The negotiation option

There are two ways of meeting difficulties: you alter the difficulties or you alter yourself meeting them. Phillis Bottome.

The recent release of twenty one of well  over 200 hundred abducted Chibok school girls has dramatically brought home the value of negotiation as a strategic option in  for nations such as ours dealing with conflicts. Reports suggest that this release is product of painstaking and patient negotiations, a process which encountered numerous false starts, setbacks, and quite possibly toxic doses of hostility and subversion from interests which will not benefit from negotiated ends to this tragic saga involving the girls that have become the nation's daughters. If the momentum which resulted in the release of these girls can be sustained, and the confidence to engage and negotiate is preserved, there is good reason to expect that more or all the girls will be released soon. Given the stakes involved in freeing these girls and other civilians abducted by Boko Haram, there are few voices being raised against negotiating for their release. Perhaps it is the case that those who will kick against a negotiated release have no credible answer to the question of options, but the universal acclaim of the release indicate that the government was right to explore the negotiated option. Now the federal government has put itself at the heart of rising expectations that it will soon free more or all the girls and many more abducted citizens.

If this particular and productive attempt to engage with Boko Haram has been difficult, it will be because it has a background of many failed and subverted attempts, and very weak political will There was never even a near-consensus among Nigerians that negotiating with people who threw or detonated bombs and fired  bullets at men, women and children as a religious duty was a credible option. The lame effort by President Jonathan to initiate dialogue with the insurgency collapsed in the face of internal subversion, weak political will and lack of interest from an insurgency that appeared to be winning the war, and therefore lacked any incentive to negotiate. Then you had a strong military ranged against an insurgency riding high on morale and victories, while politicians and commanders milked their misery and weaknesses in billions of Naira. Those in the military who fought and lost colleagues, limbs and pride saw any talk of negotiation as capitulation. Those behind them who made billions from the war saw the option of dialogue and negotiation for an end to the insurgency as major setbacks in accumulation of personal fortunes.

Until, that is, the tide changed with a new political and military leadership which believed that one of the world's most tested military should not be running away from the insurgency. Massive territory and entire populations were freed from the insurgency, pinning it to enclaves. The snag was, it had a prized property of the Nigerian state, made even more valuable by a national and global indignation that a little less than 300 girls could not be retrieved from insurgents who were being routed by the day. The Chibok girls became the yardstick by which much of the world measured the success of the Nigerian state against Boko Haram. Now the government and the insurgency have cracked open a window of opportunity to explore options other than use of force alone. How wide and for how long it stays  will depend largely on the willingness of both parties to sustain trust, achieve the goals of the negotiation without the risk of giving too much advantage to the other side, and ultimately exploring  the achievement of higher goals.

 Many of man's conflicts have had to go the full distance, taking a lot more casualties in egos, lives and economies than they would if their endings were negotiated before a violent resolutions. Wars and strife and untold human suffering had  been pushed as options by egos and pride and the false, popular belief canvassed by leaders that fighting for total victory or comprehensive defeat is the solution to social conflict. Once violence takes center stage in resolving conflicts, mediating for peace becomes more and more difficult. This is the reason why prevention of conflicts from escalating to stages where force becomes the main mediator in relations is vital. The gaping hole at the heart of mankind that is Aleppo, Syria, speaks volumes of the failure of mediated ends to smaller conflicts, until they become large enough to swallow more and more of our humanity. It is not necessarily the case that mediation and negotiations result in peaceful resolutions of conflicts on a permanent basis, but for every Columbia whose citizens recently voted down many years of difficult negotiations to end a 40 year conflict, you have the Northern Ireland and  South African conflicts and many more scattered across the globe which were negotiated into enduring peace and development.

President Buhari has maintained his administration's willingness to negotiate with groups who claim that their grievances are responsible for their destructive assaults on the nation's oil and gas assets in the Niger Delta. Clearly, groups and mediators assigned by Buhari to engage these groups and bring them round to some sort of negotiation have failed to make a dent on the armed uprising against the economy, and possibly against the nation. It is also safe to assume that the president is under considerable pressure to release the military from its leash against violent  groups in  a terrain where fighting will register massive casualties, including the national economy. Ideally, the president will be well briefed and prepared to meet, as he plans to, with leaders of groups currently holding the economy by the jugular. He should learn a few lessons from President Obasanjo who thought taking personal charge of the negotiation will strengthen the clout and credibility of the federal government, only to find that most of the "leaders" of the militants had little respect for his office, Governors from the region, or a negotiation process which fails to give them most of what they wanted. There are times when it is useful for the leader to put himself forward, but on those occasions, it is usually the case that most contentious issues that will be referred to him for consideration or decision have been resolved. When militants fighting the state sit with presidents, they tend to behave as if they are at summits negotiating with equals, and any subsequent relations with subordinates becomes difficult or impossible.

Still, there is no single template to negotiate ends to  all conflicts. In this round of negotiations with Niger Delta  militants, President Buhari will be well advised to learn lessons from the process under late President 'Yar Adua, particularly how a resolution can avoid being rooted in the midst of a culture of corruption which severely corrupts institutions and policies, and strong men who put forward their interests in place of those of communities. Background briefings cannot avoid references to resistance to the fight against corruption, and the possibility that negotiations may involve some demands for concessions to powerful and entrenched interests in the region.

The willingness of the federal government to re-engage violence in the Delta around the  table should encourage the exploration of the efficacy of negotiation as an important tool in conflict resolution in other areas where national security is threatened. There are good reasons to advise that the leadership of the Shiite sect(s) in Nigeria should be engaged in discussions over the future of their leaders and the practice of their creed in the context of the laws of the land and national security. Nnamdi Kanu and his compartriots can be engaged in discussions in a context that suggests that some grievances can be raised and addressed in a nation bulging with grievances from all groups. States and communities and herders can be brought together to explore how a vital component of the national economy and the security and economy of communities can be protected. Small communities locked in unending conflicts with each other can be encouraged through credible mediation to isolate causes of friction and devise homegrown solutions they can police. The clamour to restructure the nation will benefit from autonomous initiatives by elites engaging each other. All these are possible, but the key to them is the demonstration that a negotiated release of the Chibok girls which shows some promise must be supported and sustained.