“Necessity unites hearts” German
Proverb.
An extraordinary meeting was convened last week Monday
at the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Center, Abuja by the Northern Elders Forum, a group
that appears to house the residue of political influence and credibility in
northern leadership. The meeting was to give muscle and support for its inputs
into proposals for an effective engagement between government and insurgencies
of Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lid Daawati Wal Jihad and Ansar which it
planned to submit to President Jonathan. The Forum had met with the President a
few days earlier, during which it made a strong case for dialogue which should
be preceded by the grant of amnesty. In the days following that meeting, there
were widespread and divergent reactions to the setting up of a committee under
the National Security Adviser (NSA) to advise on a framework for amnesty and
dialogue, if it was the way out. As expected, the overwhelming reaction from
the North was in support of the intention to explore options to the
militarization of substantial parts of the region and the traumatization of the
lives of citizens by both the insurgency and the security agents of the state. A
few voices were raised against pardon without restitution for christian churches
and lives taken by the insurgency. On the other hand, there was a chorus of
condemnation from traditional nay sayers in the Christian Association of
Nigeria (CAN) and a few political circles. Finally, although this would not
have been reported, there must have been some resistance from security circles,
since the military has become a major stakeholder in this conflict that shows
no sign of yielding a victor.
Attention had become focused on the nature of the
framework which the President may adopt in dealing with dialogue and peaceful
resolution. It is safe to assume that many interests were at play to shape it;
from those which would advise in favour of a controlled and limited framework
designed to give government a firm grip on the process, to those who would suggest
a comprehensive and largely autonomous framework that should target full
acceptance, dialogue, restitution, rehabilitation and reconciliation as goals.
Some other positions would have taken cognizance of the repudiation of the
concept and offer of amnesty by leader of the JASLIWAJ, Abubakar Shekau as soon
as it was even mentioned, and may have advised in favour of a strategy which
seeks dialogue and reinforcement of existing strategies at the same time.
The Northern Elders had summoned retired Chief
Justices and other senior judicial officers, senior technocrats, retired heads
of military, police and intelligence services, politicians and an impressive
array of other northerners who had served the nation with distinction and who
may never have thought they would attend a meeting of that nature, to make
further inputs into its own suggestions. The meeting turned out to be anything
but a tame and measured gathering of elders who had been asked to make inputs
into work in progress.
The first sign that it was to be anything but a
routine meeting was the large attendance of very senior retired security
officers. Generals, including a few who held top, command positions do not make
a habit of attending meetings summoned by elderly citizens and politicians in
large numbers. When they join former Chief Justices and heads of police and
other security agencies and politicians and elder statesmen who have stepped
forward into public limelight over the state of security in the North, it could
only signify that something is seriously amiss.
Secondly, the mix in the attendance was evidence that
the meeting was a response to some deep-seated sentiment which had been
twicked. It had people who had never shown an overt interest in political or public
matters since disengaging, either owing to character or demands of positions
they held, or personal experiences. It had Christian and Muslim Northerners who
lived lives only as Northerners in a nation which went where the North went. It
had people who fought in the civil war, or were part of every major development
in the history of the nation in the last 40-odd years. It had people who had
crossed swords on many occasions, colleagues and comrades who had fallen out;
victims and beneficiaries of intrigues and historians who chronicled how the
North won and lost the power game, all seated in the same room. It had elderly
people who labored to keep attention and energy focused on the future, rather
than around elaborate lamentations of a glorious past of which they were
architects and beneficiaries. It has a smattering of relatively younger elders
who think they are by right entitled to call the shots, but cannot do so owing
to the state of the North and the nation.
Then you had the intense anger and frustrations which
poured out of elderly men and women who two decades ago were the reference
points in Nigerian politics. How could the nation have been reduced to what it
is today: insecure, unsure and so dangerously divided? How did the North lose
so spectacularly in the delicate management of power, and who was responsible
for dropping the ball? How could the awesome political arsenal of the North
have been so whittled down that it is now virtually an instrument in the hands
of other Nigerians to manipulate for their own political interests? How could
this insurgency have been allowed to grow and develop into what it is today: a
veritable war machine which is even more dangerous because it attracts the vengeful
powers of the Nigerian state to destroy lives, communities, infrastructure, the
economy and political fortunes of the North? How is it possible that the
militarization of many parts of the North is the only strategy of the
government, and why is the administration reluctant to examine other options? What
does the law say about military mobilization and management of internal
security, and what are governors doing about it?
Still more questions: why has it taken this long for
anyone, anyone at all, to summon a meeting of this nature? Where are other
northern elite groups or leaders? What is being done about northern elite
disunity? Who will advise the President that the northern population sees the
military as any army of occupation? How would the insurgents know that the
people have had enough, and it is time stop killing them and ruining their
lives? What needs to be done by the people at the meeting to help the peace
process? Where are northern political leaders, governors and others with
influence? What are they doing to influence the thinking and actions of the
President and his key advisers on this insurgency? What next, after the
meeting?
The import of the meeting which lasted three hours
went far beyond its rather bland and restrained communiqué. There were many
revelations which were, however limited to the meeting room. One was the
significant response of highly-placed northerners to the need to discuss issues
and proposals on how the insurgency and the response of government to it are
destroying the north. It is not an exaggeration to say there has not been
anything even remotely resembling this public display of commitment from people
who were in large measure, responsible both for the rise and fall of the north.
Two, the Christians at the meeting, by no means inconsequential in their
communities, reinforced the sentiment that all Northerners are paying an
unacceptable price for this conflict, and want to see an end to it. The mixed nature
of those who attended, and the heart-rending lamentations of the good old days
when the strength of the North laid in its ability to manage its cultural and
religious pluralism as an asset, suggests that a campaign to continue to
exploit ethno-religious fautlines in the North may meet with stiffer
resistance.
Three, there was a very strong resolve to work both against
the insurgency and a government which merely makes life more difficult for its
victims. Four, the North is virtually on its knees but is going to fight back
because this not a position it wants to be, or is accustomed to be in. Five,
northern leaders are determined to work towards the fastest and most
comprehensive resolution of this conflict, and a genuine re-invention of the
northern economy and society. Six, the gulf which exists between critical
elements of the northern elite, as well as that between the elites as a whole
and the federal government is hurting the North, the federal government and the
nation.
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