“Distrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful.” F. W. Nietzsche

 By agreeing to constitute a Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, President Jonathan would appear to have turned the tables on the people who had insisted that he had to explore options to his current strategy in dealing with the insurgency of the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lid Daawati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ) and its offshoots such as Ansaru. Specifically, he appears to have yielded to suggestions that engaging the insurgency in dialogue in both feasible and ultimately, more rewarding. That he did not name his Committee an Amnesty Committee is also significant. This again appears to be a concession to those who think the term amnesty is problematic as a concept and a negotiating instrument when applied to the peculiarities of this insurgency. Dialogue and reconciliation, on the other hand, suggest a wider and deeper form of engagement which may produce, among others, resolution of grievances, cessation of hostilities and non-attribution of criminality and full integration of the insurgents into society.

 In conceding to the clamour to explore dialogue, the President has improved his options in ending this war. First, he is not calling off the military option. He is putting out a carrot in addition to the stick, but has enlisted the proponents of the carrot approach to sell it to the insurgency. Second, he is ridding himself of accusations that his sole strategy of the use of force is fueling, rather than containing the problem. Those who have made the case that the JTF has caused more casualties than the insurgency will now expect the dialogue option to end its terror, or the twin terrors of the insurgency and the JTF. They will now have to join the search for peace through dialogue if they want an end to the activities of the JTF. Then again, he would have addressed the near total hostility of the mostly Muslim North over his approach to the insurgency, informed by the suspicion that he is reluctant or outrightly unwilling to resolve this damaging conflict for political reasons. If he counts his steps towards rebuilding bridges with this region, he may note that he has made some movement in that direction. Finally, it would appear that the Committee has representation from major sources of the pressures to explore the dialogue option. The President appears to have handed over the entire search for the insurgents, engaging them in dialogue, resolving their grievances and providing the credibility and respect which will hold it all together. This is a very heavy burden to place on any shoulder, but the President would say they asked for it.

 All these may suggest that the President has registered a masterstroke against the North, many other Nigerians and the international community. Nothing could be further from the truth. There will be many people who will see the Committee on Dialogue as capitulation by the President and this will ultimately force him to make further concessions. His hardliner constituency which see the insurgency as an armed political resistance against him, and security advisers who will see no end to the insurgency outside a fight-to-the finish approach, as well as senior Christian leaders who want to see punishment and restitution for Christian blood will be prominent in this category. Others will regret his decision on grounds that making concessions to armed uprisings and insurgencies merely pays off those currently under arms; and reminds others that the route to influence and wealth is shorter with arms. The Niger Delta deal, which is fast coming unstuck and threatening the post-2015 peace and survival of the nation will be used at every turn to lament the President’s decision.

 What the President may have gained in approval in setting up the Committee may have been lost by its constitution in other quarters. But this is not the end of his problems. The simultaneous deployment of carrot and stick have their own problems. Baga, Mayo Balwa and other areas are tragic reminders that even as he announces a Committee to dialogue with the insurgency, his military apparatus and the insurgency are at each others’ throats, with dire consequences for civilians in particular. Indeed, going by the seeming escalation of the conflict in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, you would think that the two sides are digging in for more bloody engagements. They both do not seem to have heard that President Jonathan has put out an olive branch.

 Left to them, the military and the insurgency will raise this conflict to new heights. The military will not scale down its operations or change tactics unless it is prevailed up by the strongest hands and will of their Commander-In-Chief. If President Jonathan wants to walk his talk, he needs to demonstrate a firmer grip on the troops which appear to operate with disturbing freedom in identifying the enemy, choosing tactics and strategies in dealing with it, and determining how it accounts for its actions. No one will send troops into hostile territories with their hands tied behind their backs. But then no one should give armed men free rein to operate in an environment where the friend is also the enemy either.

 Similarly, the insurgency should not get away with the impression that its grievances against the state, or the anger of the population against excesses of the JTF is sufficient ground to give it the license to do as it pleases. Those eminent people, many with unquestionable credentials who have urged government to explore dialogue as an option believe that the insurgency leaders can be reasoned with. If they have access to them, they are likely to remind them of the severe damage they have caused the Muslim Ummah, in addition to all other grievances against the Ummah which they claim to fight for. These leaders now need to move and help convince the insurgency leaders to speak with the Committee. Their integrity and standing are at stake. If they fail to make an impression on the insurgency after President Jonathan’s gesture, they will lose more than they bargained for. They will be exposed as lightweights in a region desperate for leaders. Elites from parts of the nation who think they stampeded the President into the dialogue option will accuse them of barking without a bite. The insurgency will break new grounds in terms of its alienation from all influences in a region where Muslims constitute 90% of the population. President Jonathan himself will say he gave the dialogue option a chance, and it failed. If he insists on reinforcing the military option, no one should blame him. The hard-pressed public which has borne the brunt of the activities of the insurgency and the JTF will either submit to more pressure, or rise up an defend itself against both.

 The only way to establish the genuineness and sincerity of President Jonathan’s gesture is to see how he plans to support it. This is where his Committee comes in. It must act as a vital bridge between many skeptical and hostile points. A skeptical public; a hostile insurgency, and a security force which thinks its lives are being compromised by politics. But the Committee itself needs to be assisted by all those who want to see and end to this conflict. If this initiative fails, it will not be the end of Jonathan Presidency. But it will leave no room for any other option than the continued destruction of lives, economy and society of northern Muslims. This may be a positive for some interests, but it cannot be in the interest of northern Muslims.