Little light, long tunnel

“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” J.F Kennedy

President Jonathan appears to be leaning towards the recent upsurge in appeals for amnesty for insurgents of the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lid’da’awati Wal Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram. A large delegation of elderly and distinguished northerners known as Northern Elders Forum met with him last week Wednesday, the second meeting in a year. Last year, the forum had left him with a long shopping list of issues and grievances which affect the economy, security and other challenges of the North which they wanted the President to act on, including the need for dialogue with Boko Haram. He promised to respond to them in a couple of weeks, but did not do so for many months. In exasperation, some of the elders began to speak out in a manner only elders speak: frankly, with controlled anger. Their frustrations were compounded by lack of access to northern governors to look at the same issues.

What appears to have broken the camel’s back was the public demand by the Emir of Kano that the President should implement the recommendations of the Elders. Until the Emir sent the message through the delegation that went to condole him over the bus park bombing, anyone would be forgiven for thinking the President will not budge on his insistence that dialogue or amnesty are not options on his table. The Sultan had spoken out, with full support of the Jamaatu Nasril Islam (JNI) in favour of amnesty. Two days after this significant intervention, the Governors and elders of Borno and Yobe states made the case for amnesty when the President visited their two states. He turned down the appeals, on the grounds that the insurgents are unknown combatants (popularly referred to as ghosts), and you cannot negotiate with them. The Borno-Yobe visit appeared to have compounded the President’s situation.

A significant portion (the one largely removed from the physical and economic damage of the insurgency) applauded the President’s appearance of principled courage in resisting the pressure to submit to the amnesty clamour. A major source of the pressure to resist also came from the security, law and order community which sees amnesty as capitulation. The other side raised its voice to a new pitch in the demand for amnesty as the key to eventual resolution of the conflict. More leaders of opinion spoke out, and were joined by professional groups, traditional rulers, politicians, the clergy (including senior Christian clergy) the media and a very wide swathe of public opinion which saw the President’s position as “typical”. International opinion was also nudging the President to explore options to his current, singular strategy of using force against the insurgency.

By the time the Northern Elders Forum visited the President, it was obvious that his position with regards to the amnesty issue has no support in the northern part of the country. To sustain that position would have meant alienating just about every important source of influence in the region. Even the Christian community, despite the warnings of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) was joining the immunity bandwagon, after living under the horror and stress of being bombed and killed in a conflict that shows no signs of abeting.

The elders met a President already looking critically at the amnesty issue. He told them he had never ruled out amnesty, but had been consistent in demanding that amnesty is the product of dialogue involving people who can and are willing to articulate their grievances. To do this, they have to make themselves available for talks and negotiations. They have not done so, and he cannot grant amnesty to people he does not know. Those who speak for amnesty also appear to deny any knowledge of the insurgents, who live amongst them.

The Elders reportedly requested him to consider granting amnesty and then set up a framework which will give it substance and structure. They made the case that even the Niger Delta militants came out only after late President Yar’Adua had made strenuous efforts in pursuit of the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis which was part of his seven point agenda, and had to put in place an amnesty programme with a structure and credibility. They advised the President to set up an Amnesty Commission or another structure which should administer the amnesty provisions, including guaranteeing the safety and security of those who take up the offer, and facilitating dialogue and eventual resolution.

Since the visit of the Elders, developments suggest that President Jonathan is seriously considering the grant of amnesty under a formal structure and processes which should both tap into existing confidence that it can work, and also continue to protect the security and territorial integrity of the nation. It is safe to assume that President Jonathan is meeting stiff resistance from many quarters. First, the leadership of the security agencies will not simply roll over. They will insist that amnesty or dialogue is capitulation. They will tell the President that their men and women will be furious and disappointed after all the blood, limbs and lives lost in the conflict. They will insist that they can win this war, and are in fact, at the point of winning it. They will advise against listening to advise from people who are sponsors or godfathers of the insurgents; and they will warn that far from encouraging insurgents to defect and take up the amnesty offer, more people will be encouraged by the seeming weakness of the state, to take up the battle in new fronts. They will warn that amnesty to these insurgents will spawn more insurgencies. They tell him to sustain his current strategy.

Then he will have to contend with a powerful circle around him which will see amnesty and dialogue as a political setback. They will remind him that he has another political constituency which is adamant that amnesty is reward for the mass murder of their kith and kin and other Christians. They will point to the Niger Delta amnesty programme which is now rapidly coming unstuck, as evidence that amnesty does not work. They will warn him to beware of walking into the trap of northerners who lit the Boko Haram fire to burn up his administration, and who will use his amnesty programme to claim credit for putting out a fire that refused to consume him and his administration. They will advise him against appearing as weak, with 2015 round the corner, a north substantially in a rebellious mood, and a south-south and south-east unsure over whether he can be trusted with another term.

President Jonathan appears set to experiment with the amnesty option. If he does offer some semblance of concession as key to dialogue and resolution, much will still have to be done to make it work. First, the structural framework will have to be credible and run by people of transparent integrity, the type all sides to this conflict will be comfortable with. Second, all leaders who have made appeals for amnesty as the first step towards resolution must be actively involved in encouraging those under arms to also consider and avail themselves of the amnesty option. This is the time for those who believe amnesty can work to live up to their responsibilities as leaders: whether they know the insurgents or not, they must look for them, persuade them to lay down their arms, and dialogue. Third, the grant of amnesty must be part of a process, which must include a scaling down of the use of force, freeing detainees who have been in detention without trial, and the creation of safe and secure dialogue facilities. Four, the on-going attempt to politicize the amnesty issue with specific reference to 2015 should be stopped.

There are many questions legitimately being raised by Nigerians regarding amnesty and dialogue with JASLIWAJ and its sister, Ansaru. Will the insurgents take up the offer at all? Are we rewarding mass murder with freedom and possible financial benefits? Can the Nigerian state face two threats from the south-south and north which are unsuccessfully contained within rickety amnesty frameworks? Can amnesty for JASLIWAJ remove other threats from other interests who are aping its tactics but do not share its goals? Can those who make much money from the insurgency walk away from a lucrative venture without a fight? Can northern leaders and elders help make sure that amnesty leads to full resolution; or have they lost all power and influence?

There are many more questions and few answers, but the fear to try to find an alternative to the status quo that may work is the biggest threat we face. There is a faint light at the end of the tunnel the nation must walk towards, even though it has no idea how far it is. Whatever happens, we must not go back.