Conference
on the North and Strategies for sustainable Development Arewa House, Kaduna 6th
December, 2012
Security,
Politics and Economy of the North
Dr.
Hakeem Baba-Ahmed, OON
Introduction
This
paper will seek to explore the linkages between current security situation in
the North and Nigeria, the political context in which it can be understood, and
the economic implications of both. It does not claim expertise or spcialized
knowledge over the security situation beyond what is generally available as
information, conjectures, and analyses. It is also substantially predicated on
projections which are capable of being challenged by the highly dynamic nature
of developments in the northern political economy, and the tendency for
partisan and narrow interests to assert their own world view.
Background
Since 1999, the dominance of two parties
in the North, the ANPP and the PDP have deepened the traditionally plural
political environment in the North. Although the two parties defied strict
ethno-regional and historical boundaries of previous political tendencies, in
the north-east in particular, the competition between the ANPP and PDP had been
most intense, and had reinforced the historic faultlines around religious sects
and ethnic affiliation. The extensive reliance on cleric and traditional
authority, as well as support from young people armed and mobilized by both
parties made political competition in the region particularly volatile.
Opportunistic pandering to groups with
some influence in religious matters and the centrality of the issues around expanding
the scope for Sharia created a closer relationship between ANPP governments and
groups such as those led by Yusuf Muhammad. The weakening influence of
traditional structures and the Ulaama foreclosed an effective challenge to the
recourse to fringe groups by politicians, and the conduct of politics and the
desire for expansion by ambitious clerics began to merge. Violence became
central to the acquisition and retention of political power all over Nigeria,
and in many parts, such as the south-east, south-south and north-east, armed
(and mostly) young people were used extensively to fight the opposition, rig
elections and seek re-election.
The attempt to use the political process
to expand the scope of application of sharia in the north marked a new threshold
in muslim-state relations in the North. Very popular sentiments were tapped in
favour of a possible expansion of sharia. The failure to deliver on promises of
radical improvements in application of sharia, as well as the absence of
effective implementation mechanisms and poor political judgment of the
political terrain resulted in two monumental setbacks. One was the failure of
governors to implement what was promised. The other were the massive conflicts
involving muslims and non-muslims who felt threatened by the appearance of
Islamic-inspired governance. The outcome of these failures and crises were
twofold: sharia implementation remained essentially symbolic; and the relations
between christians and muslims were more damaged than they had ever been.
Pockets of frustrations survived the
failure to improve the manner muslims lived under Islamic law in Nigeria. In a
region which had a long history of turbulence around periodic efforts to expand
the scope of islam into public and private lives, it was logical that some of
these frustrations will acquire political outlets. In parts of Yobe and Borno
States, and in limited circles in Kano, and Kaduna and Sokoto, resentment at
the failure of the political process to engineer the expansion of Islamic laws
and processes in the north became intensified. Politicians who had cultivated intimate
relationships with groups seeking expansion of sharia, or improvements in the
quality of governance through observance of transparent justice, elimination of
impunity and curtailing moral and economic corruption became targets of
hostility of religious groups.
Growth of JASLIWAJ:
This was the context in which Yusuf
Muhammad’s group emerged. Its attempt to withdraw from the social environment which
it felt had repudiated it or had reneged on promises was curtailed by its
reliance on state resources to operate. Evidence that it was arming itself in
readiness for some form of conflict with state abound, but the decisive
confrontation between the group and the state, in which he lost his life was a
significant turning point. The conflict itself revealed a well-armed group willing
to defend itself against a state with little qualms over murdering citizens.
The deceptive respite which followed the murder
of Yusuf and other members of his groups, as well as many innocent citizens was
used by the group to re-invent itself and re-strategise. Tragically, it also
marked a major failure on the part of the Nigerian state to deploy intelligence
towards the rump of the group, its plans and strategies, and the social and
political roots of its growth and development. Even more tragic was the failure
to recognize that the period 2007 to 2009 was also a period of intense activity
in the Sahel and the Maghreb, as well as intensification of conflicts in the Horn
of Africa. A suitable terrain, surfeit of grievances and deluge of material
support and other opportunities for linkages may have encouraged the rebuilding
of Yusuf’s group into a more organized and better motivated outfit. An
obviously ill-prepared Nigerian state and a community which had borne the brunt
of the group was targeted by a disciplined, trained and highly motivated
insurgency, whose most potent weapon, the suicide bomber, raised the stakes in
a new conflict. Operating with the tactics, if not the sophistication of terror
groups which seek to achieve maximum impact by inducing fear among citizenry,
the Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ) embarked upon
spectacular campaigns against the Nigerian state, and a systematic campaign of intimidation
around the local population. Goals of the group appear to be to:
i)
Engage the
Nigerian state in violent conflicts with the goals of discrediting its capacity
and integrity;
ii)
Enhance its image
among Nigerian muslims as defenders and protectors of their rights and dignity;
iii)
Engage in violent
acts against non-muslims with the objective of reducing their numbers in
“muslim” areas through relocation; and triggering conflicts between muslims and
non-muslims which will further polarize the two in spatial and political terms;
iv)
The creation of
substantial influence over a physical part of the Nigerian state in which
Islamic laws and practices govern private and public lives of the people.
