When Governors sneeze…

“It is certainly more agreeable to have power to give than to receive.” Winston Churchill

An amusing report in one of the dailies last week claimed that PDP governors are demanding N46b worth of projects for their states for voting for President Jonathan in 2015. Apparently, the new leadership of the PDP Governors Forum is spearheading a move to get the President to acknowledge the loyalty of his colleague by siting at least one federal project in each PDP state. The report says they will take up the issue with the President this week. The same report claimed that chairman of the party’s Board of Trustees appealed to them to avoid divisive tendencies, to commit more firmly to the party and forgive past transgressions. He also drew their attention to security challenges in the country, which can only be solved by cooperation of all governments.

If this report is true, it will speak volumes of the difficulties which the PDP is facing at its top echelons. Spin it right or left, but a meeting of PDP governors taking place at a period of unprecedented rancor among them which resolves to ask President Jonathan to give more for their loyalty can only mean that the governors are yet to enlist in his project. Presumably this is the same meeting which the governor of Rivers State was reported to have half-attended. This could be the same meeting which discussed whether to allow Amaechi to continue as chairman, or put the President’s man, Governor of Katsina State on his seat. It could be the meeting which was deadlocked over the matter, and may have resolved to allow them to slug it out in an election.

The drama around Ameachi will suggest that the BOT Chair’s efforts to whip governors of the PDP into line has not been entirely successful. It would appear that the Rivers State governor is being chased left, right and everywhere, including airports which refuse his planes approval to take off, but it is very doubtful if he is implementing a one-governor agenda. Chances are that Amaechi is the arrowhead of an entrenched resistance against President Jonathan, which has a number of options and flexible strategies.

Governors are very powerful people. There is a way they are, collectively, more powerful than the President: they control party structures in their states which at critical moments, can make or mar presidential ambitions. President Obasanjo was the first near-victim of the awesome powers of their grip over delegates that turn into zombies from state capitals to Eagle Square and back. Vice President Atiku Abubakar saw the effect of PDP’s labour from 1999 to 2007 on his ambitions in 2011. Twenty-three of them in the PDP is a nightmare to contemplate for a President who wants a ticket. They have already shot down his pet project around the national leadership, and have effectively grounded the Bamanga Tukur chairmanship. They will walk around Chief Anineh for a while, since he appears to be holding an olive branch, but they are unlikely to sheath their swords.

The damage to the PDP in the President’s stronghold, the south-south, is largely the handiwork of the governors. Those among them who have dug in in resisting Jonathan’s ambitions will encourage Amaechi, but stay in the shadows. The new PDP governors’ chair, Godswill Akpabio will wield a stick, but whether it is the big stick or a straw will be determined by the manner Ameachi’s seeming rebellion is affected. No one believes governors Sule Lamido and Ameachi when they claim they have no hand in the plethora of billboards and posters proclaiming their ambitions to run in 2015 on the PDP’s presidential ticket. Nor, for that matter, does anyone believe that Dr Muazu B. Aliyu is as innocent as he says he is; or that Shema is not Jonathan’s pointman in the north; or that Yuguda has no presidential ambitions of his own. They could all be innocent of course; but in a political party where integrity and credibility are in very short supply, Nigerians would rather hang them as guilty than see them as injured parties in a war which takes no prisoners.

The power of governors goes beyond determining the President’s political fortunes. They can frustrate key policies, such as the Sovereign Wealth Fund. Some can raise storms around key legislations such as the Petroleum Industry Bill (P.I.B), and substantially cripple them. They can frustrate constitutional amendments and other legislations they do not like. On the other hand, they are supreme in their states. They have local governments and the legislature in pockets, and huge resources which they use as they please, thanks to weak or corrupted regulatory mechanisms they set up themselves.

In the next few months, the maneuvers around presidential tickets in 2015 will intensify. Governors will sneeze, and the nation will catch cold many times. PDP governors have President Jonathan’s political future in the hands for now. If he can find a weapon in the party’s considerable arsenal to whittle down their powers and resistance, he will sleep better. But it will have to be the type of instrument which gives them the assurance that he can win an election in 2015; will be a better candidate than any of them; will protect them from the law after 2015; and will guarantee that as many of them as possible get to the Senate. But he has to be President first, and this is the big issue. Many do not believe he will win. Others will not dare campaign for him openly.

