinion leaders will think he has missed a good opportunity to make a dent on the insurgency, and they will dig in around the idea of an amnesty as a possible solution which the President refuses to consider. The President visited Borno and Yobe States and came back empty handed as far as the insurgency is concerned. And the ghosts will still have their bombs and bullets. It is time to go back to the drawing board. This insurgency must end long before the 2015 elections. The north must find a  solution to a problem destroying it, no matter who is responsible for it.