Feeding off a state which had basically reacted to the
strategies and tactics of the insurgency, the JASLIWAJ had suffered major
setbacks and recorded spectacular successes. Primarily, it has succeeded in
pinning down the bulk of the security assets and infrastructure of the Nigerian
state, and has attracted and retained attention and visibility, two key
objectives of terror. It has also suffered stresses and fragmentation
associated with groups that are involved in prolonged conflicts in which
success or failure ultimately depend largely on community support. Its losses
in leadership, manpower and expertise and morale had been substantially made up
by intensification of measures of control over areas where it had strategic
advantages, and tactics which sustain its visibility. The Nigerian state has
made credible incursions into its rank and file, accumulating valuable
intelligence which however does not appear to have been productively utilized.
There
is enough evidence to suggest that the original JASLIWAJ has spawned one or two
groups which appear to function with total or substantial autonomy. Its loose
structure and decentralized command and control has functioned to give its
operations flexibility and reach; but it has also suffered massive infiltration
of people with varying levels of commitment to its goals. The spread of the
technology and know-how for making I.E.Ds, as well as availability of funds to
acquire small arms and capacities to acquire local intelligence and utilize the
cover of the community have all contributed in creating the image of a movement
with many variants capable of sustaining its hostility against the state for a
long time to come.
The Nigerian State
Although there is no direct evidence that
the state itself is involved in activities which ape or further the goals of
the JASLIWAJ, there is strong and widespread suspicion that interests with the
capabilities of the JASLIWAJ and with goals which include prolonging the
conflict and weakening the social structures of particularly northern
communities are also active in this conflict. There is also quite credible
suspicion that fringe elements of the JASLIWAJ have become entirely independent
of its leadership, and are fighting both the Nigerian state and other clusters
of the insurgency. The localization of the routine conflicts in and around towns
and cities in Yobe and Borno suggests that the presence of the Joint Task Force
is both impacting on the operations of the group, as well as intensifying the strategic
imperative of retaining control and influence in the communities by the group.
The Nigerian state has been consistent in
its pursuit of a singular strategy of fighting the insurgency by the deployment
of force and leaning hard on the community to flush it out. Against a foe which
has a variety of tactics and targets, this strategy of the state has been
basically a failure. Attempts to engage the insurgency in dialogue and
negotiations failed because of insufficient political will behind them, and the
powerful influence of security interests in determining state responses. A
political environment which has primarily defined the insurgency as a
resistance against the Jonathan administration has also been a strong
disincentive in terms of engaging politicians in discussing options and
strategies.
A significant factor in this conflict is
the appearance of the absence of a sophisticated political level within the
insurgency. It appears to have no exit strategy, and no credible and sustained
attempts to engage in discussing options and capitalizing on successes. The
group(s) waging a war against the Nigerian state appear to believe that they
can win this war in the long run, or at least avoid defeat and total collapse.
The state, on the other hand, has also been poorly served by its elaborate
institutions and capacities which could have been mobilized to bring this
conflict to an end, or limit its damage. Massive financial resources deployed
towards the threat make its sustainance beneficial in those circles which
benefit from spending funds around purchase of equipment, training and payments
for operational expenses. Reluctance or resistance of key global players like
the US and EU to get more actively involved has provided sources of frustration
for the governments, and created a static mindset in the search for options to
the exclusive use of the military. Intense inter-service rivalries and weak
coordination of security assets have hampered the effectiveness of the states’
responses. Weak political muscle from the northern communities and political
leaders have resulted in ineffective lobby of the administration to examine
options to its current strategies. Opportunistic, damaging assaults by criminal
groups all over the nation have made massive inroads into subverting basic law
and order issues, placing citizens under extensive threats. The Nigeria police
appears to have collapsed in the face of the multiple threats to law, order and
security.
Where are we?