Governors in the emerging opposition will also be extremely influential in determining political fortunes of ambitious flagbearers. With six governors, the ACN holds the aces here in terms of determining who is a candidate, and whose ambitions are scuttled. The CPC, with a solitary governor, will appear to be in the weakest position, yet it will put forward its leader as the most qualified to win the ticket and the elections. The ANPP has a number of ambitious members who may think they can effectively step in, and their governors may team up with ACN governors to squeeze General Muhammadu Buhari out.

The framers of our constitution could never have envisioned creating the albatross which governors have become around our democratic process. For all their powers, northern governors have failed to make a dent on poverty in the North. They have watched over the escalation of an insurgency in their midst, and have limited themselves to funding security operations and setting up committees on it. There are quite possibly more almajirai today in the north than there were in 1999, and the economy of the North has virtually collapsed under their watch.

Governors in the south-south have cornered the unprecedented resources accruing to their states around government houses, cronies and favoured circles which pass for communities. Criminal activities around oil and gas are increasing, and the threat of increased violence is feeding sentiments that there is still scope to make more money from kidnapping and crude theft than waiting for government contracts or being an ex-militant. In the southwest, an elaborate arrangement allows governors and their leader to keep out opposition and the public away from massively-subsidized politics using public funds, while the choreographed image of real development are created in the media. Governors in the southeast have erected high walls and retreated, leaving the space to marauding criminality which is ravaging some of the most enterprising communities of the nation.

In 2015, Nigerians will have a chance to elect people into offices who will not treat the law, public funds and their mandates as personal property. A substantial improvement in the quality of our democratic process can be made if governors who will serve, rather than be served by a weak system are elected.

2015: Many rivers to cross (2)

“Some persons are likable in spite of their unswerving integrity.”

Don Marquis

It is difficult not to have some sympathy for the intense excitement of the ANPP, the CPC, and the ACN as they inch nearer to the first merger of political parties since 1999. They think they have got many things right this time. They are emphatically unanimous that only a merger of their parties will replace the PDP as the ruling party. They believe they have learnt all the right lessons from past mistakes. They have started early enough, a key asset in view of the many requirements they need to meet before they can be a party. They believe they have shown faith in each other by surrendering a substantial amount of cherished territories and ambitions, and overlooking past injuries. They are willing to walk into largely uncharted territory, leaning on each other to avoid booby traps and hostility from the PDP. They think they can handle treachery, fifth columnists, damaging ambitions, and an electoral umpire whose credentials for integrity they still suspect. Above all, they think they can defeat the PDP in an electoral contest which will be difficult to manipulate now that INEC is not dealing with opposition parties it can assault with impunity.

The optimism of the merging parties is receiving valuable fillip from the appearance of panic within the PDP at the prospect of the merger. Suddenly, a party long used to crises around ambitions of incumbents appears to be crossing traditional boundries. Its festering wounds which started with the emergence of Bamanga Tukur as national chairman appear to be worsening as governors flex muscles with the President. At the heart of this battle is the attempt by the President to assume full control of the party, an irreducible minimum made popular by President Obasanjo. The problem for President Jonathan is that he got the party national leadership but substantially lost the governors in the process – a fatal, unforgiveable mistake, coming from a President who was once a governor. His problem has been made worse because some of the governors resisting his men in Abuja want the same thing he wants – the presidency in 2015. Many others are on their way out, and they want firm assurances and guarantees that they will be both safe, free and still within the power loop after 2015. They want a President who can guarantee that, but they are not sure that Jonathan will win an election and protect them. One of them, on the other hand, especially one from the north, a region which feels substantially hard done by under Jonathan, may just likely rally the troops to win with massive financial resources, a few tricks here and there, and a prayer that the merger will fall apart at a critical moment.

The President appears to have chosen to improve his hand by bringing in Chief Anenih, and sacrificing Alhaji Bamanga. That move has increased the perception of panic. Governors who know the Chief’s reputation think the President has lost the first few battles in this war of nerves. The opposition thinks the President is playing his trump card long before the game is over, and he will have little to fall back on if the gambit fails to work. Every move he makes is seen either as a retreat or a concession from a President struggling to maintain some balance in a fast-shifting environment. He sends governors after rebellious governors, and only succeeds in creating more factions. He placates one ambitious governor, and another springs up with billboards and posters the next day.

Certainly, the opposition has reasons to draw some inspiration from the internal problems of the PDP, but it will do well to look beyond them. Their merger talks appear to have survived a number of pitfalls to produce a constitution and a logo largely because General Muhammadu Buhari, Senator Bola Tinubu and ANPP leaders have supported them fully and apparently, transparently. Negotiating teams appear to have been well chosen and briefed, and they have worked hard to deliver on target. Elementary mistakes have been made, such as the haste with which governors announced the proposed name of the party seeking merger, which played into hands of mischief makers. How the merger walks out of the name debacle will largely depend on its willingness to adopt a flexible and informed strategy, but it should also know by now that there are many more traps ahead.

The merging parties may be diverted by the internal squabbles in the PDP to ignore to fix their own problems. They will need to pay very close attention to provisions of the Electoral Act as they relate to merger of political parties, and avoid offending them. Their Conventions have to be flawless, or some members will resort to legal steps to seek redress, genuine or contrived, voluntary or paid for by the PDP, which will take up valuable time. The manner protem party offices are allocated and contested for will also have to be handled with great care. Ambitions and resources will clash; zones will bicker and quarrel over assigned positions, and veteran politicians will pore over the new constitution to see how provisions can be exploited.

Many of these problems will be mitigated by a firm and close supervision of the merger process and the bonding of many disparate groups into one party by party leaders. This is one potential area of problem for the proposed party. The ACN is reputed to be under firm control of Tinubu and governors, and is the most disciplined of the three in the merger. Its Convention had gone like clockwork, and it appears set to assume the role of a senior partner. The CPC has the advantage of having a very popular leader in many parts of the north, and the weakness of being the most indisciplined and disorganized party in the mergery. It will need to resolve massive internal problems before the merger, or it will have nothing to show as an asset except General Muhammadu Buhari. In the CPC he is unchallengeable. In a merged, bigger party, he will be open to challenges, and the rump of his CPC in the new party will fight with one hand behind their backs if they go into the merger in their present state. The ANPP, against all expectations, has stuck to the merger process, perhaps because it recognizes that a CPC-ACN  merger will eat up much of the little space it clings to. But it is having to fight a battle for integrity and trust on all fronts. Its leaders are widely suspected of pandering to PDP lollies. Deep wounds inflicted in over a decade of association and bitter separation between its members and those of the CPC are difficult to heal or ignore. It is seen as the weak link in the merger chain, an image some of its leaders court daily by associating with the PDP.

But by far the biggest problem of the merger will be what roles its leaders will play. It is no longer a secret that General Muhammadu Buhari want Nigerians to trust him with a mandate in 2015. What are the ambitions of Senator Bola Tinubu? Does he want an elective office, or will he be content to pull the strings of power? How will he be disposed to a Buhari candidature in 2015? What do the ANPP bigwigs want? Can they live with a Buhari candidature, or will they team up with others in the merged, bigger party to scheme for another flagbearer? How would the party cope with intrigues and ambitions, in a contest where there are no fallback positions, except to join the PDP or become irrelevant?

There are many other challenges which the merging parties have to face. Merging may ultimately turn out to be only one step in a long process to wrest power from the PDP. Bonding the party around issues and candidates will be a much more challenging step. Keeping an eye on the electoral process is also a major challenge, because even a bigger, merged party can be rigged out. But if it can improve its internal cohesion and avoid intra-party disputes which sap energy and divert attention, the merging opposition may defeat the PDP in 2015, no matter who flies its flag.

Walking the talk

“Distrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful.” F. W. Nietzsche

 By agreeing to constitute a Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, President Jonathan would appear to have turned the tables on the people who had insisted that he had to explore options to his current strategy in dealing with the insurgency of the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lid Daawati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ) and its offshoots such as Ansaru. Specifically, he appears to have yielded to suggestions that engaging the insurgency in dialogue in both feasible and ultimately, more rewarding. That he did not name his Committee an Amnesty Committee is also significant. This again appears to be a concession to those who think the term amnesty is problematic as a concept and a negotiating instrument when applied to the peculiarities of this insurgency. Dialogue and reconciliation, on the other hand, suggest a wider and deeper form of engagement which may produce, among others, resolution of grievances, cessation of hostilities and non-attribution of criminality and full integration of the insurgents into society.