The cumulative consequences of the threats
of the JASLIWAJ insurgency can be summarized in the following:
i)
We have a
weakening Nigerian state with its military showing all the signs of stress and
prolonged exposure; and police and intelligence services dangerously
marginalized and becoming increasingly irrelevant in terms of providing
security to lives and property;
ii)
We have an
insurgency which is unable to extend its scope of influence beyond its current
campaign but which is going to be difficult to defeat. Its capacity to arm
itself and recruit young people; its capacity to dig deep within local
communities and draw inspiration and resources from neighbouring groups and
developments in the Sahel all seem to suggest that defeating this insurgency will
take quite a while. There is also the complicating issue of the possibility
that the JASLIWAJ has broken into groups which are fairly autonomous, and even
a political settlement with one or two groups does not guarantee that the
entire conflict comes to an end;
iii)
There is growing
evidence that events in Mali and other parts of the Sahel will increasingly
influence developments in the manner the JASLIWAJ insurgency operates.
Certainly, the level of sophistication of training and weaponry, improved
funding, the improvements in liason between groups involved in uprisings in
West African will impact in the manner the insurgency relates with the Nigerian
state;
iv)
Substantial parts
of the economy and social life in the North East and many other parts of the
North have been deeply influenced by this conflict. The impotence of Northern
political leadership has been demonstrated on many occasions. The failure of 15
PDP northern governors to influence the Presidency over strategies on dealing
with the insurgency, JTF activities or the protection of basic human rights of
citizens is already evident. The failure of successive efforts by Elders from
Borno and Yobe States, as well as the ACF, Northern Elders Forum and sundry
groups to influence thinking and strategy of the administration or to curtail
or eliminate the threat of the insurgency is also evidence of that impotence.
The distance created between muslims and christians in the north as a result of
church bombings and other activities which target christians has created
massive gaps in northern cohesion and the search for northern consensus around
the insurgency.
v)
The devastation of
the northern economy is unprecedented. Massive investment and capital flight
has taken place in the last two years all over the north; and it is doubtful if
any new investment will be made in any part of the northern economy in the near
future. Most states governments in the north claim to be expending huge amounts
in security, and with little left after massive state expenditure on salaries,
overheads and paying off political cronies, there is hardly any state in the
north which invests real money in infrastructure or human capital.
vi)
At the rate at
which this conflict is developing, it will take the north the next ten years to
recover and enjoy the type of stability and climate which should attract
investment, even if the conflict is to end within the next one year.
Established and crucial local investors, mostly distributors of finished goods
and buyers of agricultural produce may relocate to the north from where they
have substantially moved away in the next one or two years; but large numbers
of distributors, shopkeepers, and artisans from the south may take longer to
relocate back to the north.
vii)
With little or no
investment by states and local governments in human capital development and
infrastructure, the northern economy would be regressing dangerously. Even
without the threat of the insurgency, some research has shown that less than
10% of the monthly allocation of all northern states is spent on new
infrastructure, or improving the quality of human capital. Limitations imposed
on the economy by curfews, banning motorcycle riders, closed markets and attacks
on businesses have also severely damaged the economy further.
viii)
The demographic
revolution in the north is yet to be fully comprehended. Sixty-two percent (62%)
of the north’s population of roughly 86m is under 18. In ten years’ time, the
north will have a population of 100m, with 70% under the age of 18. This
population will encounter even more limited opportunities; weaker economies and
fragmenting social values and structures, unless a radical improvement is made
in investment in the real economy and in education and skills acquisition.
The Role of Politics
The North’s preparations towards the 2011
election and its reaction to their outcome were disastrous. The dominance of
the PDP in the region and the involvement and the hype given to attempts to
procure a northern candidate for its succeeded in creating the impression that
there was widespread and popular consensus behind the northern PDP candidature
in the North. The elites’ decision not to support Buhari even after the PDP had
nominated Jonathan left the North dangerously exposed. Jonathan relied on the
clout of northern governors to secure a term against hostility by a large
section of the northern political establishment mostly in the PDP and a
grassroot clamour for a Buhari presidency. A spontaneous reaction to the
perception that the presidential elections were massively rigged reinforced the
image of a muslim north which harbours bitter hostility towards a Jonathan
presidency.
The Jonathan presidency sees the north as
essentially hostile, and the JASLIWAJ insurgency is linked to this hostitlity,
at least in the assumption that northern leaders are not doing enough to bring
it to an end. The concentration of the damage which the insurgency causes to
the economy and society to the north tends to limit the impulses to find
solutions to it. With every effort made to alert the presidency over the manner
the state is engaging the insurgency, the North’s political capital dwindles.
The administration is isolated from strong northern pressure, and its political
assets in governors and people close to the president feel that they are being
unfairly victimized for holding the offices they hold.
2015
The possibilities that President Jonathan
will run again in 2015 are real. Indeed, it is safer to assume that he will run
than its opposite, if the traditional Nigerian arguments for additional terms
as consolidation periods will be advanced. The North will again be in the thick
of the manouvres. Northern governors, some of whom are nursing presidential
ambitions will be torn between supporting his candidature or going against him.