 In conceding to the clamour to explore dialogue, the President has improved his options in ending this war. First, he is not calling off the military option. He is putting out a carrot in addition to the stick, but has enlisted the proponents of the carrot approach to sell it to the insurgency. Second, he is ridding himself of accusations that his sole strategy of the use of force is fueling, rather than containing the problem. Those who have made the case that the JTF has caused more casualties than the insurgency will now expect the dialogue option to end its terror, or the twin terrors of the insurgency and the JTF. They will now have to join the search for peace through dialogue if they want an end to the activities of the JTF. Then again, he would have addressed the near total hostility of the mostly Muslim North over his approach to the insurgency, informed by the suspicion that he is reluctant or outrightly unwilling to resolve this damaging conflict for political reasons. If he counts his steps towards rebuilding bridges with this region, he may note that he has made some movement in that direction. Finally, it would appear that the Committee has representation from major sources of the pressures to explore the dialogue option. The President appears to have handed over the entire search for the insurgents, engaging them in dialogue, resolving their grievances and providing the credibility and respect which will hold it all together. This is a very heavy burden to place on any shoulder, but the President would say they asked for it.

 All these may suggest that the President has registered a masterstroke against the North, many other Nigerians and the international community. Nothing could be further from the truth. There will be many people who will see the Committee on Dialogue as capitulation by the President and this will ultimately force him to make further concessions. His hardliner constituency which see the insurgency as an armed political resistance against him, and security advisers who will see no end to the insurgency outside a fight-to-the finish approach, as well as senior Christian leaders who want to see punishment and restitution for Christian blood will be prominent in this category. Others will regret his decision on grounds that making concessions to armed uprisings and insurgencies merely pays off those currently under arms; and reminds others that the route to influence and wealth is shorter with arms. The Niger Delta deal, which is fast coming unstuck and threatening the post-2015 peace and survival of the nation will be used at every turn to lament the President’s decision.

 What the President may have gained in approval in setting up the Committee may have been lost by its constitution in other quarters. But this is not the end of his problems. The simultaneous deployment of carrot and stick have their own problems. Baga, Mayo Balwa and other areas are tragic reminders that even as he announces a Committee to dialogue with the insurgency, his military apparatus and the insurgency are at each others’ throats, with dire consequences for civilians in particular. Indeed, going by the seeming escalation of the conflict in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, you would think that the two sides are digging in for more bloody engagements. They both do not seem to have heard that President Jonathan has put out an olive branch.

 Left to them, the military and the insurgency will raise this conflict to new heights. The military will not scale down its operations or change tactics unless it is prevailed up by the strongest hands and will of their Commander-In-Chief. If President Jonathan wants to walk his talk, he needs to demonstrate a firmer grip on the troops which appear to operate with disturbing freedom in identifying the enemy, choosing tactics and strategies in dealing with it, and determining how it accounts for its actions. No one will send troops into hostile territories with their hands tied behind their backs. But then no one should give armed men free rein to operate in an environment where the friend is also the enemy either.

 Similarly, the insurgency should not get away with the impression that its grievances against the state, or the anger of the population against excesses of the JTF is sufficient ground to give it the license to do as it pleases. Those eminent people, many with unquestionable credentials who have urged government to explore dialogue as an option believe that the insurgency leaders can be reasoned with. If they have access to them, they are likely to remind them of the severe damage they have caused the Muslim Ummah, in addition to all other grievances against the Ummah which they claim to fight for. These leaders now need to move and help convince the insurgency leaders to speak with the Committee. Their integrity and standing are at stake. If they fail to make an impression on the insurgency after President Jonathan’s gesture, they will lose more than they bargained for. They will be exposed as lightweights in a region desperate for leaders. Elites from parts of the nation who think they stampeded the President into the dialogue option will accuse them of barking without a bite. The insurgency will break new grounds in terms of its alienation from all influences in a region where Muslims constitute 90% of the population. President Jonathan himself will say he gave the dialogue option a chance, and it failed. If he insists on reinforcing the military option, no one should blame him. The hard-pressed public which has borne the brunt of the activities of the insurgency and the JTF will either submit to more pressure, or rise up an defend itself against both.

 The only way to establish the genuineness and sincerity of President Jonathan’s gesture is to see how he plans to support it. This is where his Committee comes in. It must act as a vital bridge between many skeptical and hostile points. A skeptical public; a hostile insurgency, and a security force which thinks its lives are being compromised by politics. But the Committee itself needs to be assisted by all those who want to see and end to this conflict. If this initiative fails, it will not be the end of Jonathan Presidency. But it will leave no room for any other option than the continued destruction of lives, economy and society of northern Muslims. This may be a positive for some interests, but it cannot be in the interest of northern Muslims.

The North stops running

“Necessity unites hearts” German Proverb.

An extraordinary meeting was convened last week Monday at the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Center, Abuja by the Northern Elders Forum, a group that appears to house the residue of political influence and credibility in northern leadership. The meeting was to give muscle and support for its inputs into proposals for an effective engagement between government and insurgencies of Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lid Daawati Wal Jihad and Ansar which it planned to submit to President Jonathan. The Forum had met with the President a few days earlier, during which it made a strong case for dialogue which should be preceded by the grant of amnesty. In the days following that meeting, there were widespread and divergent reactions to the setting up of a committee under the National Security Adviser (NSA) to advise on a framework for amnesty and dialogue, if it was the way out. As expected, the overwhelming reaction from the North was in support of the intention to explore options to the militarization of substantial parts of the region and the traumatization of the lives of citizens by both the insurgency and the security agents of the state. A few voices were raised against pardon without restitution for christian churches and lives taken by the insurgency. On the other hand, there was a chorus of condemnation from traditional nay sayers in the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and a few political circles. Finally, although this would not have been reported, there must have been some resistance from security circles, since the military has become a major stakeholder in this conflict that shows no sign of yielding a victor.

Attention had become focused on the nature of the framework which the President may adopt in dealing with dialogue and peaceful resolution. It is safe to assume that many interests were at play to shape it; from those which would advise in favour of a controlled and limited framework designed to give government a firm grip on the process, to those who would suggest a comprehensive and largely autonomous framework that should target full acceptance, dialogue, restitution, rehabilitation and reconciliation as goals. Some other positions would have taken cognizance of the repudiation of the concept and offer of amnesty by leader of the JASLIWAJ, Abubakar Shekau as soon as it was even mentioned, and may have advised in favour of a strategy which seeks dialogue and reinforcement of existing strategies at the same time.

The Northern Elders had summoned retired Chief Justices and other senior judicial officers, senior technocrats, retired heads of military, police and intelligence services, politicians and an impressive array of other northerners who had served the nation with distinction and who may never have thought they would attend a meeting of that nature, to make further inputs into its own suggestions. The meeting turned out to be anything but a tame and measured gathering of elders who had been asked to make inputs into work in progress.

The first sign that it was to be anything but a routine meeting was the large attendance of very senior retired security officers. Generals, including a few who held top, command positions do not make a habit of attending meetings summoned by elderly citizens and politicians in large numbers. When they join former Chief Justices and heads of police and other security agencies and politicians and elder statesmen who have stepped forward into public limelight over the state of security in the North, it could only signify that something is seriously amiss.

Secondly, the mix in the attendance was evidence that the meeting was a response to some deep-seated sentiment which had been twicked. It had people who had never shown an overt interest in political or public matters since disengaging, either owing to character or demands of positions they held, or personal experiences. It had Christian and Muslim Northerners who lived lives only as Northerners in a nation which went where the North went. It had people who fought in the civil war, or were part of every major development in the history of the nation in the last 40-odd years. It had people who had crossed swords on many occasions, colleagues and comrades who had fallen out; victims and beneficiaries of intrigues and historians who chronicled how the North won and lost the power game, all seated in the same room. It had elderly people who labored to keep attention and energy focused on the future, rather than around elaborate lamentations of a glorious past of which they were architects and beneficiaries. It has a smattering of relatively younger elders who think they are by right entitled to call the shots, but cannot do so owing to the state of the North and the nation.

Then you had the intense anger and frustrations which poured out of elderly men and women who two decades ago were the reference points in Nigerian politics. How could the nation have been reduced to what it is today: insecure, unsure and so dangerously divided? How did the North lose so spectacularly in the delicate management of power, and who was responsible for dropping the ball? How could the awesome political arsenal of the North have been so whittled down that it is now virtually an instrument in the hands of other Nigerians to manipulate for their own political interests? How could this insurgency have been allowed to grow and develop into what it is today: a veritable war machine which is even more dangerous because it attracts the vengeful powers of the Nigerian state to destroy lives, communities, infrastructure, the economy and political fortunes of the North? How is it possible that the militarization of many parts of the North is the only strategy of the government, and why is the administration reluctant to examine other options? What does the law say about military mobilization and management of internal security, and what are governors doing about it?

Still more questions: why has it taken this long for anyone, anyone at all, to summon a meeting of this nature? Where are other northern elite groups or leaders? What is being done about northern elite disunity? Who will advise the President that the northern population sees the military as any army of occupation? How would the insurgents know that the people have had enough, and it is time stop killing them and ruining their lives? What needs to be done by the people at the meeting to help the peace process? Where are northern political leaders, governors and others with influence? What are they doing to influence the thinking and actions of the President and his key advisers on this insurgency? What next, after the meeting?