If PDP northern governors can break free and support one of them against him,
they could influence substantial northern sentiment against another term for
Jonathan. He on the other had will mobilize the south-south and south-east, and
parts of the non-Muslim north. The build-up to 2015 in likely to be very
turbulent; and the possibility of a merger between ANPP, CPC and ANC will
stretch the cohesion of the Northern political framework to breaking points.
Scenarios
Of the many scenarious that can be built,
the most practical is one which forsees another Jonathan candidature towards
2015 amidst a raging war against variants of an insurgency and a substantially
weakened Nigerian state. This will be made even worse if efforts are made to
rig the 2015 elections after dangerous sentiments around faith and region would
have been tapped into.
In my view, the time to head off this
frightening scenario is now. Even with the best of intentions and with
concerted efforts to bring the insurgency to an end by one means or another and
rebuild the law and order and security infrastructure of the Nigerian state, it
will take the best part of two years to achieve the levels of peace and
security which should provide a basis for conducting free and fair elections.
There is no evidence of these best intentions, and the north will be the worse
off if it loses even more power and relevance in another Jonathan presidency
from 2015. So what should be done?
i.
The most important
task for the north at this stage is to put out the fire started by JASLIWAJ,
which is now destroying it economically and politically. A politically weak and
divided north is an advantage to Jonathan’s ambitions, and while he may be
obliged as president to tackle this threat, his record so far and the nature of
the conflict suggests he wont change his tactics and strategies. So a forum of
this nature should resolve to set up a team of credible Ulaama, politicians and
elders and seek to engage the insurgency towards resolving its issues with the
Nigerian state. The forum should also exercise sufficient influence and
leverage on northern governors and President Jonathan to move beyond their
current positions and explore fresh initiatives and options;
ii.
A platform should
be created which will allow northern muslims and christians to discuss the
threats they all face from the insurgency and other criminal activities. It is
vital that this platform operates with sufficient anotonomy from existing
organizations or structures which claim to represent broad interests of muslims
and christians. It should target the reduction of the damaging distance which
is being exploited by the insurgency and others between Muslims and christians.
Its goal should be to engineer effective bridges across muslim and christian
communities in the north, and improve northern unity;
iii. The quality of people who should seek for elective
offices in the north should be radically improved. The existing power
structures should be completely overhauled, and governors in particular who
will emerge in 2015 should be God-fearing, honest and visionary. It will
require dedicated and knowledgeable Muslim politicians to engage the JASLIWAJ
insurgency, and take those steps with them or against them which are necessary,
and cannot be faulted as representing an illegal or corrupt Nigerian state. Faith
and piety of politicians, whether Muslim or christian should be a key element
in terms of the criteria for selecting them as candidates, or voting them into
office. People who fear God will not fear their own people, will not deceive
citizens to win and retain offices, and they are less likely to subvert the
rule of law. This forum should commence the search for this type of platform.
iv. There is a need for some strategic rethinking in the
manner the North engages the rest of Nigeria. At this stage, the most important
requirements for the north is a committed and honest leadership and a state
with enough resources to address at least the basic needs of citizens. The
North should be open-minded about current efforts to re-assess the nature,
structure and operations of the Nigerian state. It should demand, not beg for
what belongs to it as of right from resources located far from it, but it
should also be more aggressive in tapping into what God gave it. The North
should support a thorough re-appraisal of the nature of our federal system, but
not in the current context which seeks merely to create a state or two in the
south-east, and give states more money than they receive. A forum like this
should initiate linkages with other groups from other parts of the nation interested
in a genuine search for a Nigerian state which meets the needs of Nigerian
citizens better. The weakness of the North, with 19 largely ineffective states governors
as leaders and pluralism it is not managing well will be a liability for it,
and an even bigger liability for Nigeria.
v.
The North needs to
be placed on alert over the possibility that it will provide the battlefront
and the casualties in the build-up to the 2015 elections and its aftermath.
Already, the manouvres within the PDP indicate that the North will be pitched
against President Jonathan. The opposition will also mobilize the North against
the PDP. Politicians and political groups need to work hard and close ranks,
not on the eve of elections, but long before then.
The next two years will test the resilience of the
Nigerian state, and the capacity of northerners to bounce back. Right now, the
JASLIWAJ insurgency is eating it up like a cancer, and it will require bold
initiatives by northerners to find a solution, by influencing both the
insurgency and the government. Not all Nigerians are comfortable with a united
and strong North. Its current position therefore is welcome to its detractors
and rivals. They will not lift a finger to heal its wounds. This will have to
be done by people in this hall who feel the pain most.
Thank you.
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