The import of the meeting which lasted three hours went far beyond its rather bland and restrained communiqué. There were many revelations which were, however limited to the meeting room. One was the significant response of highly-placed northerners to the need to discuss issues and proposals on how the insurgency and the response of government to it are destroying the north. It is not an exaggeration to say there has not been anything even remotely resembling this public display of commitment from people who were in large measure, responsible both for the rise and fall of the north. Two, the Christians at the meeting, by no means inconsequential in their communities, reinforced the sentiment that all Northerners are paying an unacceptable price for this conflict, and want to see an end to it. The mixed nature of those who attended, and the heart-rending lamentations of the good old days when the strength of the North laid in its ability to manage its cultural and religious pluralism as an asset, suggests that a campaign to continue to exploit ethno-religious fautlines in the North may meet with stiffer resistance.

Three, there was a very strong resolve to work both against the insurgency and a government which merely makes life more difficult for its victims. Four, the North is virtually on its knees but is going to fight back because this not a position it wants to be, or is accustomed to be in. Five, northern leaders are determined to work towards the fastest and most comprehensive resolution of this conflict, and a genuine re-invention of the northern economy and society. Six, the gulf which exists between critical elements of the northern elite, as well as that between the elites as a whole and the federal government is hurting the North, the federal government and the nation.

Seven, and finally, the meeting drew a line for the North. It said in clear terms that the region is done with running, and being run over. It will take back its destiny, and repair the severe damage being done to its future generations. Anyone who has an interest in managing the affairs of the nation now or in the future should note this.

2015: Many rivers to cross (1)

“If you are the big tree, we are the small ants, ready to cut you down.” Bob Marley song.

The elections in 2015 promise to be different in many ways. If the current widespread state of insecurity extends into the preparations, campaigns and the conduct of the elections, they could very well be conducted under a substantially-militarized atmosphere in many parts of the nation. In parts of the country which the insurgency appears bent on “liberating”, they may not take place at all. In that context, they will go down in history as the only elections which have been conducted in a state of war. If circumstances make it impossible to conduct the elections in many parts of the country, the President may invoke constitutional powers he shares with the legislature, to postpone them. They may also be the only elections since 2003 in which a ruling party will face genuine threat of being defeated. It will resist this of course, and the opposition which has smelt the possibility of success will fight, literary, to the finish.

It is obvious that the PDP is taking the threat from the merger seriously. You will not know this from what its leaders say, but from what they do. The signs that it is re-strategizing for a bruising contest are all there to see. The high profile role of its BOT chairman, Chief Tony Anenih is evidence that it is rolling out its big guns. The party chairman, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur appears to have lost out to the intrigues within the party, the awesome powers of its governors, and the widespread doubts that he and President Jonathan at the head of a campaign for 2015 can win anything.

The man who calls the shots, Chief Anenih, now appears to have re-designed strategies for re-engineering the party. His attempt to win back difficult and ambitious PDP governors to join the train appears to have sank Bamanga’s boat, and created the impression that the party has a role for them. How this plays out in the next few months is not clear, but the party will buy a little time with President Jonathan’s claim that he has not made up his mind to run in 2015.

Further forays are being made by Chief Anenih’s strategy to paper over massive cracks. His visit to President Obasanjo has been duly noted as a knees-on-the-ground appeal to him to sheath his sword against a Jonathan candidacy. Chief Anenih and president Obasanjo know each other very well. Between these two gladiators, there are very few tricks in the book they did not pull together, or separately in the past. If Obasanjo takes the bait and agrees that he is better off on board than rocking the PDP boat, he will still have to consider his value in a southwest PDP where the waters have receded too far from him, in a party which has respect for you only if you have a letter from home. His ace in influencing some northern governors to challenge a Jonathan presidency may have to be surrendered in exchange for an uncertain future, to a few people who are still wary of him.

There will be other moves the party will make in the next few months to attempt to control damage and head off the threat of a promising merger. It will try to contain the seeming belligerence of the River State governor, or scare him into silence or acquiescence. It will have to find a way around the ambitions of a number of northern governors as well as Alhaji Atiku Abubakar who believe that the next PDP candidate must come from the North, or the party will commit suicide.

It will have to address widespread worries over the poor record of President Jonathan in office, and convince many genuine members that he can be trusted with another mandate in 2015. But its biggest challenge will be convincing President Jonathan not to run again in 2015, if he wants to. It will take superhuman courage, which is not particularly evident in the PDP at this stage, to tell President Jonathan that he will tear the party apart if he choses to run in 2015. The leaders may be able to alert him to the possibility that he will be fiercely challenged in the build up to the primaries, and how it is safer not to assume that he will be unchallenged. Some may find a way to tell him that his candidature will substantially play into the hands of the opposition which is, right now, praying fervently that the PDP does field him. A few ambitious and wealthy members may avoid the arrows fired at their ambitions to cripple his candidacy and his campaign, and may trigger massive defections and elaborate “anti-party” to get him defeated. Those close to him who will worry over the outcome of the elections may hint that it will quite possibly be the most divisive elections organized, and the nation may be pushed nearer the abyss if a bitterly-contested election compounds its existing insecurity.

If, for the sake of argument, President Jonathan says he will not run in 2015, a whole new set of scenarios will unfold. Would the south-south PDP insist on another term under another candidate? If its militants and other fire-spitting beneficiaries of the administration of President Jonathan think he did not jump, but was pushed, will they resume large scale, armed hostility against the Nigerian State, with the nation’s assets in oil and gas as hostages? If the party fields a northerner as its candidate, who is it likely to be? Atiku is stupendously wealthy and has an unyielding ambition. But he has many enemies who would rather live under any other President than him. There are also many ambitious governors who will give him a run for his money. They will get a hefty push from people like Obasanjo and quite possibly Anenih, but they will run a campaign against opposition candidates who will enjoy popularity that will, in part, be the product of the failures of the PDP.

All in all, the PDP has some major challenges ahead of it. The confidence of the emerging opposition is partly derived from the current weakness and limitations of the PDP, and in part from its assessment of its own strength. It will be foolhardy for the opposition to think replacing the PDP as ruling party will be easy, however. This is a party that has all the cards stacked in its favour, in spite of its current limitations. It has resources and control over vital institutions of the state which are part of the electoral process. Life without power will expose too many people to threats and dangers of losing privileges, and huge sources of wealth and influence. A different leadership may ask too many awkward questions; reopen or open new investigations into the management of the nation’s economy; or assume tougher stands against criminality and routine subversion of the judiciary and law and order institutions.

The possibility that it could lose power in 2015 may likely be the strongest motivation for the PDP to put its house in order, and prepare to defeat a potentially-damaging opposition. Many people think the PDP has already lost the 2015 elections. Their optimism may not be without foundations, but it will be wrong to assume that the PDP will surrender its entire fortunes and future to an electoral process to decide. The period between now and 2015 will test the resilience of the PDP, the strength of the opposition, the integrity of the electoral process, and the nation's capacity to survive more challenging crises.

Little light, long tunnel

“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” J.F Kennedy

President Jonathan appears to be leaning towards the recent upsurge in appeals for amnesty for insurgents of the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lid’da’awati Wal Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram. A large delegation of elderly and distinguished northerners known as Northern Elders Forum met with him last week Wednesday, the second meeting in a year. Last year, the forum had left him with a long shopping list of issues and grievances which affect the economy, security and other challenges of the North which they wanted the President to act on, including the need for dialogue with Boko Haram. He promised to respond to them in a couple of weeks, but did not do so for many months. In exasperation, some of the elders began to speak out in a manner only elders speak: frankly, with controlled anger. Their frustrations were compounded by lack of access to northern governors to look at the same issues.

What appears to have broken the camel’s back was the public demand by the Emir of Kano that the President should implement the recommendations of the Elders. Until the Emir sent the message through the delegation that went to condole him over the bus park bombing, anyone would be forgiven for thinking the President will not budge on his insistence that dialogue or amnesty are not options on his table. The Sultan had spoken out, with full support of the Jamaatu Nasril Islam (JNI) in favour of amnesty. Two days after this significant intervention, the Governors and elders of Borno and Yobe states made the case for amnesty when the President visited their two states. He turned down the appeals, on the grounds that the insurgents are unknown combatants (popularly referred to as ghosts), and you cannot negotiate with them. The Borno-Yobe visit appeared to have compounded the President’s situation.

A significant portion (the one largely removed from the physical and economic damage of the insurgency) applauded the President’s appearance of principled courage in resisting the pressure to submit to the amnesty clamour. A major source of the pressure to resist also came from the security, law and order community which sees amnesty as capitulation. The other side raised its voice to a new pitch in the demand for amnesty as the key to eventual resolution of the conflict. More leaders of opinion spoke out, and were joined by professional groups, traditional rulers, politicians, the clergy (including senior Christian clergy) the media and a very wide swathe of public opinion which saw the President’s position as “typical”. International opinion was also nudging the President to explore options to his current, singular strategy of using force against the insurgency.

By the time the Northern Elders Forum visited the President, it was obvious that his position with regards to the amnesty issue has no support in the northern part of the country. To sustain that position would have meant alienating just about every important source of influence in the region. Even the Christian community, despite the warnings of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) was joining the immunity bandwagon, after living under the horror and stress of being bombed and killed in a conflict that shows no signs of abeting.

The elders met a President already looking critically at the amnesty issue. He told them he had never ruled out amnesty, but had been consistent in demanding that amnesty is the product of dialogue involving people who can and are willing to articulate their grievances. To do this, they have to make themselves available for talks and negotiations. They have not done so, and he cannot grant amnesty to people he does not know. Those who speak for amnesty also appear to deny any knowledge of the insurgents, who live amongst them.

The Elders reportedly requested him to consider granting amnesty and then set up a framework which will give it substance and structure. They made the case that even the Niger Delta militants came out only after late President Yar’Adua had made strenuous efforts in pursuit of the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis which was part of his seven point agenda, and had to put in place an amnesty programme with a structure and credibility. They advised the President to set up an Amnesty Commission or another structure which should administer the amnesty provisions, including guaranteeing the safety and security of those who take up the offer, and facilitating dialogue and eventual resolution.

Since the visit of the Elders, developments suggest that President Jonathan is seriously considering the grant of amnesty under a formal structure and processes which should both tap into existing confidence that it can work, and also continue to protect the security and territorial integrity of the nation. It is safe to assume that President Jonathan is meeting stiff resistance from many quarters. First, the leadership of the security agencies will not simply roll over. They will insist that amnesty or dialogue is capitulation. They will tell the President that their men and women will be furious and disappointed after all the blood, limbs and lives lost in the conflict. They will insist that they can win this war, and are in fact, at the point of winning it. They will advise against listening to advise from people who are sponsors or godfathers of the insurgents; and they will warn that far from encouraging insurgents to defect and take up the amnesty offer, more people will be encouraged by the seeming weakness of the state, to take up the battle in new fronts. They will warn that amnesty to these insurgents will spawn more insurgencies. They tell him to sustain his current strategy.

Then he will have to contend with a powerful circle around him which will see amnesty and dialogue as a political setback. They will remind him that he has another political constituency which is adamant that amnesty is reward for the mass murder of their kith and kin and other Christians. They will point to the Niger Delta amnesty programme which is now rapidly coming unstuck, as evidence that amnesty does not work. They will warn him to beware of walking into the trap of northerners who lit the Boko Haram fire to burn up his administration, and who will use his amnesty programme to claim credit for putting out a fire that refused to consume him and his administration. They will advise him against appearing as weak, with 2015 round the corner, a north substantially in a rebellious mood, and a south-south and south-east unsure over whether he can be trusted with another term.

President Jonathan appears set to experiment with the amnesty option. If he does offer some semblance of concession as key to dialogue and resolution, much will still have to be done to make it work. First, the structural framework will have to be credible and run by people of transparent integrity, the type all sides to this conflict will be comfortable with. Second, all leaders who have made appeals for amnesty as the first step towards resolution must be actively involved in encouraging those under arms to also consider and avail themselves of the amnesty option. This is the time for those who believe amnesty can work to live up to their responsibilities as leaders: whether they know the insurgents or not, they must look for them, persuade them to lay down their arms, and dialogue. Third, the grant of amnesty must be part of a process, which must include a scaling down of the use of force, freeing detainees who have been in detention without trial, and the creation of safe and secure dialogue facilities. Four, the on-going attempt to politicize the amnesty issue with specific reference to 2015 should be stopped.

There are many questions legitimately being raised by Nigerians regarding amnesty and dialogue with JASLIWAJ and its sister, Ansaru. Will the insurgents take up the offer at all? Are we rewarding mass murder with freedom and possible financial benefits? Can the Nigerian state face two threats from the south-south and north which are unsuccessfully contained within rickety amnesty frameworks? Can amnesty for JASLIWAJ remove other threats from other interests who are aping its tactics but do not share its goals? Can those who make much money from the insurgency walk away from a lucrative venture without a fight? Can northern leaders and elders help make sure that amnesty leads to full resolution; or have they lost all power and influence?

There are many more questions and few answers, but the fear to try to find an alternative to the status quo that may work is the biggest threat we face. There is a faint light at the end of the tunnel the nation must walk towards, even though it has no idea how far it is. Whatever happens, we must not go back.